Editing On War (section)

=== Purpose, goal and means ===
Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along the line of the categories ''Purpose'', ''Goal'' and ''Means''. He reasoned that the ''Purpose'' of war is one's will to be enforced, which is determined by politics. The ''Goal'' of the conflict is therefore to defeat the opponent in order to exact the ''Purpose''. The ''Goal'' is pursued with the help of a strategy, that might be brought about by various ''Means'' such as by the defeat or the elimination of opposing armed forces or by non-military ''Means'' (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state might serve as ''Means'' to achieve the set goal.<ref>LeMay, "Napoleonic Warfare"</ref>

One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes summarizes that idea: "War is the continuation of policy with other means."<ref name="Clausewitz2010" />

That quote in itself allows for the interpretation that the military will take over from politics as soon as war has begun (as, for example, the [[German General Staff]] did during [[World War I]]). However, Clausewitz had postulated the ''primacy of politics'' and in this context elaborated: "[...], we claim that war is nothing more than a continuation of the political process by applying other means. By applying other means we simultaneously assert that the political process does not end with the conclusion of the war or is being transformed into something entirely different, but that it continues to exist and proceed in its essence, regardless of the structure of the means it makes use of [...]."<ref>{{Cite web |title =Clausewitz' Theorie des Krieges |url =https://intr2dok.vifa-recht.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/mir_derivate_00007083/Muenkler.pdf |last =Herfried Münkler |publisher =Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft |access-date =April 30, 2020 | page = 5 | quote = Wir behaupten dagegen, der Krieg ist nichts als eine Fortsetzung des politischen Verkehrs mit Einmischung anderer Mittel. Wir sagen Einmischung anderer Mittel, um damit zugleich zu behaupten, dass dieser politische Verkehr durch den Krieg selbst nicht aufhört, nicht in etwas ganz anderes verwandelt wird, sondern daß er sich in seinem Wesen fortbesteht, wir auch seine Mittel gestaltet sein mögen, deren er sich bedient, [...].}}</ref>

According to [[Azar Gat]], the "general message" of the book was that "the conduct of war could not be reduced to universal principles [and is] dominated by political decisions and moral forces."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Gat |first=Azar |title=A history of military thought: from the Enlightenment to the Cold War |date=2001 |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-924762-2 |location=Oxford (GB) |pages=125}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title =Staatenkrieg und nicht-staatliche Kriege in Clausewitz, Vom Kriege |url =https://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Herberg-Rothe/ClausewitzUndNicht-StaatlicheKriege2.htm |last =Andreas Herberg-Rothe |publisher =Clausewitz Com |access-date =April 23, 2020}}</ref> These basic conclusions are essential to Clausewitz's theory:
* War must never be seen as having any purpose in itself but should be seen as a political instrument: "War is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of the political process, an application by other means."<ref>''On War'', Book I, Chapter 1, 24., Carl von Clausewitz, translated by J.J. Graham, p. ''18'' {{ISBN|956-8356-20-7}}</ref>
* The military objectives in war that support one's political objectives fall into two broad types: "war to achieve limited aims" and war to "disarm" the enemy: "to render [him] politically helpless or militarily impotent."
* All else being equal, the course of war will tend to favor the party with the stronger emotional and political motivations, especially the defender.<ref name="Cla08" />
<!--Unsourced and displaced... Within the book the writer Clausewitz writes about his memories fighting away in France as a trooper in the Napoleonic wars. Some say that is where Clausewitz got his inspiration to create the book on War. Others disagree and state that he was a physiologist at heart and wanted to understand how and why people wanted to go to war and fight others.-->

Some of the key ideas (not necessarily original to Clausewitz or even to his mentor, [[Gerhard von Scharnhorst]]) discussed in ''On War'' include<ref>This list is from "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/faqs.htm#Ideas Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz]," ''ClausewitzStudies.org'', edited by Christopher Bassford.</ref> (in no particular order of importance):
* the [[dialectic|dialectical approach]] to military analysis
* the methods of "critical analysis"
* the uses and abuses of historical studies
* the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
* the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
* the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
* the nature of "'''military genius'''" ({{langx |de| der kriegerische Genius}}) - as exemplified particularly in Frederick the Great and in Napoleon Bonaparte<ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Handel
 |first1               = Michael I.
 |editor-last1         = Handel
 |editor-first1        = Michael I.
 |date                 = 12 November 2012
 |orig-date            = 1986
 |chapter              = Clausewitz in the Age of Technology
 |title                = Clausewitz and Modern Strategy
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=exDz1e_C8QgC
 |publication-place    = Abingdon
 |publisher            = Routledge
 |page                 = 77
 |isbn                 = 9781136285479
 |access-date          = 23 August 2024
 |quote                = Frederick the Great and Napoleon, the models for Clausewitz' military genius, were very different from [[Lazare Carnot|Carnot]] (whom Clausewitz never mentions) [...].
}} 
</ref>
* the "fascinating trinity" ({{lang|de|Wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit}}) of war
* philosophical distinctions between "absolute or ideal war," and "real war"
* in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited war and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
* "war" belongs fundamentally to the social realm, rather than to the realms of art or science
* "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art
* "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science
* the essential unpredictability of war
* simplicity: Everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate.<ref>{{cite web |last1 =Ratcliffe |first1 =Susan |title =Oxford Essential Quotations, Karl von Clausewitz 1780–1831 |url =https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780191843730.001.0001/q-oro-ed5-00003050 |website =Oxford Reference |publisher =Oxford |access-date =December 7, 2021}}</ref> The strength of any strategy lies in its simplicity.<ref>{{cite web |last1 =Pietersen |first1 =Willie |title =Von Clausewitz on War: Six Lessons |url =https://www8.gsb.columbia.edu/articles/node/1788/von-clausewitz-on-war-six-lessons-for-the-modern-strategist |website =Columbia Business School |publisher =Columbia University |access-date =December 7, 2021}}</ref>
* the "[[fog of war]]"
* "friction"
* strategic and operational "[[center of gravity (military)|centres of gravity]]"
* the "[[culminating point]] of the offensive"
* the "culminating point of victory"