Editing Philip IV of Spain (section)

==Philip and the Spanish military==
[[File:Felipe IV; Rey de España.jpg|thumb|upright|Philip dressed as a [[cuirassier]], accompanied by a [[court dwarf]], by [[Caspar de Crayer]]]]

Philip and Olivares attempted to address the perceived issues of the army, which they concluded were primarily due to the ''falta de cabezas'', or a lack of leadership.{{cn|date=February 2024}} In keeping with their wider agenda of renewing the concepts of duty, service and aristocratic tradition, the King agreed to efforts to introduce more [[grandee]]s into the higher ranks of the military, working hard to overcome the reluctance of many to take up field appointments in the [[Spanish Netherlands|Netherlands]] and elsewhere.<ref name=Parker102>{{harvnb|Parker|2004|pages= 101-103}}</ref>

The results were not entirely as hoped. The grandees dragooned into service in this way were disinclined to spend years learning the normal professional military skill set; they wished 'to start out as generals and soldiers on the same day', to quote one disgruntled career soldier.{{Who|date=July 2010}} By the 1630s, the King was waiving the usual rules to enable promotion to higher ranks on a shorter timescale, and having to pay significantly inflated salaries to get grandees to take up even these appointments.<ref name=Parker102/> The performance of these officers at battles such as [[Battle of Rocroi|Rocroi]] left much to be desired.

In 1640, Philip IV's initial strategy to undermine the new Portuguese government involved dividing the extensive border shared between Portugal and Castile into military districts.<ref name=":0">''The conspiracy of the Duke of Medina Sidonia'' by Luis Salas Almela (2013) Page 60.  https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/87106/9789004255753.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

</ref> Each district would be overseen by the highest-ranking nobleman on the Castilian side.<ref>Elliott, El conde-duque, 591–92; Rafael Valladares, La guerra olvidada: Ciudad Rodrigo y su comarca durante la Restauración de Portugal (1640–1668) (Ciudad Rodrigo: Centro de Estudios Mirobrigenses, 1988).</ref> For example, the [[Gaspar Alfonso Pérez de Guzmán, 9th Duke of Medina Sidonia|9th Duke of Medina Sidonia]] was tasked with managing the [[Algarve]] district from his headquarters in [[Ayamonte]].<ref>III Jornadas de Historia de Ayamonte (Ayamonte, 1998), 187–213, 209.</ref> The Ayamonte junta consisted of six members, and Don [[Matías González de Medrano]], the king's secretary in the Council of War, acted as the junta's secretary.<ref name=":0" /><ref>{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f7dS-hy5QawC&dq=Don+Mat%C3%ADas+Gonz%C3%A1lez+de+Medrano&pg=PA669 |title=Revista Hidalguía número 131. Año 1975 |publisher=Ediciones Hidalguia |pages=669 |language=es}}</ref>

=== Spanish Navy ===
[[File:Francisco de Zurbarán 014FXD.jpg|thumb|[[Cádiz expedition (1625)|Defense of Cádiz]] against the English in 1625]]
Philip was also notable for his interest in the [[Spanish Navy]]. Shortly after taking power, he began to increase the size of his fleets, rapidly doubling the size of the naval budget from the start of his reign, and then tripling it.<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=45}}</ref> Philip is credited with a 'sensible, pragmatic approach' to provisioning and controlling it.<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=32}}</ref> He was prepared to involve himself in considerable details of naval policy; he was commenting on the detail of provisions for the ''armada'' in 1630, for example.<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=157}}</ref> The ''Junta de Armadas'' was the only ''junta'' committee to survive the fall of Olivares intact.<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=34}}</ref> Even after the disastrous [[Battle of the Downs]], Philip remained closely interested in his navy, including ensuring ministerial attention. In 1646, de Haro was personally involved in supplying and equipping the Atlantic fleet from [[Cádiz]]. Throughout the period there was no 'weakening of the importance attached to naval forces'<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=156}}</ref> by the King, who argued that joint land and naval operations were essential. Some of his conclusions on naval policy were quite advanced: after the peace of 1648, Philip argued that the Dutch fleets off the Spanish peninsula were actually good for trade, despite concerns from his senior officials, since they provided protection against the [[Royal Navy|English]] and [[French Navy|French navies]].<ref>{{harvnb|Goodman|2002|p=26}}</ref>