Editing Nixon Doctrine (section)

==Contemporary usage==
Scholar Walter Ladwig argued in 2012 that the United States should adopt a "neo-Nixon doctrine" towards the [[Indian Ocean]] region, in which the U.S. would sponsor key local partners—[[India]], [[Indonesia]], [[Australia]], and [[South Africa]]—to assume the primary burden for upholding regional peace and security. A key shortcoming of the original Nixon Doctrine, Ladwig argues, was its reliance on pro-Western autocrats who proved to be a poor foundation for an enduring regional security structure. In contrast, his "neo-Nixon Doctrine" would focus on cultivating the major Indian Ocean nations that are democratic and financially capable of being net providers of security in the region.<ref>Walter C. Ladwig III, [http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/A%20Neo-Nixon%20Doctrine%20for%20the%20Indian%20Ocean.pdf "A Neo-Nixon Doctrine for the Indian Ocean: Helping States Help Themselves,"] ''Strategic Analysis'', Vol. 36, No. 3 (May 2012).</ref> Although crediting this idea for the "reasonable balance it strikes between US leadership and local initiative", Andrew Philips of the [[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]] has suggested the idea overstates "the degree of convergent security interests between its four presumptive sub-regional lynchpin states."<ref>Andrew Phillips, [http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-challenges-of-order-building-in-the-indian-ocean-region "The challenges of order-building in the Indian Ocean Region,"] ''The Strategist'' (October 2012).</ref><ref name="urlSpringtime for Strongmen – Foreign Policy">{{cite web |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/gt-essay/springtime-for-strongmen-authoritarian-leaders-china-russia-north-korea-venezuela-turkey/ |title=Springtime for Strongmen – Foreign Policy }}</ref>