Editing Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (section)

====After Castle Bravo: 1954–1958====
In 1954, just weeks after the [[Castle Bravo]] test, Indian Prime Minister [[Jawaharlal Nehru]] made the first public call for a "standstill agreement" on nuclear testing. Nehru viewed a testing moratorium as a crucial first step toward broader and more comprehensive arms control agreements, reflecting his commitment to nuclear disarmament and global peace.<ref name=bravo/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=247}} In the same year, the [[Labour Party (UK)|British Labour Party]], then led by [[Clement Attlee]], called on the UN to ban testing of thermonuclear weapons.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=58}} 1955 marks the beginning of test-ban negotiations, as Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] first proposed talks on the subject in February 1955.{{sfn|Rhodes|2008|p=72}}{{sfn|Reeves|1993|p=121}} On 10 May 1955, the Soviet Union proposed a test ban before the UN Disarmament Commission's "Committee of Five" (Britain, [[Canada]], [[France]], the Soviet Union, and the US). This proposal, which closely reflected a prior Anglo-French proposal, was initially part of a comprehensive disarmament proposal meant to reduce conventional arms levels and eliminate nuclear weapons. Despite the closeness of the Soviet proposal to earlier Western proposals, the US reversed its position on the provisions and rejected the Soviet offer "in the absence of more general control agreements," including limits on the production of [[fissionable material]] and protections against a [[pre-emptive nuclear strike|surprise nuclear strike]].<ref name=statedept/> The May 1955 proposal is now seen as evidence of Khrushchev's "new approach" to foreign policy, as Khrushchev sought to mend relations with the West. The proposal would serve as the basis of the Soviet negotiating position through 1957.{{sfn|Evangelista|1999|pp=91–93}}

Eisenhower had supported nuclear testing after [[World War II]]. In 1947, he rejected arguments by [[Stafford L. Warren]], the Manhattan Project's chief physician, concerning the detrimental health effects of atmospheric testing, agreeing instead with [[James Bryant Conant]], a chemist and participant in the Manhattan Project, who was skeptical of Warren's then-theoretical claims.{{clarify|what exactly was the difference of opinion and how did Bravo change all that? Project 4.1 had yet to be finalized som medical evidence was lacking|date=October 2016}} Warren's arguments were lent credence in the scientific community and public by the Castle Bravo test of 1954.{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=10–11}} Eisenhower, as president, first explicitly expressed interest in a comprehensive test ban that year, arguing before the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], "We could put [the Russians] on the spot if we accepted a moratorium&nbsp;... Everybody seems to think that we're skunks, saber-rattlers and warmongers. We ought not miss any chance to make clear our peaceful objectives."<ref name=nsarchive/> Then-Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] had responded skeptically to the limited arms-control suggestion of Nehru, whose proposal for a test ban was discarded by the National Security Council for being "not practical."{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=247}}<ref name=macdonald/> [[Harold Stassen]], Eisenhower's special assistant for disarmament, argued that the US should prioritize a test ban as a first step towards comprehensive arms control, conditional on the Soviet Union accepting on-site inspections, over full disarmament. Stassen's suggestion was dismissed by others in the administration over fears that the Soviet Union would be able to conduct secret tests.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=305}} On the advice of Dulles, [[United States Atomic Energy Commission|Atomic Energy Commission]] (AEC) chairman [[Lewis Strauss]], and Secretary of Defense [[Charles Erwin Wilson]], Eisenhower rejected the idea of considering a test ban outside general disarmament efforts.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=61}} During the [[1952 United States presidential election|1952]] and [[1956 United States presidential election|1956]] presidential elections, Eisenhower fended off challenger [[Adlai Stevenson II|Adlai Stevenson]], who ran in large part on support for a test ban.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=7}}

[[File:Eisenhower and Strauss.jpg|left|thumb|[[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[Lewis Strauss|Strauss]] discuss [[Operation Castle]], 1954]]
The British governments of 1954–58 (under [[Conservative Party (UK)|Conservatives]] [[Winston Churchill]], [[Anthony Eden]], and [[Harold Macmillan]]) also quietly resisted a test ban, despite the British public favoring a deal, until the [[85th United States Congress|US Congress]] approved expanded nuclear collaboration in 1958 and until after Britain had tested [[Operation Grapple|its first hydrogen bombs]].{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=7}} In their view, testing was necessary if the UK nuclear program were to continue to develop. This opposition was tempered by concern that resistance to a test ban might lead the US and Soviet Union to pursue an agreement without Britain having any say in the matter.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|p=112}}

Members of the Soviet [[military–industrial complex]] also opposed a test ban, though some scientists, including [[Igor Kurchatov]], were supportive of antinuclear efforts.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=248}} France, which was in the midst of developing its own nuclear weapon, also firmly opposed a test ban in the late 1950s.{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|p=457}}

The proliferation of thermonuclear weapons coincided with a rise in public concern about [[nuclear fallout]] debris contaminating food sources, particularly the threat of high levels of [[strontium-90]] in milk (see the [[Baby Tooth Survey]]). This survey was a scientist and citizen led campaign which used "modern media advocacy techniques to communicate complex issues" to inform public discourse.<ref name=E.Gerl>{{cite journal |last1=Gerl |first1=Ellen |title=Scientist-citizen advocacy in the atomic age: A case study of the Baby Tooth Survey, 1958–1963 |journal=PRism |date=2014 |volume=11 |issue=1 |url=https://www.prismjournal.org/uploads/1/2/5/6/125661607/v11-no1-a1.pdf |access-date=21 June 2019}}</ref> Its research findings confirmed a significant build-up of strontium-90 in bones of babies<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Reiss |first1=L. Z. |title=Strontium-90 Absorption by Deciduous Teeth: Analysis of teeth provides a practicable method of monitoring strontium-90 uptake by human populations |journal=Science |date=24 November 1961 |volume=134 |issue=3491 |pages=1669–1673 |doi=10.1126/science.134.3491.1669 |pmid=14491339}}</ref> and helped galvanise public support for a ban on atmospheric nuclear testing in the US.<ref name=E.Gerl/> [[Lewis Strauss]] and [[Edward Teller]], dubbed the "father of the hydrogen bomb,"<ref>{{cite web|url=https://news.stanford.edu/news/2003/september24/tellerobit-924.html |title=Edward Teller, 'Father of the Hydrogen Bomb,' is dead at 95 |author=Joel N. Shurkin |date=24 September 2003 |publisher=Stanford University |access-date=1 January 2017 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170101154627/http://news.stanford.edu/news/2003/september24/tellerobit-924.html |archive-date=1 January 2017}}</ref> both sought to tamp down on these fears, arguing that fallout [at the dose levels of US exposure] were fairly harmless and that a test ban would enable the Soviet Union to surpass the US in nuclear capabilities. Teller also suggested that testing was necessary to develop nuclear weapons that produced less fallout.{{Dubious|date=April 2019}} Support in the US public for a test ban to continue to grow from 20% in 1954 to 63% by 1957. Moreover, widespread antinuclear protests were organized and led by theologian and [[Nobel Peace Prize]] laureate [[Albert Schweitzer]], whose appeals were endorsed by [[Pope Pius XII]], and [[Linus Pauling]], the latter of whom organized an anti-test petition signed by more than 9,000 scientists across 43 countries (including the infirm and elderly [[Albert Einstein]]).{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=8}}{{sfn|Strode|1990|p=31}}

The AEC would eventually concede, as well, that even low levels of radiation were harmful.{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=305}}{{better source needed|date=October 2016}} It was a combination of rising public support for a test ban and the shock of the 1957 Soviet ''[[Sputnik]]'' launch that encouraged Eisenhower to take steps towards a test ban in 1958.<ref name=macdonald/>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=247–249, 305}}

There was also increased environmental concern in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1950s, Soviet scientists began taking regular radiation readings near [[Leningrad]], [[Moscow]], and [[Odessa]] and collected data on the prevalence of strontium-90, which indicated that strontium-90 levels in western Russia approximately matched those in the eastern US. Rising Soviet concern was punctuated in September 1957 by the [[Kyshtym disaster]], which forced the evacuation of 10,000 people after an explosion at a nuclear plant. Around the same time, 219 Soviet scientists signed Pauling's antinuclear petition. Soviet political elites did not share the concerns of others in the Soviet Union. However; Kurchatov unsuccessfully called on Khrushchev to halt testing in 1958.{{sfn|Strode|1990|pp=31–32}}

On 14 June 1957, following Eisenhower's suggestion that existing detection measures were inadequate to ensure compliance,{{sfn|Ambrose|1991|pp=457–458}} the Soviet Union put forth a plan for a two-to-three-year testing moratorium. The moratorium would be overseen by an international commission reliant on national monitoring stations, but, importantly, would involve no on-the-ground inspections. Eisenhower initially saw the deal as favorable, but eventually came to see otherwise. In particular, Strauss and Teller, as well as [[Ernest Lawrence]] and [[Mark Muir Mills]], protested the offer. At a meeting with Eisenhower in the White House, the group argued that testing was necessary for the US to eventually develop bombs that produced no fallout ("clean bombs"). The group repeated the oft-cited fact, which was supported by [[Freeman Dyson]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.powermag.com/too-dumb-to-meter-part-7/?pagenum=3|title=Too Dumb to Meter, Part 7|date=1 January 2013}}</ref> that the Soviet Union could conduct secret nuclear tests.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=8–9}} In 1958, at the request of Igor Kurchatov, Soviet nuclear physicist and weapons designer [[Andrei Sakharov]] published a pair of widely circulated academic papers challenging the claim of Teller and others that a clean, fallout-free nuclear bomb could be developed, due to the formation of [[carbon-14]] when nuclear devices are detonated in the air. A one-megaton clean bomb, Sakharov estimated, would cause 6,600 deaths over 8,000 years, figures derived largely from estimates on the quantity of [[carbon-14]] generated from atmospheric nitrogen and the contemporary risk models at the time, along with the assumption that the world population is "thirty billion persons" in a few thousand years.<ref name=sakharovpaper>{{cite journal |title=Radioactive carbon from nuclear explosion and nonthreshold biological effects |last=Sakharov |first=Andrei |s2cid=97684558 |author-link=Andrei Sakharov |journal=The Soviet Journal of Atomic Energy |volume=4 |issue=6 |pages=757–762 |date=June 1958|doi=10.1007/BF01515403}}</ref>{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=152}}<ref name=aip>{{cite web |title=Nuclear Testing and Conscience, 1957–1963 |publisher=[[American Institute of Physics]] |url=https://www.aip.org/history/exhibits/sakharov/dangers.htm |access-date=11 August 2016 |archive-date=20 August 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160820053647/https://www.aip.org/history/exhibits/sakharov/dangers.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 1961, Sakharov was part of the design team for a 50 megaton "clean bomb", which has become known as the [[Tsar Bomba]], detonated over the island of [[Novaya Zemlya]].<ref name=aip/>

[[File:International Diplomacy.jpg|thumb|[[Harold Macmillan|Macmillan]] (second from left) with [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] in March 1957]]
In the spring of 1957, the US National Security Council had explored including a one-year test moratorium and a "cut-off" of fissionable-material production in a "partial" disarmament plan. The British government, then led by Macmillan, had yet to fully endorse a test ban. Accordingly, it pushed the US to demand that the production cut-off be closely timed with the testing moratorium, betting that the Soviet Union would reject this. London also encouraged the US to delay its disarmament plan, in part by moving the start of the moratorium back to November 1958. At the same time, Macmillan linked British support for a test ban to a revision of the [[Atomic Energy Act of 1946]] (McMahon Act), which prohibited sharing of nuclear information with foreign governments. Eisenhower, eager to mend ties with Britain following the [[Suez Crisis]] of 1956, was receptive to Macmillan's conditions, but the AEC and the congressional [[United States Congress Joint Committee on Atomic Energy|Joint Committee on Atomic Energy]] were firmly opposed. It was not until after ''Sputnik'' in late 1957 that Eisenhower quickly moved to expand nuclear collaboration with the UK via presidential directives and the establishment of bilateral committees on nuclear matters. In early 1958, Eisenhower publicly stated that amendments to the McMahon Act were a necessary condition of a test ban, framing the policy shift in the context of US commitment to its [[NATO]] allies.{{sfn|Risse-Kappen|1995|pp=112–114}}

In August 1957, the US assented to a two-year testing moratorium proposed by the Soviet Union, but required that it be linked to restrictions on the production of fissionable material with military uses, a condition that the Soviet Union rejected.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}} While Eisenhower insisted on linking a test ban to a broader disarmament effort (e.g., the production cut-off), Moscow insisted on independent consideration of a test ban.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=61}}

On 19 September 1957, the US conducted the first contained underground test at the [[Nevada Test Site]], codenamed ''[[Operation Plumbbob#Rainier|Rainier]]''. The ''Rainier'' shot complicated the push for a comprehensive test ban, as underground tests could not be as easily identified as atmospheric tests.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}

Despite Eisenhower's interest in a deal, his administration was hamstrung by discord among US scientists, technicians, and politicians. At one point, Eisenhower complained that "statecraft was becoming a prisoner of scientists."<ref name=macdonald/>{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=2, 6}} Until 1957, Strauss's AEC (including its Los Alamos and [[Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory|Livermore]] laboratories) was the dominant voice in the administration on nuclear affairs, with Teller's concerns over detection mechanisms also influencing Eisenhower.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|p=249}} Unlike some others within the US scientific community, Strauss fervently advocated against a test ban, arguing that the US must maintain a clear nuclear advantage via regular testing and that the negative environmental impacts of such tests were overstated. Furthermore, Strauss repeatedly emphasized the risk of the Soviet Union violating a ban, a fear Eisenhower shared.{{sfn|Greene|2006|p=5}}

On 7 November 1957, after ''Sputnik'' and under pressure to bring on a dedicated science advisor, Eisenhower created the [[President's Science Advisory Committee]] (PSAC), which had the effect of eroding the AEC's monopoly over scientific advice.{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=63}} In stark contrast to the AEC, PSAC promoted a test ban and argued against Strauss's claims concerning its strategic implications and technical feasibility.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|p=9}}{{sfn|Burns|Siracusa|2013|pp=249, 305}}{{sfn|Greene|2006|pp=6–8}} In late 1957, the Soviet Union made a second offer of a three-year moratorium without inspections, but lacking any consensus within his administration, Eisenhower rejected it. In early 1958, the discord within American circles, particularly among scientists, was made clear in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Disarmament, chaired by Senator [[Hubert Humphrey]]. The hearings featured conflicting testimony from the likes of Teller and Linus Pauling, as well as from Harold Stassen, who argued that a test ban could safely be separated from broader disarmament, and AEC members, who argued that a cutoff in nuclear production should precede a test ban.{{sfn|Seaborg|1981|pp=10–11}}{{sfn|Polsby|1984|p=64}}