Editing Physicalism (section)

== Reductive and non-reductive physicalism ==

=== Reductionism ===
{{See also|Reductionism}}
In [[philosophy of mind]], [[reductionism]] is commonly understood as the reduction of psychological phenomena to physics and chemistry. In a simplified form, reductionism implies that a system is nothing but the sum of its parts.<ref>Thomas Nagel (2012). ''Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False''. Oxford University Press. pp. 4–5. {{ISBN|978-0199919758}}.</ref> There are both reductive and non-reductive versions of physicalism (reductive physicalism and non-reductive physicalism). Reductive physicalism is the view that mental states are nothing over and above physical states and are reducible to physical states.

=== Emergence ===
{{main|Emergentism}}

[[Emergentism]] is a theory that became popular in the early 20th century.<ref>Van Gulick, Robert. "Emergence". ''Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy''. University of Tennessee.</ref> Notions of strong emergence are commonly found in accounts of non-reductive physicalism. A property of a [[system]] is said to be emergent if it is a new outcome of some of the system's other properties and their interaction while it is itself different from them. Emergentism emphasizes that the whole is more than the sum of its parts.<ref>O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu (eds.), "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)</ref> In the context of philosophy of mind, emergence is often thought to entail [[property dualism]].<ref>Bratcher, Daniel (1999). "David Chalmers' Arguments for Property Dualism". ''Philosophy Today''. '''43''' (3): 292–301. [[Doi (identifier)|doi]]:10.5840/philtoday199943319</ref>