Editing Psycholinguistics (section)

==Theories==

===Language acquisition===
{{Main|Language acquisition}}
Though there is still much debate, there are two primary theories on childhood language acquisition:

* the [[behaviorism|behaviorist]] perspective, whereby all language must be learned by the child; and
* the [[Innatist hypothesis|innatist]] perspective, which believes that the abstract system of language cannot be learned, but that humans possess an innate language faculty or access to what has been called "[[universal grammar]]".

The innatist perspective began in 1959 with [[Noam Chomsky]]'s highly critical review of [[B.F. Skinner]]'s ''[[Verbal Behavior]]'' (1957).<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Chomsky N, Skinner BF |year=1959 |title=A Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior |journal=Language |issn=0097-8507 |volume=35 |issue=1 |pages=26–58 |doi=10.2307/411334 |jstor=411334}}</ref> This review helped start what has been called the ''[[cognitive revolution]]'' in psychology. Chomsky posited that humans possess a special, innate ability for language, and that [[Syntactic Structures|complex syntactic features]], such as [[recursion]], are "hard-wired" in the brain. These abilities are thought to be beyond the grasp of even the most intelligent and social non-humans. When Chomsky asserted that children acquiring a language have a vast search space to explore among all possible human grammars, there was no evidence that children received [[Poverty of the stimulus|sufficient input to learn]] all the rules of their language. Hence, there must be some other innate mechanism that endows humans with the ability to learn language. According to the "[[innateness hypothesis]]", such a language faculty is what defines human language and makes that faculty different from even the most sophisticated forms of animal communication.

The field of linguistics and psycholinguistics has since been defined by pro-and-con reactions to Chomsky. The view in favor of Chomsky still holds that the human ability to use language (specifically the ability to use recursion) is qualitatively different from any sort of animal ability.<ref>{{cite journal | vauthors = Hauser MD, Chomsky N, Fitch WT | title = The faculty of language: what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? | journal = Science | volume = 298 | issue = 5598 | pages = 1569–79 | date = November 2002 | pmid = 12446899 | doi = 10.1126/science.298.5598.1569 }}</ref>

The view that language must be learned was especially popular before 1960 and is well represented by the [[Mentalism (psychology)|mentalistic]] theories of [[Jean Piaget]] and the empiricist [[Rudolf Carnap]]. Likewise, the behaviorist school of psychology puts forth the point of view that language is a behavior shaped by conditioned response; hence it is learned. The view that language can be learned has had a recent resurgence inspired by [[emergentism]]. This view challenges the "innate" view as scientifically [[Falsifiability|unfalsifiable]]; that is to say, it cannot be tested. With the increase in computer technology since the 1980s, researchers have been able to simulate language acquisition using neural network models.<ref>{{cite book | title=Rethinking innateness: A connectionist perspective on development | last1=Elman |first1=Jeffrey | last2 = Bates | first2 = Elizabeth | last3 = Johnson | first3 = Mark | last4 = Karmiloff-Smith | first4 = Annette | last5 = Parisi | first5 = Domenico | last6 = Plunkett | first6 = Kim | name-list-style = vanc | year=1998 | publisher=The MIT Press}}</ref>

===Language comprehension===
{{Main|Language comprehension}}

The structures and uses of language are related to the formation of ontological insights.<ref>{{Cite journal |jstor = 1400116|title = The Structure of the Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis|journal = Philosophy East and West|volume = 49|issue = 1|pages = 45–62|last1 = Mou|first1 = Bo | name-list-style = vanc |year = 1999|doi = 10.2307/1400116}}</ref> Some see this system as "structured cooperation between language-users" who use conceptual and [[Semantic differential|semantic difference]] in order to exchange meaning and knowledge, as well as give meaning to language, thereby examining and describing "semantic processes bound by a 'stopping' constraint which are not cases of ordinary deferring." Deferring is normally done for a reason, and a rational person is always disposed to defer if there is good reason.<ref>{{Cite journal |doi = 10.1111/1468-0017.00143|title = Reference and Deference|journal = Mind and Language|volume = 15|issue = 4|pages = 433–451|year = 2000|last1 = Woodfield|first1 = Andrew | name-list-style = vanc }}</ref>

The theory of the "semantic differential" supposes universal distinctions, such as:<ref>Himmelfarb (1993) p 57</ref>

* Typicality: that included scales such as "regular–rare", "typical–exclusive";
* Reality: "imaginary–real", "evident–fantastic", "abstract–concrete";
* Complexity: "complex–simple", "unlimited–limited", "mysterious–usual";
* Improvement or Organization: "regular–spasmodic", "constant–changeable", "organized–disorganized", "precise–indefinite";
* Stimulation: "interesting–boring", "trivial–new".

====Reading====
{{Main|Reading}}
One question in the realm of language comprehension is how people understand sentences as they read (i.e., [[sentence processing]]). Experimental research has spawned several theories about the architecture and mechanisms of sentence comprehension. These theories are typically concerned with the types of information, contained in the sentence, that the reader can use to build meaning and the point at which that information becomes available to the reader. Issues such as "[[modularity of mind|modular]]" versus "interactive" processing have been theoretical divides in the field.

A modular view of sentence processing assumes that the stages involved in reading a sentence function independently as separate modules. These modules have limited interaction with one another. For example, one influential theory of sentence processing, the "[[Garden-path sentence|garden-path theory]]", states that syntactic analysis takes place first. Under this theory, as the reader is reading a sentence, he or she creates the simplest structure possible, to minimize effort and cognitive load.<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Frazier L, Rayner K|year=1982|title=Making and correcting errors during sentence comprehension: Eye movements in the analysis of structurally ambiguous sentences|journal=Cognitive Psychology|volume=14|issue=2|pages=178–210|doi=10.1016/0010-0285(82)90008-1|s2cid=54407337}}</ref> This is done without any input from [[Semantic analysis (linguistics)|semantic analysis]] or context-dependent information. Hence, in the sentence "The evidence examined by the lawyer turned out to be unreliable", by the time the reader gets to the word "examined" he or she has committed to a reading of the sentence in which the evidence is examining something because it is the simplest parsing. This commitment is made even though it results in an implausible situation: evidence cannot examine something. Under this "syntax first" theory, semantic information is processed at a later stage. It is only later that the reader will recognize that he or she needs to revise the initial parsing into one in which "the evidence" is being examined. In this example, readers typically recognize their mistake by the time they reach "by the lawyer" and must go back and reevaluate the sentence.<ref>{{cite journal | title=The interaction of syntax and semantics during sentence processing: Eye movements in the analysis of semantically biased sentences | vauthors = Rayner K, Carlson M, Frazier L | journal=Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior | volume=22 |issue=3 | pages=358–374 | year=1983 | doi=10.1016/s0022-5371(83)90236-0}}</ref> This reanalysis is costly and contributes to slower reading times. A 2024 study found that during self-paced reading tasks, participants progressively read faster and recalled information more accurately, suggesting that task adaptation is driven by learning processes rather than by declining motivation.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Chromý |first=Jan |last2=Tomaschek |first2=Fabian |date=2024-12-15 |title=Learning or Boredom? Task Adaptation Effects in Sentence Processing Experiments |url=https://direct.mit.edu/opmi/article/doi/10.1162/opmi_a_00173/125744/Learning-or-Boredom-Task-Adaptation-Effects-in |journal=Open Mind |volume=8 |pages=1447–1468 |doi=10.1162/opmi_a_00173 |issn=2470-2986|pmc=11666283 }}</ref>

In contrast to the modular view, an interactive theory of sentence processing, such as a [[Constraint-based grammar|constraint-based]] lexical approach assumes that all available information contained within a sentence can be processed at any time.<ref>{{cite journal|vauthors=Trueswell J, Tanenhaus M|year=1994|title=Toward a lexical framework of constraint-based syntactic ambiguity resolution|journal=Perspectives on Sentence Processing|pages=155–179}}</ref> Under an interactive view, the semantics of a sentence (such as plausibility) can come into play early on to help determine the structure of a sentence. Hence, in the sentence above, the reader would be able to make use of plausibility information in order to assume that "the evidence" is being examined instead of doing the examining. There are data to support both modular and interactive views; which view is correct is debatable.

When reading, [[saccade]]s can cause the mind to skip over words because it does not see them as important to the sentence, and the mind completely omits it from the sentence or supplies the wrong word in its stead. This can be seen in "Paris in the{{nbsp}}the Spring". This is a common psychological test, where the mind will often skip the second "the", especially when there is a line break in between the two.<ref>Drieghe, D., K. Rayner, and A. Pollatsek. 2005. "Eye movements and word skipping during reading revisited." ''[[Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance]]'' 31(5). p. 954.</ref>

===Language production===
{{Main|Language production}}

Language production refers to how people produce language, either in written or spoken form, in a way that conveys meanings comprehensible to others. One of the most effective ways to explain the way people represent meanings using rule-governed languages is by observing and analyzing instances of [[speech errors]], which include speech disfluencies like false starts, repetition, reformulation and constant pauses in between words or sentences, as well as slips of the tongue, like-blendings, substitutions, exchanges (e.g. [[Spoonerism]]), and various pronunciation errors.

These speech errors have significant implications for understanding how language is produced, in that they reflect that:<ref>{{cite book | editor-last=Fromkin | editor-first=Victoria A. | title=Speech Errors as Linguistic Evidence | publisher=De Gruyter | date=31 December 1984 | isbn=978-90-279-2668-5 | doi=10.1515/9783110888423}}</ref>
# Speech is not planned in advance: speech errors such as substitution and exchanges show that one does not plan their entire sentence before they speak. Rather, their language faculty is constantly tapped during the speech production process. This is accounted for by the limitation of working memory. In particular, errors involving exchanges imply that one plans one's sentence ahead but only with regard to its significant ideas (e.g. the words that constitute the core meaning) and only to a certain extent.
# Lexicon is organized semantically and phonologically: substitution and pronunciation errors show that lexicon is organized not only by its meaning, but also its form.
# Morphologically complex words are assembled: errors involving blending within a word reflect that there seems to be a rule governing the construction of words in production (and also likely in mental lexicon). In other words, speakers generate the morphologically complex words by merging morphemes rather than retrieving them as chunks.

It is useful to differentiate between three separate phases of language production:<ref name="Psycholinguistics">{{cite book|last=Harley|first=Trevor A.|title=Psycholinguistics|date=2011|publisher=SAGE|isbn=9781446263013|location=Los Angeles, Calif.|oclc=846651282|name-list-style=vanc}}</ref>

# conceptualization: "determining what to say"; 
# formulation: "translating the intention to say something into linguistic form";
# execution: "the detailed articulatory planning and articulation itself".

Psycholinguistic research has largely concerned itself with the study of formulation because the conceptualization phase remains largely elusive and mysterious.<ref name="Psycholinguistics" />

===Cognition and linguistic relativity===
{{Main|Linguistic relativity}}

Linguistic relativity, often associated with the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, posits that the structure of a language influences cognitive processes and world perception. While early formulations of this idea were largely speculative, modern psycholinguistic research has reframed it as a testable hypothesis within the broader study of language and thought.

Contemporary approaches to linguistic relativity are often discussed into following perspectives:

# Weak linguistic relativity – Language biases cognitive tendencies but does not determine thought. This perspective aligns with experimental findings showing that linguistic structures influence perception, memory, and categorization probabilistically rather than absolutely.<ref name="Levinson2003">Levinson, S. C. (2003). "Space in language and cognition: Explorations in cognitive diversity". Cambridge University Press.</ref>
# Language as a cognitive tool – Language serves as a scaffolding mechanism for cognitive processes, actively shaping mental representations in domains such as space, time, and color perception.<ref name="Winawer2007">Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade, A. R., & Boroditsky, L. (2007). "Russian blues reveal effects of language on color discrimination". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(19), 7780-7785. [https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701644104 doi:10.1073/pnas.0701644104]</ref>
A key refinement of linguistic relativity is Slobin’s (1996) "Thinking for Speaking" hypothesis, which argues that language influences cognition most strongly when individuals prepare to communicate. Unlike traditional views of linguistic relativity, which suggest that language passively shapes thought, "Thinking for Speaking" proposes that speakers actively engage with linguistic categories and structures while constructing utterances.<ref name="Slobin1996">Slobin, D. I. (1996). "From ‘thought and language’ to ‘thinking for speaking’". In J. J. Gumperz & S. C. Levinson (Eds.), Rethinking linguistic relativity (pp. 70–96). Cambridge University Press.</ref>

From a psycholinguistic standpoint, research on linguistic relativity intersects with conceptual representations, perceptual learning, and cognitive flexibility. Experimental studies have tested these ideas by examining how speakers of different languages categorize the world differently. For instance, cross-linguistic comparisons in spatial cognition reveal that languages with absolute spatial frames (e.g., Guugu Yimithirr) encourage speakers to encode space differently than languages with relative spatial frames (e.g., English).<ref name="Levinson2003" />

In the domain of bilingual cognition, psycholinguistic research suggests that bilinguals may experience cognitive restructuring, where language context modulates perception and categorization. Recent studies indicate that bilinguals can flexibly switch between different conceptual systems, depending on the language they are using, particularly in domains such as motion perception, event construal, and time perception.<ref name="AthanasopoulosBylund2023">Athanasopoulos, P., & Bylund, E. (2023). "Cognitive restructuring: Psychophysical measurement of time perception in bilinguals". Bilingualism: Language and Cognition, 26(4), 809-818. [https://doi.org/10.1017/S1366728922000664 doi:10.1017/S1366728922000664]</ref>

Overall, linguistic relativity in psycholinguistics is no longer seen as a rigid determinism of thought by language, but rather as a gradual, experience-based modulation of cognition by linguistic structures. This perspective has led to a shift from a purely linguistic hypothesis to an integrative cognitive science framework incorporating evidence from experimental psychology, neuroscience, and computational modeling.<ref name="BoroditskyFuhrmanMcCormick2011">Boroditsky, L., Fuhrman, O., & McCormick, K. (2011). "Do English and Mandarin speakers think about time differently?". Cognition, 118(1), 123–129. [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2010.09.010 doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.09.010]</ref>