Editing Nihilism (section)

=== Moral nihilism ===
{{main|Moral nihilism}}
Unlike existential nihilism, moral nihilism focuses specifically on moral phenomena rather than a higher meaning or purpose. In its broadest form, it is the [[metaethics|metaethical]] view that there are no moral facts. Also called ''amoralism'' and ''error theory'', it denies the objective existence of morality, arguing that the theories and practices categorized under this label rest on misguided assumptions without any substantial link to reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–12]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} }}</ref> On a practical level, some moral nihilists, such as [[Friedrich Nietzsche]], conclude from this observation that anything is permitted, suggesting that people are allowed to act however they want without any social restrictions. Other moral nihilists reject this conclusion and argue that the denial of morality affects not only moral obligations, or what people are required to do, but also moral permissions, or what people are allowed to do.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=240–242}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/44631529 75–90]}} | {{harvnb|Joyce|2013}} | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} }}</ref> Axiological nihilism, a related view, denies the objective existence of values in general. This rejection is not limited to moral values and also concerns other types, like aesthetic and religious values.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Mulligan|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Bt99AgAAQBAJ&pg=PA401 401–402]}} | {{harvnb|Oddie|2013|loc=Lead section, § Do Value Claims Have Truth Makers?}} }}</ref>

One motivation for denying the existence of morality rests on the idea that moral properties are odd compared to other properties, like shape and size. This view is sometimes combined with the claim that scientific inquiry does not reveal objective moral facts or that humans lack a [[Epistemology#Sources|source]] of moral knowledge. A related argument for moral nihilism focuses on the conventional aspects of moral evaluations and the difficulties in resolving moral disagreements.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Gemes|Sykes|2013|p=673}} | {{harvnb|Dreier|2007|pp=242–249}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}} }}</ref> Another line of thought emphasizes the [[evolution]]ary origin of morality, viewing it as a mere product of natural selection without a deeper metaphysical foundation.<ref>{{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=76–80}}</ref>

[[Moral realism|Moral realists]] have raised various objections to moral nihilism. Naturalists argue that moral facts belong to the natural world and can be empirically observed. [[Ethical non-naturalism|Non-naturalists]] assert that moral phenomena are different from natural phenomena, but are real nonetheless.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sayre-McCord|2023|loc=§ 2. Metaphysics}} | {{harvnb|Lutz|2023|loc=Lead section, § 1. What Is Moral Naturalism?}} | {{harvnb|DeLapp|loc=§ 4a. Moral Realisms}} | {{harvnb|FitzPatrick|2011|pp=[https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/9780230294899_2 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Ridge|2019|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> Another perspective highlights the deep gap between moral nihilism and the fields of [[common sense]] and moral experience. Some viewpoints emphasize the negative practical consequences of abandoning moral beliefs or assert that moral nihilism is incoherent because it rests on a misunderstanding of moral language.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Sinnott-Armstrong|2007|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5pzCOHmcDocC&pg=PA59 53–59]}} | {{harvnb|Krellenstein|2017|pp=80–82}} }}</ref>

The term ''moral nihilism'' is sometimes used with a different meaning. In one sense, it is the same as moral subjectivism, arguing that moral evaluations are purely subjective and lack rational objective justification. As a result, moral judgments are seen as [[Expressivism|expressions of arbitrary individual preferences]], which vary between individuals, making moral disagreements rationally unresolvable.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11–14]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref> In another sense, moral nihilism refers to [[ethical egoism]], the theory that morality is determined by self-interest. This view denies that the [[well-being]] of others has moral implications unless it has external consequences for one's own well-being.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Crosby|1988|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=9VnPgFiW0CIC&pg=PA11 11, 14–15]}} | {{harvnb|Weller|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=TEZ9DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA10 10]}} }}</ref>