Editing Mind–body dualism (section)

===Thomistic dualism===

Thomistic dualism is a type of dualism derived from the views of [[Thomas Aquinas]].<ref name="Feser 2005">{{cite book |last=Feser |first=Edward |date=2006 |title=Philosophy of Mind: A Beginner's Guide |url=https://library.ucaphil.online/assets/files/Philosophy-ofMind-Feser.pdf |url-status= |pages=221–228| publisher=Oneworld Publications |isbn=978-1851684786|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927010324/https://library.ucaphil.online/assets/files/Philosophy-ofMind-Feser.pdf |archive-date=September 27, 2024}}</ref> [[Edward Feser]] has written that:

{{blockquote|Aristotelians and Thomists (those philosophers whose views are derived from St.Thomas Aquinas) sometimes suggest that their hylomorphic position is no more a version of dualism than it is of materialism. But though their view is not a Cartesian form of dualism, it is clear from a consideration of how the human soul differs from the souls of plants and animals (at least on the Thomistic variation of hylomorphism) that the view does amount to a kind of dualism: Thomistic dualism or hylomorphic dualism, as it has variously been called.<ref name="Feser 2005"/>}}

[[Thomism|Thomistic]] substance dualism has been defended by [[J. P. Moreland]] and [[Scott B. Rae]].<ref>{{cite journal|author=Reichenbach, Bruce R.|year=2002|title=J. P. Moreland & Scott B. Rae, Body and Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1883&context=faithandphilosophy|volume=19|issue=1|pages=112–116|doi=10.5840/faithphil200219112}}</ref><ref name="Van Dyke 2009">{{cite journal|author=Van Dyke, Christina|year=2009|title=Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and 'Thomistic Substance Dualism'|journal=Faith and Philosophy|url=https://www.pdcnet.org/faithphil/content/faithphil_2009_0026_0002_0186_0204|volume=26|issue=2|pages=186–204|doi=10.5840/faithphil200926226}}</ref> Thomistic substance dualism distinguishes itself from Cartesian substance dualism by denying that the body and soul are different substances. Instead, a person is composed of only one substance the soul while the body is considered an ensouled physical structure.<ref name="Van Dyke 2009"/> J. P. Moreland has commented:

{{blockquote|Thomistic substance dualism is not a dualism of two separable substances. There is only one substance, though I do not identify it with the body/soul composite. Rather, I take the one substance to be the soul, and the body to be an ensouled biological and physical structure that depends on the soul for its existence.<ref name="Moreland 2010"/>}}

[[Eleonore Stump]] has suggested that [[Thomas Aquinas]]'s views on matter and the soul are difficult to define in contemporary discussion but he would fit the criteria as a non-Cartesian substance dualist.<ref>{{cite journal|author=Stump, Eleonore|year=1995|title=Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism Without Reductionism|journal=Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers|url=https://place.asburyseminary.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1552&context=faithandphilosophy|volume=12|issue=4|pages=505–531|doi=10.5840/faithphil199512430}}</ref>

Other terms for Thomistic dualism include hylomorphic dualism or [[Thomistic hylomorphism]] which are contrasted with substance dualism.<ref name="Feser 2005"/><ref>{{cite journal|author=Stango, Marco|year=2017|title=Understanding Hylomorphic Dualism|journal=Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association|url=https://www.pdcnet.org/acpaproc/content/acpaproc_2017_0091_0145_0158?file_type=pdf|volume=91|issue=|pages=145–158|doi=10.5840/acpaproc2019102295}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|author=Skrzypek, Jeremy W.|year=2021|title=Not Just a Terminological Difference: Cartesian Substance Dualism vs Thomistic Hylomorphism|journal= Roczniki Filozoficzne|url=https://ojs.tnkul.pl/index.php/rf/article/view/15765|volume=69|issue=1|pages=103–117|doi=10.18290/rf21691-10|doi-access=free}}</ref> Hylomorphism is distinct from substance dualism as it holds the view that the immaterial (form) and material (matter) are not distinct substances and only share an efficient causality.<ref name="Feser 2005"/>

Thomistic scholars such as Paul Chutikorn and Edward Feser have written that Aquinas was not a substance dualist.<ref name="Chutikorn 2018">{{Cite web|author=Chutikorn, Paul|date=2018|title=A Thomistic Critique of Cartesian Dualism|url=https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism|website=Thomistica|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 25, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925123920/https://thomistica.net/essays/2018/11/9/a-thomistic-critique-of-cartesian-dualism|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|author=Feser, Edward|date=2020|title=Soul Proprietor|url=https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/02/soul-proprietor|website=First Things|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 25, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925182235/https://www.firstthings.com/article/2020/02/soul-proprietor|url-status=live}}</ref> Edward Feser who has defended hylomorphic dualism has suggested that it has advantages over substance dualism such as offering a possible solution to the interaction problem.<ref name="Feser 2005"/> Paul Chutikorn has commented that "adopting Aquinas' view of substance will provide a solution to the problem by avoiding altogether the position that man is made up of dual substances. Rather, Aquinas shows us that we can acknowledge a duality within substance itself, while maintaining its inherent substantial unity".<ref name="Chutikorn 2018"/>

Aristotelian hylomorphic dualism also has many similarities with Thomistic dualism.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2023|title=Aristotelian Hylomorphic Dualism|url=https://thomistica.net/essays/https/thomisticanet/quaestiones-url/hylomorphic-dualism|website=Thomistica|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 27, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927022733/https://thomistica.net/essays/https/thomisticanet/quaestiones-url/hylomorphic-dualism|url-status=live}}</ref> [[Michael Egnor]] is a notable advocate of Aristotelian dualism.<ref name="Stoke 2017">{{Cite web|author=Stoke, David|date=2017|title=Review of the 2017 Annual Meeting|url=https://christianscientific.org/review-of-the-2017-annual-meeting/|website=The Christian Scientific Society|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 22, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922232435/https://christianscientific.org/review-of-the-2017-annual-meeting/|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="Conference 2021">{{Cite web|date=2021|title=Science Beyond Materialism: Cosmology, Astrobiology, Consciousness|url=https://christianscholarsconference.org/panel/science-beyond-materialism-cosmology-astrobiology-consciousness/|website=Thomas H. Olbricht Christian Scholars Conference|language=en-GB|archive-date=September 22, 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240922233432/https://christianscholarsconference.org/panel/science-beyond-materialism-cosmology-astrobiology-consciousness/|url-status=live}}</ref>