Editing Operation Market Garden (section)

===Strategy===

Eisenhower proposed a [[Broad front versus narrow front controversy in World War II|"broad front strategy"]] in which the allied armies of Montgomery in Belgium and Bradley further south in France advanced in parallel on a front several hundred miles wide into Germany. Montgomery{{snd}}and Bradley's aggressive subordinate, [[George S. Patton]]{{snd}}both desired a concentration of forces, a "single thrust" forward into Germany, but each man saw himself as the leader of a single thrust. Montgomery said the allied strategy should be "one powerful full-blooded thrust across the Rhine and into the heart of Germany backed by the whole of the resources of the Allied Armies". Such a policy would relegate Bradley's American armies to a "purely static role".{{sfn|MacDonald|1963|page=10}} On his part, Patton said that with 400,000 gallons of gasoline he could be in Germany in two days. War planners saw both men's proposals as tactically and logistically infeasible.<ref name="Axelrod">{{cite book |last1=Axelrod |first1=Alan |title=Patton |date=2006 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan |location=New York |isbn=9781403971395 |page=141}}</ref>

[[File:Bernard Law Montgomery.jpg|thumb|left|Field Marshal Sir [[Bernard Montgomery]]]]

While agreeing that Montgomery's drive towards the industrial district of the [[Ruhr]] in Germany should have priority, Eisenhower still thought it was important to "get Patton moving again". This strategy was contested by Montgomery, who argued that with the supply situation deteriorating, he would not be able to reach the Ruhr, but "a relocation of our present resources of every description ''would'' be adequate to get ''one'' thrust to Berlin".{{sfn|Ellis|Warhurst|2004|p=17}} Montgomery initially suggested ''Operation Comet'', a limited [[Airborne forces|airborne]] ''[[coup de main]]'' operation that was to be launched on 2 September 1944. Comet envisioned using British and Polish airborne forces to capture several bridges en route to the Rhine.{{sfn|Bennett|2008|pp=19–21}} However several days of poor weather and Montgomery's concerns over increasing levels of German resistance caused him to postpone the operation and then cancel it on 10 September.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=281}}

Montgomery replaced Comet with Market Garden, a more ambitious plan to bypass the West Wall or [[Siegfried Line]] of German defenses by hooking around its northern end and securing a crossing of the Rhine River, thereby gaining a path to the Ruhr. Another factor was the existence of [[V-2]] sites in the Netherlands which were launching rocket strikes on [[London]]. On 10 September Dempsey, the British Second Army commander, told Montgomery that he had doubts about this plan. Montgomery replied that he had just received an order from the British government that the V-2 launch sites around [[The Hague]] should be neutralised and that the plan must therefore proceed.{{sfn|Hibbert|2003|pp=29–30}}

That same day, angered by Eisenhower's reluctance to give his plan the priority he desired, Montgomery flew to Brussels to meet him. Montgomery tore a file of Eisenhower's messages to shreds in front of him, argued for a concentrated northern thrust, and demanded priority in supplies. So fierce and unrestrained was Montgomery's language that Eisenhower reached out, patted Montgomery's knee, and said, "Steady, Monty! You can't talk to me like that. I'm your boss."<ref name="ryan85"/>

Eisenhower allegedly told Montgomery why a "single thrust" toward Berlin was not feasible:
<blockquote>What you're proposing is this – if I give you all the supplies you want, you could go straight to Berlin – right straight (500 miles) to Berlin? Monty, you're nuts. You can't do it... If you try a long column like that in a single thrust you'd have to throw off division after division to protect your flanks from attack.<ref name="ryan85">Cornelius Ryan, ''A Bridge Too Far'', Popular Library, 1974, pp. 85–88.</ref></blockquote>

Nevertheless, Eisenhower consented to Operation Market Garden, giving it "limited priority" in terms of supplies – but only as part of an advance on a broad front.{{sfn|Hibbert|2003|pp=30–31}} Eisenhower promised that aircraft and trucks would deliver an additional 1,000 tons of supplies daily to Montgomery for Market Garden.{{sfn|MacDonald|1963|p=129}}{{Efn|Eisenhower wrote to Montgomery stating that 1,000 tons by air to the "Brussels area" was not possible since the transport aircraft would be given over to the airborne operations but{{snd}}by temporarily immobilising some American divisions{{snd}}every effort would be made to deliver 500 tons by road with {{snd}}while the aircraft were not in use for the airborne operations{{snd}}500 tons by air<ref>Ellis (1968) p. 23</ref>}}

Eisenhower was also under pressure from the United States to use the [[First Allied Airborne Army]] as soon as possible.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=269}} After Normandy, most of the airborne forces had been withdrawn to England, re-forming into the First Allied Airborne Army of two British and three US airborne divisions and the Polish 1st Independent Parachute Brigade.{{sfn|MacDonald|1963|p=128}} Eighteen airborne operations had been proposed, then cancelled, when the rapidly moving Allied ground forces overran the intended drop zones.{{sfn|Pogue|1954|p=281}}{{efn|"Handsup", a drop on [[Quiberon]], was cancelled after naval objections and "Beneficiary", a drop on [[Saint-Malo]], because defences were too strong.{{sfn|Warren|1956|p=83}}}} Eisenhower believed that the use of the airborne forces might provide the push needed for the allies to cross the Rhine.{{sfn|MacDonald|1963|pages=119–120}}