Editing Operation Barbarossa (section)

===German-Soviet relations of 1939–40===
{{Main|Germany–Soviet Union relations, 1918–1941}}
[[File:Europe before Operation Barbarossa, 1941 (in German).png|thumb|The geopolitical disposition of Europe in 1941, immediately before the start of Operation Barbarossa. The grey area represents Nazi Germany, its allies, and countries under its control.]]

On August 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in Moscow known as the [[Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact]].{{sfn|Dimbleby|2021|pp=73–74}} A secret protocol to the pact outlined an agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union on the division of the eastern European [[Border states (Eastern Europe)|border states]] between their respective "[[spheres of influence]]," Soviet Union and Germany would partition Poland in the event of an invasion by Germany, and the Soviets would be allowed to overrun [[Finland]], [[Estonia]], [[Latvia]] and the region of [[Bessarabia]].{{sfn|Kirby|1980|p=120}} On 23 August 1939 the rest of the world learned of this pact but were unaware of the provisions to partition Poland.{{sfn|Hildebrand|1973|p=89}} The pact stunned the world because of the parties' earlier mutual hostility and their conflicting [[Ideology|ideologies]].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=30}} The conclusion of this pact was followed by the [[German invasion of Poland]] on 1 September that triggered the outbreak of [[World War II in Europe]], then the [[Soviet invasion of Poland]] that led to the annexation of the eastern part of the country.{{sfn|Bellamy|2007|pp=56–59}} As a result of the pact, Germany and the Soviet Union maintained reasonably strong diplomatic relations for two years and fostered [[Nazi–Soviet economic relations (1934–41)|an important economic relationship]]. The countries entered a [[German-Soviet Commercial Agreement (1940)|trade pact in 1940]] by which the Soviets received German military equipment and trade goods in exchange for raw materials, such as oil and wheat, to help the German [[war effort]] by circumventing the British [[Blockade of Germany (1939–45)|blockade of Germany]].{{sfn|Shirer|1990|pp=668–669}}

Despite the parties' ostensibly cordial relations, each side was highly suspicious of the other's intentions. For instance, the Soviet invasion of [[Bukovina]] in June 1940 went beyond their sphere of influence as agreed with Germany.{{sfn|Brackman|2001|p=341}} After Germany entered the [[Tripartite Pact|Axis Pact]] with Japan and Italy, it began [[German–Soviet Axis talks|negotiations about a potential Soviet entry into the pact]].{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} After two days of negotiations in Berlin from 12 to 14 November 1940, Ribbentrop presented a draft treaty for a Soviet entry into the Axis.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} However, Hitler had no intention of allowing the Soviet Union into the Axis and in an order stated, "Political conversations designed to clarify the attitude of Russia in the immediate future have been started. Regardless of the outcome of these conversations, all preparations for the East previously ordered orally are to be continued. [Written] directives on that will follow as soon as the basic elements of the army's plan for the operation have been submitted to me and approved by me."{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} There would be no "long-term agreement with Russia" given that the Nazis intended to go to war with them; but the Soviets approached the negotiations differently and were willing to make huge economic concessions to secure a relationship under general terms acceptable to the Germans just a year before.{{sfn|Weinberg|1994|p=199}} On 25 November 1940, the Soviet Union offered a written counter-proposal to join the Axis if Germany would agree to refrain from interference in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, but Germany did not respond.{{sfn|Roberts|2006|p=57}} As both sides began colliding with each other in Eastern Europe, conflict appeared more likely, although they did sign a [[German–Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement|border and commercial agreement]] addressing several open issues in January 1941. According to historian [[Robert Service (historian)|Robert Service]], [[Joseph Stalin]] was convinced that the overall military strength of the Soviet Union was such that he had nothing to fear and anticipated an easy victory should Germany attack; moreover, Stalin believed that since the Germans were still fighting the British in the west, Hitler would be unlikely to open up a two-front war and subsequently delayed the reconstruction of defensive fortifications in the border regions.{{sfn|Service|2005|p=259}} When German soldiers swam across the [[Bug River]] to warn the [[Red Army]] of an impending attack, they were shot as enemy agents.{{sfn|Service|2005|pp=259–260}} Some historians believe that Stalin, despite providing an amicable front to Hitler, did not wish to remain allies with Germany. Rather, Stalin might have had intentions to break off from Germany and proceed with his own campaign against Germany to be followed by one against the rest of Europe.{{sfn|Weeks|2002|p=98}} Other historians contend that Stalin did not plan for such an attack in June 1941, given the parlous state of the Red Army at the time of the invasion.{{sfn|Uldricks|1999|p=629}}

[[File:1939 German Diplomatic passport used in the USSR.jpg|thumb|1939 German Diplomatic passport with its holder returning after the outbreak of war 2 years later and being evacuated on a special train out of the USSR.]]