Editing Sabra and Shatila massacre (section)

== Attack ==
=== Lead-up events ===
On the night of 14/15 September 1982 the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]] chief of staff [[Raphael Eitan]] flew to [[Beirut]] where he went straight to the Phalangists' headquarters and instructed their leadership to order a general mobilisation of their forces and prepare to take part in the forthcoming Israeli attack on West Beirut. He also ordered them to impose a general curfew on all areas under their control and appoint a liaison officer to be stationed at the IDF forward command post. He told them that the IDF would not enter the refugee camps but that this would be done by the Phalangist forces. The militia leaders responded that the mobilisation would take them 24 hours to organise.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=9}}

On morning of Wednesday 15 September Israeli Defence Minister, Sharon, who had also travelled to Beirut, held a meeting with Eitan at the IDF's forward command post, on the roof of a five-storey building 200 metres southwest of Shatila camp. Also in attendance were Sharon's aide [[Avi Duda'i]], the Director of [[Military Intelligence Directorate (Israel)|Military Intelligence]] -[[Yehoshua Saguy]], a senior [[Mossad]] officer, General [[Amir Drori]], General [[Amos Yaron]], an Intelligence officer, the Head of [[Shin Bet|GSS]]—[[Avraham Shalom]], the Deputy Chief of Staff—General [[Moshe Levi]] and other senior officers. It was agreed that the Phalange should go into the camps.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=9}} According to the Kahan Commission report throughout Wednesday, R.P.G. and light-weapons fire from the Sabra and Shatila camps was directed at this forward command post, and continued to a lesser degree on Thursday and Friday (16–17 September). It also added that by Thursday morning, the fighting had ended and all was 'calm and quiet'.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=11}}

Following the assassination of Lebanese Christian President [[Bachir Gemayel]], the Phalangists sought revenge. <!--(commented out paragraph - does not belong in this section): The massacre is regarded as a reprisal for the [[Damour massacre]] by [[Palestinians]] a few years earlier,<ref name="ict">{{cite web |date=5 July 2008 |url=https://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/291/currentpage/1/Default.aspx |title=PLO Policy towards the Christian Community during the Civil War in Lebanon |publisher=ict.org.il |access-date=16 August 2015 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130731131638/https://ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/291/currentpage/1/Default.aspx |archive-date=31 July 2013}}</ref> which personally impacted [[Elie Hobeika]].<ref name="au">{{cite web |url=http://www.moreorless.au.com/killers/hobeika.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20041215213908/http://www.moreorless.au.com:80/killers/hobeika.html |archive-date=15 December 2004 |url-status=dead |title=Elie Hobeika killer file |publisher=web.archive.org |access-date=16 August 2015}}</ref> The view of the Sabra and Shatila killing as a revenge for the [[Damour massacre]] was asserted by the prominent writer Samir Khalaf,<ref>{{cite book |last=Samir |first=Khalaf |title=Civil and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon |location=New York |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |date=2002 |page=45}}</ref> by ''[[The New York Times]]'' writer [[Thomas Friedman]],<ref>{{cite book |last=Friedman |first=Thomas L. |author-link=Thomas Friedman |title=From Beirut to Jerusalem |location=Glasgow |publisher=Fontana-Collins |date=1990 |page=161}}</ref><ref name="google">{{cite book |title=Massacring: Webster's Quotations, Facts and Phrases |author=Icon Group International, Inc. Staff |date=2008 |publisher=Icon Group International, Incorporated |isbn=9780546713459 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=98N2un6iXUkC&pg=PA72 |page=72 |access-date=16 August 2015}}</ref> and by author B. Gabriel who wrote that "Palestinian militiamen started the killings in 1976, long before the 1982 Sabra and Shatila massacres. Beit Mellat, Deir Achache, Damour."<ref name="google2">{{cite book |title=Because They Hate: A Survivor of Islamic Terror Warns America |last=Gabriel |first=B. |date=2006 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |isbn=9780312358372 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f8PzwOjR7Z4C&pg=PA92 |page=92 |access-date=16 August 2015}}</ref> In the Damour massacre, Yasser Arafat's [[PLO]] killed nearly 600 Christians.<ref>{{cite book |last=Nisan |first=Mordechai |date=2003 |title=The Conscience of Lebanon: A Political Biography of Etienne Sakr (Abu-Arz) |location=London |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=0-7146-5392-6}}</ref>{{pn|date=January 2025}} The Damour massacre, however, had been a response to the [[Karantina massacre]], which had taken place earlier in 1976. In the Karantina massacre, Phalangists killed an estimated 1500 Muslims.<ref>Harris (p. 162) notes "the massacre of 1,500 Palestinians, Shi'is, and others in Karantina and Maslakh, and the revenge killings of hundreds of Christians in [[Damour massacre|Damour]]"</ref> --->By noon on 15 September, Sabra and Shatila had been surrounded by the [[Israel Defense Forces|IDF]], which set up checkpoints at the exits and entrances, and used several multi-story buildings as observation posts. Amongst them was the seven-story Kuwaiti embassy which, according to ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine, had "an unobstructed and panoramic view" of Sabra and Shatila. Hours later, IDF tanks began shelling Sabra and Shatila.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|p=57}}

The following morning, 16 September, the sixth IDF order relating to the attack on West Beirut was issued. It specified: "The refugee camps are not to be entered. Searching and mopping up the camps will be done by the Phalangists/Lebanese Army".{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|pp=8–9}}

According to Linda Malone of the [[Jerusalem Fund]], Ariel Sharon and Chief of Staff [[Rafael Eitan]]<ref>{{cite web |first=Linda |last=Malone |url=http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/informationbrief.php?ID=40 |title=Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, A War Criminal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060714051037/http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/images/informationbrief.php?ID=40 |archive-date=14 July 2006 |series=Information Brief |number=78 |date=14 June 2001 |website=[[The Jerusalem Fund]] / The [[Palestine Center]] |access-date=24 February 2006}}</ref> met with Phalangist militia units and invited them to enter Sabra and Shatila, claiming that the PLO was responsible for Gemayel's assassination.<ref>{{cite book |first=Robert |last=Fisk |author-link=Robert Fisk |title=The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East |date=13 February 2007 |pages=484, 488–489 |publisher=[[National Geographic Books]] |isbn=978-1-4000-7517-1}}</ref> The meeting concluded at 15:00 on 16 September.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|p=38}}

Shatila had previously been one of the PLO's three main training camps for foreign fighters and the main training camp for European fighters.{{sfn|Becker|1984|pp=239, 356–357}} The Israelis maintained that 2,000 to 3,000 terrorists remained in the camps, but were unwilling to risk the lives of more of their soldiers after the Lebanese army repeatedly refused to "clear them out."{{sfn|Becker|1984|p=264}} No evidence was offered for this claim. There were only a small number of forces sent into the camps and they suffered minimal casualties.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|p=39}} Two Phalangists were wounded, one in the leg and another in the hand.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=13}} Investigations after the massacre found few weapons in the camps.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|p=39}}<ref name="Byman2011">{{cite book |first=Daniel |last=Byman |title=A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism |url=https://archive.org/details/highpricetriumph0000byma|url-access=registration |date=2011 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]], US |isbn=978-0-19-983045-9 |page=[https://archive.org/details/highpricetriumph0000byma/page/68 68]}}</ref> Thomas Friedman, who entered the camps on Saturday, mostly found groups of young men with their hands and feet bound, who had been then lined up and machine-gunned down gang-land style, not typical he thought of the kind of deaths the reported 2,000 terrorists in the camp would have put up with.<ref>{{cite book |last=Friedman |first=Thomas L. |author-link=Thomas Friedman |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=877DR3un9rIC&pg=PT110 |title=From Beirut to Jerusalem |publisher=Macmillan |date=2010 |page=109 |isbn=978-0-374-70699-9 |access-date=22 February 2020 |archive-date=8 October 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20241008001758/https://books.google.com/books?id=877DR3un9rIC&pg=PT110#v=onepage&q&f=false |url-status=live}}</ref>

=== Massacre ===
An hour later, 1,500 militiamen assembled at Beirut International Airport, then occupied by Israel. Under the command of [[Elie Hobeika]], they began moving towards the area in IDF-supplied [[jeeps]], some bearing weapons provided by Israel,<ref>{{cite news |last1=Friedman |first1=Thomas L. |author1-link=Thomas Friedman |title=The Beirut Massacre: The Four Days |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/26/world/the-beirut-massacre-the-four-days.html |newspaper=[[The New York Times]] |access-date=21 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101015175317/http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/26/world/the-beirut-massacre-the-four-days.html?pagewanted=all |archive-date=15 October 2010 |date=26 September 1982 |url-status=unfit}}</ref> following Israeli guidance on how to enter it. The forces were mostly Phalangist, though there were some men from [[Saad Haddad]]'s "Free Lebanon forces".{{sfn|Shahid|2002|pp=39–40}} According to [[Ariel Sharon]] and Elie Hobeika's bodyguard, the Phalangists were given "harsh and clear" warnings about harming civilians.<ref name="Accused" /><ref name="online">{{cite book |first=Robert Maroun |last=Hatem |title=From Israel to Damascus |chapter=7: The Massacres at Sabra and Shatilla |chapter-url=http://www.free-lebanon.com/News/Documents_of_Note/DOC_chap8/doc_chap8.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040512001055/http://www.free-lebanon.com/News/Documents_of_Note/DOC_chap8/doc_chap8.html |archive-date=12 May 2004 |access-date=24 February 2006}}</ref> However, it was by then known that the Phalangists presented a special security risk for Palestinians. It was published in the edition of 1 September of ''Bamahane'', the IDF newspaper, that a Phalangist told an Israeli official: "[T]he question we are putting to ourselves is—how to begin, by raping or killing?"{{sfn|Hirst|2010|p=156}} A US envoy to the Middle East expressed horror after being told of Sharon's plans to send the Phalangists inside the camps, and Israeli officials themselves acknowledged the situation could trigger "relentless slaughter".<ref name="Anziska" />

The first unit of 150 [[Phalangists]] entered Sabra and Shatila at sunset on Thursday, 16 September. They entered the homes of the camp residents and began shooting and raping them, often taking groups outside and lining them up for execution.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|p=40|ps=: "The first unit of 150 militiamen [...] entered the camp at sunset on Thursday, 16 September, armed with knives and hatchets in addition to firearms. The killing began almost immediately, with groups of militiamen entering homes and slitting throats, axing, shooting, and raping, often taking groups outside and lining them up for execution. There was virtually no resistance, only a very few camp residents having managed to keep a personal weapon for self-protection: throughout the forty hours of killing, there was only a handful of Phalangist casualties. As of nightfall, both Thursday and Friday, Israel began firing illuminating flares over the camps long into the night; according to a Dutch nurse, the camp was as bright as "a sports stadium lit up for a football game"."}} During the night, the Israeli forces fired illuminating flares over the area. According to a Dutch nurse, the camp was as bright as "a sports stadium during a football game".<ref>''The New York Times'', 26 September 1982. in Claremont Research p. 76</ref>{{full citation needed|date=January 2025}}

At 19:30, the Israeli Cabinet convened and was informed that the Phalangist commanders had been informed that their men must participate in the operation and fight, and enter the extremity of Sabra, while the IDF would guarantee the success of their operation though not participate in it. The Phalangists were to go in there "with their own methods". After Gemayel's assassination there were two possibilities, either the Phalange would collapse or they would undertake revenge, having killed Druze for that reason earlier that day. With regard to this second possibility, it was noted, 'it will be an eruption the likes of which has never been seen; I can already see in their eyes what they are waiting for.' 'Revenge' was what Bachir Gemayel's brother had called for at the funeral earlier. [[David Levy (Israeli politician)|Levy]] commented: 'the Phalangists are already entering a certain neighborhood—and I know what the meaning of revenge is for them, what kind of slaughter. Then no one will believe we went in to create order there, and we will bear the blame. Therefore, I think that we are liable here to get into a situation in which we will be blamed, and our explanations will not stand up ..."{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=14}} The press release that followed reads:

<blockquote>In the wake of the assassination of the President-elect Bashir Jemayel, the I.D.F. has seized positions in West Beirut in order to forestall the danger of violence, bloodshed and chaos, as some 2,000 terrorists, equipped with modern and heavy weapons, have remained in Beirut, in flagrant violation of the evacuation agreement.</blockquote>

An Israeli intelligence officer present in the forward post, wishing to obtain information about the Phalangists' activities, ordered two distinct actions to find out what was happening. The first failed to turn up anything. The second resulted in a report at 20:00 from the roof, stated that the Phalangists' liaison officer had heard from an operative inside the camp that he held 45 people and asked what he should do with him. The liaison officer told him to more or less "Do the will of God." The Intelligence Officer received this report at approximately 20:00 from the person on the roof who heard the conversation. He did not pass on the report.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=12}}

At roughly the same time or a little earlier at 19:00, Lieutenant Elul testified that he had overheard a radio conversation between one of the militia men in the camp and his commander Hobeika in which the former asking what he was to do with 50 women and children who had been taken prisoner. Hobeika's reply was: "This is the last time you're going to ask me a question like that; you know exactly what to do." Other Phalangists on the roof started laughing. Amongst the Israelis there was Brigadier General [[Amos Yaron|Yaron]], Divisional Commander, who asked Lieutenant Elul, his Chef de Bureau, what the laughter was about; Elul translated what Hobeika had said. Yaron then had a five-minute conversation, in English, with Hobeika. What was said is unknown.<ref name="Accused" />{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=12}}

The Kahan Commission determined that the evidence pointed to 'two different and separate reports', noting that Yaron maintained that he thought they referred to the same incident, and that it concerned 45 "dead terrorists". At the same time, 20:00, a third report came in from liaison officer G. of the Phalangists who in the presence of numerous Israeli officers, including general Yaron, in the dining room, stated that within 2 hours the Phalangists had killed 300 people, including civilians. He returned sometime later and changed the number from 300 to 120.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=13}}

At 20:40, General Yaron held a briefing, and after it the Divisional Intelligence Officer stated that it appeared no terrorists were in the Shatila camp, and that the Phalangists were in two minds as to what to do with the women, children and old people they had massed together, either to lead them somewhere else or that they were told, as the liaison officer was overheard saying, to 'do what your heart tells you, because everything comes from God.' Yaron interrupted the officer and said he'd checked and that 'they have no problems at all,' and that with regard to the people, 'It will not, will not harm them.' Yaron later testified he had been sceptical of the reports and had in any case told the Phalangists not to harm civilians.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=23}} At 21:00 Maj. Amos Gilad predicted during a discussion at Northern Command that, rather than a cleansing of terrorists, what would take place was a massacre, informing higher commanders that already between 120 and 300 had already been killed by that time.<ref>{{cite news |last=Morris |first=Benny |author-link=Benny Morris |url=https://www.haaretz.com/life/books/.premium-the-idf-papers-that-show-what-sharon-hid-in-the-lebanon-war-1.5867371 |title=The Israeli Army Papers That Show What Ariel Sharon Hid From the Cabinet in the First Lebanon War |work=[[Haaretz]] |date=2 March 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231202014010/https://www.haaretz.com/life/books/2018-03-02/ty-article/.premium/the-idf-papers-that-show-what-sharon-hid-in-the-lebanon-war/0000017f-f65b-ddde-abff-fe7ff37e0000 |archive-date=2 December 2023}}</ref>

At 23:00 the same evening, a report was sent to the IDF headquarters in East Beirut, reporting the killings of 300 people, including civilians. The report was forwarded to headquarters in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, and to the office of the Bureau Chief of the director of Military Intelligence, Lt. Col. Hevroni, at 05:30 the following day where it was seen by more than 20 senior Israeli officers. It was then forwarded to his home by 06:15.{{sfn|Shahid|2002|pp=40–41}}{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=16}} That same morning an IDF historian copied down a note, which later disappeared, which he had found in the Northern Command situation room in Aley.

<blockquote>During the night the Phalangists entered the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps. Even though it was agreed that they would not harm civilians, they 'butchered.' They did not operate in orderly fashion but dispersed. They had casualties, including two killed. They will organize to operate in a more orderly manner—we will see to it that they are moved into the area."{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=15}}</blockquote>

Early on that morning, between 08:00 and 09:00, several IDF soldiers stationed nearby noted killings were being conducted against the camp refugees. A deputy tank commander some {{convert|200|yd|m|order=flip}} away, Lieutenant Grabowski, saw two Phalangists beating two young men, who were then taken back into the camp, after which shots rang out, and the soldiers left. Sometime later, he saw the Phalangists had killed a group of five women and children. When he expressed a desire to make report, the tank crew said they had already heard a communication informing the battalion commander that civilians had been killed, and that the latter had replied, "We know, it's not to our liking, and don't interfere."{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=17}}

At around 08:00, military correspondent [[Ze'ev Schiff]] received a tip-off a source in the General Staff in Tel Aviv that there had been a slaughter in the camps. Checking round for some hours, he got no confirmation other than that there "there's something." At 11:00 he met with [[Mordechai Tzipori]], Minister of Communications and conveyed his information. Unable to reach Military Intelligence by phone, he got in touch with [[Yitzhak Shamir]] at 11:19 asking him to check reports of a Phalangist slaughter in the camps.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=}}{{page needed|date=September 2022}} Shamir testified that from his recollection the main thing Tzipori had told him of was that 3/4 IDF soldiers killed, no mention of a massacre or slaughter, as opposed to a "rampage" had been made. He made no check because his impression was that the point of the information was to keep him updated on IDF losses.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|pp=16–17}} At a meeting with American diplomats at 12:30 Shamir made no mention of what Tzipori told him, saying he expected that he would hear from [[Ariel Sharon]], the Military Intelligence chief and the American Morris Draper about the situation in West Beirut,{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=17}} At that noontime meeting Sharon insisted that "terrorists" needed "mopping up."<ref name="Anziska" /> Americans pressed for the intervention of the Lebanese National Army, and for an IDF withdrawal immediately. Sharon replied:

<blockquote>I just don't understand, what are you looking for? Do you want the terrorists to stay? Are you afraid that somebody will think that you were in collusion with us? Deny it. We denied it,<ref name="Anziska" /></blockquote>

adding that nothing would happen except perhaps for a few more terrorists being killed, which would be a benefit to all. Shamir and Sharon finally agreed to a gradual withdrawal, at the end of Rosh Hashana, two days later. Draper then warned them:

<blockquote>Sure, the I.D.F. is going to stay in West Beirut and they will let the Lebanese go and kill the Palestinians in the camps.<ref name="Anziska" /></blockquote>

Sharon replied:

<blockquote>So, we'll kill them. They will not be left there. You are not going to save them. You are not going to save these groups of the international terrorism.. . If you don't want the Lebanese to kill them, we will kill them.<ref name="Anziska" /></blockquote>

In the afternoon, before 16:00, Lieutenant Grabowski had one of his men ask a Phalangist why they were killing civilians, and was told that pregnant women will give birth to children who will grow up to be terrorists.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=17}}

At Beirut airport at 16:00 journalist [[Ron Ben-Yishai]] heard from several Israeli officers that they had heard that killings had taken place in the camps. At 11:30 he telephoned Ariel Sharon to report on the rumours, and was told by Sharon that he had already heard of the stories from the Chief of Staff.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=}}{{page needed|date=September 2022}}
At 16:00 in a meeting with the Phalangist staff, with Mossad present, the Israeli Chief of Staff said he had a "positive impression" of their behavior in the field and from what the Phalangists reported, and asked them to continue 'mopping up the empty camps' until 5&nbsp;am, whereupon they must desist due to American pressure. According to the Kahan Commission investigation, neither side explicitly mentioned to each other reports or rumours about the way civilians were being treated in the camp.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=}}{{page needed|date=September 2022}} Between 18:00 and 20:00, Israeli Foreign Ministry personnel in Beirut and in Israel began receiving various reports from U.S. representatives that the Phalangists had been observed in the camps and that their presence was likely to cause problems. On returning to Israel, the Chief of Staff spoke to Ariel Sharon between 20:00 and 21:00, and according to Sharon, informed him that the "Lebanese had gone too far", and that "the Christians had harmed the civilian population more than was expected." This, he testified, was the first he had ever heard of Phalangist irregularities in the camps.{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=19}} The Chief of Staff denied they had discussed any killings "beyond what had been expected".{{sfn|Kahan|Barak|Efrat|1983|p=19}}

Later in the afternoon, a meeting was held between the Israeli Chief of Staff and the Phalangist staff.

On the morning of Friday, 17 September, the Israeli Army surrounding Sabra and Shatila ordered the Phalange to halt their operation, concerned about reports of a massacre.<ref name="Accused" />