Editing Operation Anaconda (section)

==Battle==

===1 March 2002===
A day before the planned operation, two Mako 31 snipers found a group of foreign fighters that had established a position and were manning a [[DShK]] [[Heavy machine gun|HMG]] on the peak where they planned to set up an observation post. The DShK overlooked the southeastern entrance to the valley through which the TF Rakkasan Chinooks were due to fly in 24 hours and, if it was not disabled before then, it could shoot down the Chinooks carrying the conventional forces. The SEALs came up with a plan to ambush the enemy in the pre-dawn darkness before the Rakkasans flew into the valley. At 4 A.M the next morning, the three SEALs from MAKO 31 quietly approached the enemy camp, intending to wait until shortly before the air assault was scheduled to begin before eliminating the fighters there. However, the SEALs were spotted by an Uzbek [[Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan|IMU]] insurgent and a brief firefight ensued. During the intense exchange, two of the SEALs' rifles jammed after firing just one shot. The third SEAL held off the enemy as his colleagues quickly cleared the jams and resumed firing, killing 5 out of the 7 foreign fighters. As another insurgent joined the firefight, firing a [[PK machine gun|PKM]], the SEAL team decided to break contact and called in an [[AC-130]] which destroyed the enemy encampment with 105&nbsp;mm rounds. The sound of the AC-130 firing alerted the Al-Qaeda fighters throughout the valley, who began firing their weapons into the air. However, this turned out to be a fatal mistake as the tracer rounds revealed their positions to the [[Advanced Force Operations|AFO]] teams, who noted the locations to be targeted by airstrikes later.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=190–191 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref><ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.54</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command |date=1 September 2015 |publisher=St. Martin's Press |page=191 |url=https://www.amazon.com/Relentless-Strike-History-Special-Operations-ebook/dp/B00TDTR5ZW/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= |language=English}}</ref>

The SEALs proceeded to occupy the observation post. Upon searching the camp, they discovered that the Al-Qaeda fighters were well-equipped. Not only did the SEALs find plenty of ammunition for the DShK, but also a Soviet-style SVD Dragunov sniper rifle, several Kalashnikov assault rifles, at least one RPG-7 launcher with several rounds, a PK machine gun, and several fragmentation grenades. The SEALs also found documents that were written in both [[Arabic script|Arabic]] and [[Cyrillic script|Cyrillic]] scripts, indicating that the Arab Al-Qaeda fighters and the Uzbek and Chechen IMU fighters were not operating separately, but had formed cross-cultural teams. Among the documents was a notebook containing instructions on how to construct homemade bombs for blowing up bridges, buildings, buses, and cars.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=191 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

===2 March 2002===
Canadian and U.S. sniper teams and Afghan forces began to sweep the [[Shah-i-Kot Valley|Shah-i-Kot]] valley area to root out rebel forces regrouping in the valley after the fall of the [[Taliban]] regime.

====TF Hammer/TF Anvil====
[[File:Cia-mi17.jpg|thumb|right|200px|U.S. special forces help Afghan troops away from a CIA-operated [[Mil Mi-17]] Hip helicopter at [[Bagram Airbase]]]]

Around midnight, the units of TF Hammer loaded into their vehicles and left their base in Gardez at {{Coord|33|35|58|N|69|13|44|E|type:city|name=Gardez}} for the Shah-i-Kot Valley in a convoy of 39 trucks, buses, and other vehicles. TF Hammer consisted of a large force of Afghan militia led by Zia Lodin and the Special Forces A-teams Texas 14/ODA 594 and Cobra 72/ODA 372. The road conditions were terrible due to a recent snowstorm that had turned the dirt roads into muddy and slippery terrain. This made progress challenging, especially in the difficult terrain.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref>

As they moved, some trucks got stuck, and there was even an accident where a large bus turned over, injuring several fighters.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref> The commanders ordered the trucks to use their headlights, destroying any element of surprise. As TF Hammer continued, it suffered from a lack of unit cohesion because of the transportation difficulties. A convoy led by Army Chief Warrant Officer Stanley L. Harriman of the Third Special Forces Group split off from the main TF Hammer force to reach the assigned observation point. Grim 31, an [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] aircraft providing fire support and reconnaissance for the assault, spotted Harriman's convoy and, due to a failure in its [[inertial navigation system]], believed it was in a position away from friendly forces (this was due to a problem with the "glint" panels which should have identified the convoy as American.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=199–201 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>) Grim 31 engaged the column, resulting in the [[friendly fire]] death of Harriman and the wounding of several Afghan militias and U.S. special forces.<ref>{{cite web |title=CNN - Report: Friendly fire killed U.S. soldier - Oct. 29, 2002 |url=http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/10/29/afghan.friendly.fire/ |work=CNN |access-date=2023-07-29 |archive-date=2023-07-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230729003801/http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/10/29/afghan.friendly.fire/ |url-status=dead }}</ref>

The main body of TF Hammer reached its pre-assault point around 06:15 and waited for the expected "55 minute" aerial bombardment of enemy positions.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher command meant the bombardment was not that extensive and consisted of six bombs. This was due to a bomb getting stuck in the launch bay of the [[B-1 Lancer|B-1B]] that was on its bomb run. The next aircraft in line waited for the B-1B to receive permission to jettison the bomb and go round again. During this time, both bombers plus the additional two [[F-15E Strike Eagle|F-15Es]] claimed to have received a "knock off" call directing them to cease the bombardment. One of the F-15E pilots later acknowledged that this may have been a communication directing Grim-31 to cease fire. This lack of air support demoralized the Afghans and frustrated the special forces. The Afghan fighters, in trucks, were devastated by [[mortar (weapon)|mortar]] fire registered in advance to strike fixed points on the road. The Afghans suffered forty or more deaths and injuries.

At this point, it became clear that the Al Qaeda fighters had been expecting an attack. The intense small arms and mortar fire, combined with the absence of close air support, caused the Afghan forces of TF Hammer to scatter and refuse to advance any further. This situation was reminiscent of the challenges faced during the earlier [[Battle of Tora Bora|Tora Bora operation]], in which the Afghan militias had similarly refused to advance in the face of enemy resistance. With no opportunity to alter the operation that had already been set in motion, the task of assaulting the Shah-i-Kot Valley had to be carried out by the troops of TF Anvil instead.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=Special Forces in the War on Terror |date=19 May 2015 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-0790-8 |page=89 |language=English}}</ref>

====TF Rakkasan====
[[File:Soldier with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), takes a knee and watches for enemy movement during a pause in a road march during Operation Anaconda, March 2002.jpg|thumb|right| A U.S. soldier with 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), watches for enemy movement during a pause in a road march during Operation Anaconda, March 2002.]]
At 05:00, the assault troops of TF Rakkasan boarded their CH-47 Chinook transport helicopters at [[Bagram Airfield|Bagram Air Base]] and flew south towards the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The weather was cold and cloudy, and the soldiers bundled up in cold weather gear to keep warm. The six Chinooks carrying the Rakkasans were accompanied by two [[UH-60 Blackhawk]] helicopters and several [[Boeing AH-64 Apache|AH-64 Apaches]]. The aircraft ran into significant troubles during the flight caused by foggy weather, and somehow the Chinooks passed the valley entrance significantly ahead of the Apaches, forcing the Rakkasans to drop off on "hot" landing zones (meaning that the insurgents were nearby and able to engage them immediately as they dropped off). The six Chinooks spread out and headed for their respective landing zones. As the security team rushed to secure the landing zones, the TF Rakkasan commander observed the valley with concern. He noticed that there were no signs of civilians in the towns below. No colors, no smoke, no animals, no hanging clothes – nothing to indicate people living there. It became clear that the civilians had been moved out and that there were only enemy combatants to be found there.<ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=1 June 2006 |publisher=Penguin Books Limited |isbn=978-0-14-192946-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vsSINu2ZvO4C&q=not+a+good+day+to+die+sean+naylor |language=en}}</ref>

At 06:30 the first wave of Rakkasans and Mountain troops landed via Chinook helicopter along the eastern and northern edges of the valley to await the fleeing fighters at their assigned blocking positions. The terrorists appeared surprised and did not fire on the Chinooks at first, possibly due to them being distracted by TF Hammer's advance or because of ineffective communication between the foreign fighters themselves. This confusion bought the infantry invaluable time to take up security positions around the helicopter landing zone, and the first shots rang out as the Chinooks lifted off and departed. Due to TF Hammer having aborted the mission, they came under much heavier fire than they had anticipated after landing on their objectives and remained pinned down by heavy mortar fire and found themselves locked in a fierce firefight throughout the day.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command |date=11 October 2016 |publisher=St. Martin's Griffin |isbn=978-1-250-10547-9 |page=192 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref> Orbiting Apache helicopters attempted to suppress enemy mortar teams, but ran into a wall of RPG and 12.7mm fire, with one Apache losing all of its electronics to an RPG hit. Instead of 200-250 fighters in the valley, as originally expected, post-assessment held that the area contained 750 to 1,000 terrorists dug in on the high ground around the valley. The insurgents used their [[ZPU]]-1 antiaircraft guns, DSHK, and small arms fire against the attack helicopters supporting the Rakkasans.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.56</ref> 
[[File:Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), scan the ridgeline for enemy forces during Operation Anaconda, March 4, 2002.jpg|thumb|left|U.S. soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), scan the ridgeline for enemy forces during Operation Anaconda, March 4, 2002.]]
The Al-Qaeda fighters employed a tactic they had learned from the [[Afghan mujahideen]] during the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet-Afghan war]]. They fired their RPG rockets into the air, aiming for the self-destruct mechanism that automatically detonates the warheads after traveling a specific distance (920 meters). The insurgents used this method to set the rounds to explode near the aircraft and damage its hydraulic and electrical innards with its lethal flak bursts of shrapnel. Furthermore, the terrorists launched RPG barrages just ahead of the Apaches, another old mujahideen tactic that made it challenging for the Apaches to navigate through the valley safely. Two Apaches were taken out of the fight and forced to return to base early on the first day due to the heavy RPG and machine-gun fire. Upon returning to base, the crew discovered more than 30 bullet holes in the fuselage of one of the helicopters, in addition to damage to its left side caused by an RPG.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=Special Forces in the War on Terror |date=20 May 2015 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |pages=90–91 |edition=1st |url=https://www.amazon.com/Special-Forces-Terror-Leigh-Neville-ebook/dp/B01DPPTL2Y/ref=tmm_kin_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= |language=English}}</ref> According to journalist Steve Call, due to the intense hostile reception, only two out of the planned eight CH-47s managed to land in their designated landing zones,<ref name="Call"/> although this is disputed as other sources contend that there were only six chinooks, and all of them successfully landed without incident.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=235–236 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |last1=Wright |first1=Donald P. |last2=Dempsey |first2=Martin E. |title=A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation Enduring Freedom, October 2001 - September 2005 |url=https://history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/gwot/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161230133024/https://www.history.army.mil/html/bookshelves/resmat/GWOT/DifferentKindofWar.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=December 30, 2016 |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS |language=en |date=July 2010}}</ref>

Despite heavy opposition, Task Force Rakkasan managed to secure its blocking positions to the north by the middle of the morning. The presence of AFO teams in strategic high-ground locations played a crucial role in preventing the infantry from being overrun by the enemy. General Hagenbeck, who was in charge of the operation, was considering calling the mission off. However, Pete Blaber, the AFO commander, got on the radio and convinced him otherwise. Blaber insisted that this was a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity on the battlefield and that he intended to keep his teams in the Shah-i-Kot Valley, continuing to decimate the enemy through air strikes until they were no longer a threat.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command |date=1 September 2015 |publisher=St. Martin's Publishing Group |isbn=978-1-4668-7622-4 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=oWiWBgAAQBAJ |language=en}}</ref> Throughout the day, TF Rakkasan soldiers fought relentlessly with the AFOs providing continuous support by calling in air strikes on Al-Qaeda positions. The Apaches also played a crucial role in protecting the Rakkasans on the valley floor during the intense battle. AFO's only frustration was that Rakkasan ETAC/JTAC had priority for calling in airstrikes over the AFOs requests and the other SOF reconnaissance teams in and around the valley.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.57</ref>

The troops of the 1st Battalion, [[87th Infantry Regiment (United States)|87th Infantry Regiment]] in the southern [[landing zone]]s faced the heaviest fighting. The men on the floor of the valley then picked up and began to patrol north again moving another 50 or so meters when an RPG was fired off a low foothill to the east.  This round closed in on around 10 men, including the two Australians and most of the American leadership, landing in the snow and mud right amongst them but failing to detonate.  The AQ then opened up with a [[DShK]] as the troops on the ground ran for the only cover on the valley floor in what became known as "Hell's Halfpipe." In this engagement, Staff Sergeant Andrzej Ropel, and Specialist William Geraci, recently transferred in from the Division's [[Long Range Surveillance Detachment]], led the squad under fire to a ridgeline above the "Halfpipe."  Ropel was able to kill the enemy observer calling mortar fire into the "Halfpipe," and he and his squad could now see the surrounding terrain. Ropel was later awarded the [[Bronze Star Medal]] with a Valor device for his actions. The expectation of very limited enemy [[indirect fire]] capability meant that only a single [[M120 120 mm mortar|120mm mortar]] was brought in the first wave. The primary fire support for the troops was provided by two [[McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache]]s of the 3rd Battalion, [[101st Aviation Regiment]], [[159th Aviation Brigade]] ("Eagle Attack").<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.56-57</ref>

As the AFO scouts investigated the southern area near the base of Takur Ghar, the prominent mountain in the valley, they came across an unusual scene. Among the Al-Qaeda fighters, they spotted a female combatant, a rare occurrence not frequently seen among the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan. This woman, in her mid-thirties, stood out with her ponytailed hair, a long scarf that draped all the way down to her knees, and an AK-47 slung across her back. Despite being armed, she wasn't engaged in combat; instead, she sat on a ledge at the mountain's base, cooking. Other enemy fighters, who had been actively sniping at the US scouts, would come down to join her for meals before returning to their positions. As the scouts prepared to move on, they called for mortar support from the 187th Infantry's mortar platoon positioned in the "Halfpipe," obliterating the woman's position, along with the other Al-Qaeda fighters in the vicinity.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=1 June 2006 |publisher=Penguin Books Limited |isbn=978-0-14-192946-0 |pages=260–261 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vsSINu2ZvO4C&q=not+a+good+day+to+die+sean+naylor |language=en}}</ref>

Signalman [[Martin Wallace (soldier)|Martin "Jock" Wallace]], of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, was awarded the [[Medal for Gallantry]] for his actions during the fighting. When a mortar team from the 1-87 Infantry was hit by enemy mortar fire, Wallace put himself in harm's way, collecting some of the wounded by dragging them into the creek bed, then dressing their wounds along with another SASR liaison officer. Throughout the day, the [[Tactical Air Control Party|TACP]] [[forward air control]]lers and [[Special forces|Special Forces]] teams that had infiltrated into the area the previous day assisted in calling in airstrikes from [[B-1 Lancer|B-1]], [[B-52 Stratofortress|B-52]], [[F-15 Eagle|F-15]], [[F/A-18 Hornet|F-18]] and [[F-16 Fighting Falcon|F-16]] aircraft, inflicting heavy casualties on the [[Taliban]] and al Qaeda fighters, but by no means silencing them.  After nearly having their position overrun, the men in the southern landing zones were in a desperate position, pinned down all day and short of ammunition.  Salvation came after dark in the form of an [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130U Spooky]] gunship that unlike the faster-moving jets during the day, was able to loiter over the area and provide sustained firepower so the men could be airlifted out under cover of darkness; the group suffered 35 wounded (two [[Chalk (military)|chalks]] of which were casevaced by PaveHawk CSAR choppers) and none killed.<ref name="Lee">{{cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EmmDOQAACAAJ|title=18 Hours: The True Story of an SAS War Hero|author=Sandra Lee|publisher=HarperCollins Publishers|location=Australia|year=2007|isbn=978-0-7322-8246-2}}</ref>

===3 March and 4 March 2002===

====Battle of Takur Ghar====
{{Main|Battle of Takur Ghar}}
[[File:AnacondaAreaOfOperations.jpg|thumb|right|A strategic map of operations by U.S. forces in the Shah-i-Kot Valley during the operation]]
On the second day of the operation, General Hagenbeck and Colonel Wiercinski decided to make some changes. Because many soldiers in the southern blocking position of the 187th Infantry had been wounded, Hagenbeck chose to withdraw forces from the southern end of the valley. Instead, he relocated them to the northern position to assist the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division in carrying out a sweep from the north to the south along the eastern ridge. Lieutenant Colonel Ron Corkran's 187th Infantry Battalion arrived in the northern region around 8:00 PM on March 3 and began their careful sweep southward, encountering no resistance. It became clear that the defenders had abandoned the valley floor. By the end of the day, they had successfully cleared a path to the base of Takur Ghar, and had gained a much better feel for the opposition, which had proven to be more formidable than initially anticipated.<ref name=Folse2022>{{cite book |last1=Folse |first1=Mark |publisher=U.S. Army Center of Military History |location=Washington, D.C. |url=https://history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-83/cmhPub_70-83-1.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230314234551/http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/070/70-83/cmhPub_70-83-1.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=March 14, 2023 |title= Operation Enduring Freedom : September 2001-March 2002 |year=2022}}</ref>

General Hagenbeck also took steps to address the challenges the air assault team had faced on the initial day of the operation. The Apache helicopters had suffered significant damage, and it had become apparent that the AC-130 aircraft were susceptible to ground fire, making them unsuitable for daytime operations. Furthermore, there weren't enough Air Force tactical controllers available to fulfill the demand for precision-guided strikes against al-Qaeda positions. To tackle these issues, CENTCOM deployed five [[A-10 Thunderbolt II]] aircraft. Not only were these robust aircraft far less susceptible to ground fire, but they could also remain over the battlefield during daylight hours and deliver accurate strikes without requiring the assistance of Air Force tactical controllers.<ref name=Folse2022/>

In the late evening of 3 March, Lieutenant Colonel Pete Blaber received notice from Brigadier General Gregory Trebon, commander of [[TF 11]], that two SEAL fire teams commanded by [[Lieutenant commander (United States)|Lieutenant Commander]] Vic Hyder were to be inserted into the Shah-i-Kot Valley. The two SEAL fire teams, Mako 30 and Mako 21, planned to establish an observation point on either end of the valley. One team would move to the peak of [[Takur Ghar]], which commanded the southern approach to the Shah-i-Kot valley. Due to time constraints, a helicopter insertion would be needed for the teams to reach the peak before dawn.  Hyder requested authorization to shift the insertion 24 hours to the next evening but was directed that insertion was critical to SOF providing support to the Operation. Originally, an insertion point {{convert|1400|m|yd}} east of the peak was identified, but due to uncontrollable time constraints, the SEALs of Mako 30 were forced into an insertion to the peak itself. Even though all overhead imagery showed no signs of life on the peak of Takur Ghar, Lieutenant Commander Hyder gave the team final guidance per special operation procedure that if any signs were seen, the mission would be aborted.

The SEAL fire team, Mako 30, was picked up by an MH-47 Chinook helicopter, at 23:23 on 3 March. However, the Chinook experienced engine difficulties and new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original helicopters. This delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the [[landing zone]] east of the peak until 02:30 on 4 March, which did not allow enough time to reach the peak before daylight. Blaber was notified that the SEALs were forced to insert on the peak to fulfill the order to infil Mako 30 that night. Nail 22, an AC-130H Spectre, reconnoitered the peak, and, seeing no enemy activity, declared the mountaintop secure. It was then called away to support other troops before the Chinook arrived.

At approximately 03:00, the Chinook attempted to land atop the mountain. As they approached, the pilots and SEALs observed tracks in the snow and other signs of recent human activity. As they discussed a possible mission abort, the helicopter was met with effective RPG fire.  Two Rocket Propelled Grenades slammed into the helicopter, shutting down one of its engines, the electric system, and the hydraulic systems. Petty Officer First Class [[Neil C. Roberts]] had fallen out of the open ramp as the pilot had taken evasive actions. They first attempted to return and retrieve him, but the engine damage prevented proper control and the helicopter was forced to crash-land in the valley below, approximately 4 miles away. The SEAL team Mako 30, regrouped and was ferried by nearby units to another Chinook to go back to Takur Ghar and search for Roberts. The AC-130 was then directed to attack the large groupings of enemy combatants currently exposed on top of the mountain, one to three minutes before the Mako 30 was scheduled to arrive. When the Chinook dropped off the SEALs back on top of the mountain, they came under immediate fire, and Air Force [[Forward air control|combat controller]] Technical Sergeant [[John A. Chapman]] was seriously injured, along with two Navy SEALs. Mako 30 was forced off the peak due to the heavy fire and damage done. The [[75th Ranger Regiment|Ranger]] [[quick reaction force]] (QRF) force located at [[Bagram Air Base]] and led by [[Nate Self|Captain Nate Self]], was called in to search for the SEAL who fell out of the helicopter, now alone on top of the mountain.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Lowrey |first1=Nathan S. |title=U.S. Marines in Afghanistan, 2001-2002: From the Sea |date=2011 |publisher=United States Marine Corps, History Division |page=264 |isbn=978-0-16-089557-9 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=L8Wej8Z9Sn4C&q=U.S.+Marines+in+Afghanistan,+2001-2002:+From+the+Sea |language=en}}</ref>

Around this time command decided to change the frequencies for satellite radio communications which different units, including the AFO teams in their reconnaissance positions, were relying on to conduct and adapt the mission as the battle unfolded. One of the generals in overall charge of the events at Takur Ghar ordered the radio frequencies switched to prevent the plan being modified.{{Citation needed|date=November 2012}}  Though the change may have been meant to enhance direct control of the rescue of the downed SEAL atop Takur Ghar, it had the critical effect of severely limiting communications between the different teams participating in the battle.
[[File:Ch-47 Chinook helicopters take off in the early morning in support of Operation Anaconda, March 2002.jpg|thumb|left|Ch-47 Chinook helicopters take off in the early morning in support of Operation Anaconda, March 2002.]]

At 03:45, the Ranger quick reaction force was dispatched to the area. Though they weren't given a specific mission, they were to establish communication for further instructions upon reaching Gardez, 10 minutes from the mountain. The quick reaction force consisted of 19 Rangers, a [[Tactical Air Control Party]] ([[Tacp]]), and a three-man USAF [[Air Force Special Tactics|special tactics team]] carried by two Chinooks, Razor 01 and Razor 02. As Air Force rules prohibited [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] aircraft from remaining in hostile airspace in daylight after the crash of an AC-130 in [[Khafji]] in the [[Gulf War]], the AC-130 support protecting Mako 30 was forced to leave before Razor 01 reached the landing zone, although the leadership was aware that Razor 01 was incoming. Unfortunately, the Razor Chinooks had not been equipped with functioning satellite radios to maintain communication with the headquarters in Bagram or, even more critically, the AFO Team's lead. Also, unfortunately, the pilot of the Razor 01 was not told about the enemy's anti-aircraft location on top of the mountain. Due to the satellite communications difficulties (which may have been caused by a little-known space weather effect caused by [[Equatorial plasma bubble|equatorial plasma bubbles]]<ref>{{cite news |title=Could Plasma Bubble Have Doomed U.S. Copter in Afghanistan Battle? |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/science/science-news/could-plasma-bubble-have-doomed-u-s-copter-afghanistan-battle-n214411 |work=NBC News |date=29 September 2014 |language=en}}</ref>), Razor 01 was mistakenly directed to the "hot" landing zone on the peak at {{Coord|33|20|34|N|69|12|49|E|type:mountain_region:AF}}. Because of this, the Razor 01 flew into the same enemy trap that the SEALs had flown into, with no one able to communicate the reality of the situation.

At approximately 06:10, Razor 01 reached the landing zone. The aircraft immediately began taking fire, and the right door [[minigun]]ner, Sergeant Phillip Svitak, was killed by small arms fire. Drone footage of the incident showed the mortally wounded Technical Sergeant [[John A. Chapman]] drawing fire away from Razor 01 as it landed. This action earned him the Congressional Medal of Honor.  A rocket-propelled grenade then hit the helicopter, destroying the right engine and forcing it to crash land. As the Rangers and special tactics team exited the aircraft, Private First Class Matt Commons, posthumously promoted to Corporal, Sergeant Brad Crose, and Specialist Marc Anderson were also killed, leading to a total of three Ranger casualties during the operation. The surviving crew and quick-reaction force at first attempted a daring assault on the Taliban positions but faced tough resistance from concealed insurgent bunkers, which caused the Rangers to retreat and take cover in a hillock where a fierce firefight began.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Neville |first1=Leigh |title=US Army Rangers 1989–2015: Panama to Afghanistan |date=24 May 2016 |publisher=Bloomsbury USA |isbn=978-1-4728-1540-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=U1cnswEACAAJ&q=us+army+ranger+1989-2015+leigh+neville |language=en}}</ref> Razor 02, which had been diverted to Gardez as Razor 01 was landing on Takur Ghar, returned with the rest of the quick-reaction force and Lieutenant Commander Hyder at 06:25. With the help of the new arrivals and close air support, the force was able to consolidate its position on the peak. The quick reaction force's Chalk 2 moved up the mountain to assist Chalk 1. While air force jets provided suppressive fire on the mountain top with individual gun runs since Mako 30 was less than {{convert|100|m|yd}} north of the peak and Chalk 1 with its downed MH-47 was less than 100 m south of the peak. Hyder saw the need to assist Mako 21 who at that time had two dead and two injured, one of them non-ambulatory. It was obvious from this viewpoint that the proximity of friendly forces to the enemy positions was preventing sufficient suppressive firepower from being used due to danger close distance to both Mako 30 and quick reaction force chalk 1. Hyder directed the Chalk 2 leader to continue mission up the mountain and moved, alone, to link up with Mako 21 in order to assist that team's movement away from the peak thereby creating a better situation for air assets to support by fire. An enemy counterattack midday mortally wounded Senior Airman [[Jason D. Cunningham]], a [[Air Force Pararescue|pararescueman]].  The wounded were refused [[medical evacuation]] during the daylight hours, due to risk of another downed helicopter. Mako 30 and Lt. Cmdr. Hyder moved down the mountain with their wounded. Through threat of nearby enemy response elements, hypothermia and shock of wounded personnel, and across nearly 30" of snow in extreme terrain, Mako 21 found a site suitable for an MH-47. The SEAL team set up defenses, attempted to warm the wounded, and waited for dark when a recovery would be attempted.

Australian [[Special Air Service Regiment]] (SASR) soldiers inserted with a United States Air Force Combat Controller had infiltrated the area prior to the first helicopter crash undetected as part of a long range reconnaissance mission when the Chinooks went down. They remained undetected in an [[observation post]] through the firefight and proved critical in co-ordinating multiple Coalition air strikes to prevent the al-Qaeda fighters from overrunning the downed aircraft, to devastating effect. This, plus the actions of the two SASR officers working with the 10th Mountain Division, earned the commander of the Australian SASR force in Afghanistan the US Bronze Star for his unit's outstanding contribution to the war on terrorism. Australian soldiers had utilised 'virtual reality' style software for mission rehearsal prior to insertion, and this contributed significantly to their situational awareness in the darkness and poor weather conditions. This was the first time this capability had been used for a live combat mission.

At around 20:00, the quick-reaction force and Mako 30/21 were exfiltrated from the Takur Ghar peak. As a result of this action, both Technical Sergeant Chapman and Senior Airman Cunningham were awarded the [[Air Force Cross (United States)|Air Force Cross]], the second-highest award for bravery. In 2018, Chapman's Air Force Cross was upgraded to the Medal of Honor and he was promoted posthumously to the rank of Master Sergeant. US and Afghan sources believe at least 200 Taliban and [[Al Qaida]] fighters were killed during the initial assault and subsequent rescue mission.

Also on March 4, the 2nd Battalion of the Rakkasans air assaulted into the eastern end of the valley, immediately attacking the heights under Apache cover. Meanwhile, the 3rd battalion were dropped into the northern end of the valley with the objective of linking up with the stranded forces at the blocking positions. Supported by 16 Apaches, 5 USMC Cobras helicopters and several A-10A ground attack aircraft; the Rakkasans methodically cleared an estimated 130 caves, 22 bunkers and 40 buildings to finally secure the valley.<ref>Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.66</ref>

=====Fate of Roberts=====
It is not certain whether the sailor died immediately or was killed by opposing soldiers. There is a possibility that Roberts was captured by the al Qaeda fighters, and executed later with a single shot to the back of the head (One of the feeds showed a group of 8-10 fighters huddling around what appeared to be a body; both GRIM 32 and MAKO 30 noted that an [[IR strobe]] was active, a video feed showed the fighters passing the IR strobe around).<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013.:</ref> This report has not been confirmed. Major General Frank Hagenbeck did confirm that al-Qaeda fighters were seen (on live video feed from a [[RQ-1 Predator|Predator]] drone orbiting the firefight) chasing Roberts, and later dragging his body away from the spot where he fell. Another feed from the same Predator showed a puff of heat [from a rifle] and the indistinct figure in front of it fall.<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013:</ref> Also, the quick-reaction soldiers reported fighters wearing Robert's gear and finding "a helmet with a bullet hole in it, [from which] it was clear the last person [Roberts] to wear it had been shot in the head."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Predator drone footage also suggested the possibility that Technical Sergeant John Chapman was alive and fighting on the peak after the SEALs left rather than being killed outright as thought by Mako 30. Chapman was seen fighting in a bunker against multiple enemies before stepping into the open and braving enemy small arms fire one last time to allow the quick reaction force helicopter a bit of breathing room.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>

A paper written by Andrew Milani (Former commander of the [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]]) and Dr. Stephen D. Biddle entitled "Pitfalls of Technology: A Case Study of the battle of Takur Ghar" noted that the Predator was on station 90 minutes after Roberts had fallen; the images that were shot before the Predator had arrived were shot by GRIM-32's Infrared Cameras.<ref>Macpherson, Malcolm. "Roberts Ridge" Bantam Dell (New York), 2013. Page 352:</ref> although this has not been confirmed by commanders.

===5 March 2002===

The last remaining AFO team in the Shah-i-Kot Valley was Team Juliet. They investigated a cave and building complex at the eastern end of the pass. The area had been targeted by multiple air strikes, including a [[thermobaric bomb]] that had destroyed the cave on the day of the operation's start. Team Juliet used their ATVs to conduct a passage of lines with the TF Rakkasan elements. They then boarded their Chinook and flew back to Gardez, meaning that every AFO team had now left the valley.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=372–373 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

Plans were put in motion to bring in fresh troops for the clearing of the Shah-i-Kot valley, such as troops of the 4th Battalion, [[31st Infantry Regiment (United States)|31st Infantry Regiment]] and allied Canadian troops. However, there was very little fighting after the events at Takur Ghar, and the U.S. commanders simply chose to take a passive approach and allow the surrounding fires to eliminate the enemy forces.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |page=373 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

===10 March 2002===
Major Bryan Hilferty stated that the "major battle ended three or four days ago." The U.S. sent 400 of its troops back to base. Efforts were organized to convene the Afghan warlords Zia Lodin and Gul Haidar. Their collaboration aimed to formulate a final offensive to sweep the valley floor and rid the villages of any remaining Al-Qaeda presence. Mark Rosengard maintained his belief in nurturing a sense of ownership and pride among the Afghans. He emphasized that the Afghans themselves needed to lead the operation to clear the villages, ensuring their active involvement in the process. Attempting to facilitate cooperation between Zia Lodin and Gul Haidar posed significant challenges. It was evident that there existed a history between these two men, marked by a lack of mutual trust, although the exact details remained elusive to the Americans. Zia Lodin, a [[Pashtuns|Pashtun]] commander, held distinct differences from Gul Haidar, a [[Tajiks#Afghanistan|Tajik]] from [[Logar Province]], who served as the [[Afghan Defense Minister|Afghan defense minister]] and had a background with the [[Northern Alliance]].<ref name="Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold S">{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=370–377 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

The primary point of contention between these two men was the order in which they would enter the valley. Both were wary that being the first to advance would leave them with their back turned towards the other, who might potentially take advantage of the situation and shoot them from behind. This disagreement stemmed from their mutual distrust and added complexity to their collaboration efforts. Nevertheless, the Americans ultimately succeeded in convincing the warlords to cooperate and sweep into the valley on March 12.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=373–374 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

===12 March 2002===

The Afghan troops finally initiated their belated sweep into the valley using a pincer-style attack. A significant aspect of this operation was Gul Haidar's inclusion of a column of [[T-54/T-55|T-55 tanks]]. The U.S. military leadership believed these tanks could play a crucial role in this final operation, despite intelligence suggesting that it was unlikely that any enemy combatants remained in the valley. The American troops accompanying Gul Haidar's forces were impressed by his leadership qualities. An illustrative example of this was when his tank column encountered several [[Anti-tank mine|antitank mines]] partially buried along the path. Gul Haidar took charge of the situation and personally used a grabbing hook to secure the mines. This garnered both respect and concern from the Americans, who were worried about the commander's safety. The only issue happened at one point when Haidar's tanks mistakenly fired upon the Rakkasan troops positioned on the mountainside. A T-55 tank crew accidentally fired a main gun round that went right through a pup tent belonging to 2-187 Infantry. Fortunately, no one was injured, and swift radio communication corrected the error.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Naylor |first1=Sean |title=Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda |date=7 March 2006 |publisher=Dutton Caliber |isbn=978-0-425-20787-1 |pages=373–774 |edition=Reprint |language=English}}</ref>

Meanwhile, Zia Lodin's forces, accompanied by Pete Blaber himself, were engaged in clearing the valley's southern end. This time, the Afghan troops had the freedom to conduct the operation according to their own strategies, and this made a big difference. Blaber noted that the Afghan troops were highly motivated because they were actually using their own tactics this time. By this point, the operation was nearing its conclusion, with no combat taking place after Takur Ghar except for a minor engagement on March 17. Zia's troops continued to clear the deserted villages within the valley, but there was minimal sign of either civilians or enemy combatants. The operation officially continued for a few more days but during this time, the focus shifted to counting bodies and verifying enemy casualties rather than encountering further fighting.<ref name="Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold S"/>

===13 March 2002===
The Rakkasans were replaced by fresh elements from the 10th Mountain Division, who continued to clear the southern end of the Shah-i-Kot. AFO teams launched further Recce teams into the nearby Naka Valley, hunting for al-Qaeda terrorists that had escaped but did not find anything.<ref name="ReferenceB">Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015  {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.66-67</ref> By this day, following heavy bombing by U.S. strike fighter aircraft, joint U.S. and Afghan forces swept through the valley and cleared it of remaining rebel forces, with little significant combat by 18 March. A total of 8 U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen were killed and 82 wounded, along with several Afghan militiamen; U.S. estimates of other casualties vary, indicating rebel casualties between 500 and 800 and at least 14 civilian casualties. An undetermined number of rebels are said to have escaped the fighting through rugged terrain.

===17 March 2002===
Task Force 11 received time-sensitive intelligence that a possible [[high-value target]] was traveling within a convoy of al-Qaeda fighters who were attempting to escape by vehicle from Shah-i-Kot into Pakistan. A Predator UAV had the convoy under surveillance, showing 3 SUVs, a pickup truck, and a large security element of gunmen. The TF 11 element assigned to the mission included SEAL operators from DEVGRU (commanded by the SEAL who led the Mako 30 mission on Takur Ghar) and attached British [[Special Boat Service|SBS]] operators, with a mixed force of Rangers as back up. The operators and an assigned CSAR team boarded 3 MH-47Es while the Rangers climbed aboard a pair of MH-60G Blackhawks, launching from Bagram in the early morning. The MH-47Es carrying the SEALs caught up to their targets: the lead Chinook landed in front of the convoy; as the occupants leapt out of their vehicles, the door gunner hosed the vehicles down with his minigun, cutting down a number of al-Qaeda terrorists; the second Chinook overshot the column and raked it with minigun fire as it passed. The TF 11 operators added their firepower. Two Chinooks then landed their passengers in cover nearby and the operators took up positions overlooking the convoy. Both teams of SEAL operators now opened fire down on the enemy fighters in a crossfire and the third Chinook landed its operators nearby to investigate a suspicious looking vehicle. The firefight was over in minutes; of the 18 al-Qaeda fighters, 16 were killed and two were wounded. The fighters were a mix of well equipped [[Uzbeks]], [[Chechens]], and [[Afghan Arabs|Arabs]]. The operators recovered a lot of US military equipment: a US-made suppressor, a number of US fragmentation grenades issued to TF 11 and a Garmin handheld GPS, later traced to the crew of Razor 01.<ref name="Neville, Leigh p.25">Neville, Leigh, '' Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)'', Osprey Publishing, 2015 {{ISBN|1472807901}} {{ISBN|978-1472807908}}, p.67-69</ref><ref name="Neville">{{cite book |last1=Neville|first1=Leigh |title=Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (Elite)|publisher= Osprey Publishing |year=2008 |isbn=978-1846033100}}P.32</ref>

===18 March 2002===
General Tommy Franks declared Operation Anaconda over, later describing it "an unqualified and complete success."<ref>Franks, Tommy R., ''American Soldier'', Regan Books, 2004  {{ISBN|978-0060731588}}, p.379</ref> Investigative reporter [[Seymour Hersh]] refuted the official account, describing it as "in fact a debacle, plagued by squabbling between the services, bad military planning and avoidable deaths of American soldiers, as well as the escape of key al-Qaeda leaders, likely including Osama bin Laden."<ref>{{cite news|author=Mary Jacoby|author-link=Mary Jacoby|url=https://www.salon.com/2004/09/18/hersh_interview/|title=Seymour Hersh's alternative history of Bush's war |work=[[Salon (website)|Salon]] |date=2004-09-18 |access-date=2018-03-02}}</ref>