Editing Mind (section)

=== Other distinctions ===
[[Mental states]] are often divided into qualitative and propositional states. Qualitative states are experiences of sensory qualities, typically referred to as [[qualia]], like colors, sounds, smells, pains, itches, and hunger. Propositional states involve an [[Propositional attitude|attitude]] towards a content that can be expressed by a [[declarative sentence]]. When a person believes that it is raining, they have the propositional attitude of belief towards the content "it is raining". Different types of propositional states are characterized by different attitudes towards their content. For instance, it is also possible to hope, fear, desire, or doubt that it is raining.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2005|pp=607–608}} | {{harvnb|Swinburne|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=FfDpm-roQwYC&pg=PA72 72–73]}} | {{harvnb|Lindeman|loc=§ 1. General Characterization of the Propositional Attitudes}} }}</ref>{{efn|Some mental states, like perceptions and emotions, may have both qualitative and propositional aspects.<ref>{{harvnb|Kim|2005|p=607}}</ref>}}

A mental state or process is [[Rationality|rational]] if it is based on good reasons or follows the norms of rationality. For example, a belief is rational if it relies on strong supporting [[evidence]] and a decision is rational if it follows careful deliberation of all the relevant factors and outcomes. Mental states are irrational if they fail to adhere to these standards, such as beliefs caused by faulty reasoning, [[superstition]], or [[cognitive bias]]es, and decisions that give into [[temptation]]s against one's best judgment.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Harman|2013|pp=1–2}} | {{harvnb|Broome|2021|loc=§ 1. Normativity and Reasons, §2. The Meaning of "Rationality"}} | {{harvnb|Siegel|2017|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=6WEwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA157 157]}} | {{harvnb|Maruyama|2020|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YlvwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA172 172–173]}} }}</ref> Mental states that fall outside the domain of rational evaluation are arational rather than irrational. There is controversy regarding which mental phenomena lie outside this domain; suggested examples include sensory impressions, feelings, desires, and involuntary responses.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nolfi|2015|pp=41–42}} | {{harvnb|Tappolet|2023|pp=137–138}} | {{harvnb|Knauff|Spohn|2021|loc=§ 2.2 Basic Concepts of Rationality Assessment, § 4.2 Descriptive Theories}} | {{harvnb|Vogler|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=zNIeDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA30 30–31]}} }}</ref>

Another contrast is between [[disposition]]al and occurrent mental states. A dispositional state is a power that is not exercised. If a person believes that cats have whiskers but does not think about this fact, it is a dispositional belief. By activating the belief to consciously think about it or use it in other cognitive processes, it becomes occurrent until it is no longer actively considered or used. The great majority of a person's beliefs are dispositional most of the time.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Bartlett|2018|pp=1, 4–5 }} | {{harvnb|Schwitzgebel|2024|loc=§ 2.1 Occurrent Versus Dispositional Belief}} | {{harvnb|Wilkes|2012|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=jtArBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA412 412]}} }}</ref>