Editing Republic of Guinea Armed Forces (section)

===The 1980s and Conté===
[[Image:FLINTLOCK 20 (50110944261).jpg|thumb|Guinean Special Forces soldiers conduct weapons range training for both close quarters rifle and sniper skills during Flintlock 20]]
On 3 April 1984, following Touré's death, [[Lansana Conté]], assistant chief of staff of the army, led a [[1984 Guinean coup d'état|coup d'état]] which toppled the interim head of state. A [[military junta]], the [[Military Committee of National Restoration|CMRN]], was installed, which started to feud within itself, and quickly, as had occurred under the Touré regime, the paramount national security concern became the preservation of the president's power.<ref>Boubacar N'Diaye, 'Guinea', in Alan Bryden, Boubacar N'Diaye, & 'Funmi Olonisakin, ''Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa'': GCDCAF, [[Lit Verlag]], Berlin, 2008, pp. 134–5. {{ISBN|978-3-03735-021-8}}</ref> Conté had to suppress his first revolt in July 1985, by his immediate deputy, Colonel [[Diarra Traoré]].<ref>{{cite web| url = http://www.webguinee.net/etat/postcolonial/primature/diarra_traore/joue-perd.html| title = Sennen Andriamirado, "Diarra a joué et perdu" ''Jeune Afrique''. N° 1280 – 17 Juillet 1985. pp. 16–20 (webguinee.com "Diarra Traoré : Tentative de coup d'Etat 4–5 Juillet 1985")| date = 7 August 2018}}</ref>

[[Image:Guineans_engage_in_close-quarters_battle_drills_at_Flintlock_20_(50110879126).jpg|thumb|Guinean Armed Forces clear an urban structure during Flintlock 20 near Nouakchott, Mauritania (2020).]]

Regional conflicts in the 1990s and 2000–2001 attacks along the southern border by rebels acting as proxies for Liberia's [[Charles Taylor (Liberian politician)|Charles Taylor]] had important effects on the security forces.{{sfn|International Crisis Group|2010|page=7}} The Conté government was deeply involved in the [[First Liberian Civil War]] as it supported [[ULIMO]], the major grouping opposing Taylor in Liberia. Yet on the other side of the border the Guinean government also contributed troops to the ill-fated ECOWAS peacekeeping force [[ECOMOG]] in Liberia. After ECOMOG departed in 1997–98, the Guinean government began supporting the new Liberian rebel movement [[LURD]]. Attacks by Taylor-backed rebels in 2000–01 were partially an attempt to stop this support.

More serious was a 1996 attempted coup that originated as a military mutiny caused by the armed forces' poor living conditions. Conté, 'civilianised' since a [[1993 Guinean presidential election|rigged election in 1993]], had to make significant concessions in order to save his regime. Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://2001-2009.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/g/6858.htm |title=Guinea (12/99) |website=U.S. State Department Background Notes Archive |at=Defense |access-date=28 December 2018 |quote=President Conté appointed his first civilian Minister of Defense in 1997. |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240522050245/https://2001-2009.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/g/6858.htm |archive-date=22 May 2024 |url-status=live }}</ref>

The military was used three times in 2006–2007 to suppress popular protest: in June 2006, resulting in 16 deaths, on 22 January 2007, when it fired on protesters at the 9 November Bridge in Conakry, killing over 100, and on 9 February 2007, when it killed several more protesters.<ref>ICG, 2010, p. 8</ref>

The military suffered serious [[2008 Guinean military unrest|unrest in 2008]] as soldiers demanded wage arrears. Among measures taken by Conté to try and shore up his support within the military after 2007 was the transfer of the 'popular [[Sékouba Konaté]] to Conakry to head the parachute Autonomous Battalion of Airborne Troops (French acronym BATA) in an attempt to calm the troops.'<ref>International Crisis Group, ''Africa Report'' No. 164, 2010, p. 8</ref> However, these and other measures failed to stop the [[2008 Guinean coup d'état|coup d'état]] led by [[Moussa Dadis Camara]] in late December 2008.

In January 2009 a [[National Council for Democracy and Development|CNDD]] ordonnance combined four elite units of the Guinean armed forces – the presidential guards, the Bataillon Autonome des Troupes Aéroportées (BATA), the Battaillon des Commandos de Kindia (popularly known as the 'Commandos Chinois') and the Battaillon des Rangers – into a combined commando regiment.<ref>Amnesty International</ref>

On 28 September 2009, in what became known as the 'Bloody Monday' massacre/[[2009 Guinea protest]], [[Amnesty International]] said that Guinea security forces killed more than 150 people and raped over 40 women during and following the protests.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/reform-security-forces-guinea-must-deliver-justice-bloody-monday-massacre-20 |title=Reform of security forces in Guinea must deliver justice for Bloody Monday massacre &#124; Amnesty International |access-date=4 December 2016 |archive-date=14 July 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140714030235/http://amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/reform-security-forces-guinea-must-deliver-justice-bloody-monday-massacre-20 |url-status=dead }}</ref> More than 1,500 people were wounded and many people went missing or were detained. As of early 2010, AI said that at least two senior military officers named by the United Nations as potentially having individual criminal responsibility for events constituting crimes against humanity, remain in positions of influence in the Guinean Presidential Cabinet, despite the formation of a new transitional government.

The [[International Crisis Group]] said in September 2010 that from 2001 to 2009 the size of the armed forces has risen dramatically from 10,000 in 2001 to a reported 45,000 in 2010 (though the latter figure needs to be treated with great caution.)<ref name=Commission>These figures were given to Crisis Group by the commission inter-armée de réflexion sur la restructuration des forces armées, Conakry, February 2010. Africa Report No. 164, p. 1. However the 45,000 figure needs to be treated with great caution.</ref> 'Both formal and informal recruitment contributed to this quick expansion. Erratic mass promotions have resulted in an inverted structure, with more officers than regular soldiers, undermining professionalism and straining the defence budget. Indiscipline, criminality and impunity are rife, while working and living conditions for rank-and-file soldiers are deplorable.'<ref>ICG, Africa Report No. 164, 23 September 2010, p. 1</ref>