Editing Military strategy (section)

==Development==

===Antiquity===
The principles of military strategy emerged at least as far back as 500 BC in the works of [[Sun Tzu]] and [[Chanakya]]. The campaigns of [[Alexander the Great]], [[Chandragupta Maurya]], [[Hannibal]], [[Qin Shi Huang]], [[Julius Caesar]], [[Zhuge Liang]], [[Khalid ibn al-Walid]] and, in particular, [[Cyrus the Great]] demonstrate strategic planning and movement. 

Early strategies included the strategy of annihilation, exhaustion, [[attrition warfare]], [[scorched earth]] action, [[blockade]], [[guerrilla]] campaign, [[deception]] and [[feint]]. Ingenuity and adeptness were limited only by imagination, accord, and technology. Strategists continually exploited ever-advancing technology. The word "strategy" itself derives from the [[Greek language|Greek]] "στρατηγία" (''strategia''), "office of general, command, generalship",<ref>
[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dstrathgi%2Fa στρατηγία],
Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, ''A Greek-English Lexicon'', on Perseus Digital Library</ref> in turn from "στρατηγός" (''strategos''), "leader or commander of an army, general",<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Dstrathgo%2Fs στρατηγός], Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, ''A Greek-English Lexicon'', on Perseus Digital Library</ref> a [[compound (linguistics)|compound]] of "στρατός" (''stratos''), "army, host" + "ἀγός" (''agos''), "leader, chief",<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Da%29go%2Fs1 ἀγός], Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, ''A Greek-English Lexicon'', on Perseus Digital Library</ref> in turn from "ἄγω" (''ago''), "to lead".<ref>[https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0057%3Aentry%3Da%29%2Fgw ἄγω], Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, ''A Greek-English Lexicon'', on Perseus Digital Library</ref>

===Middle Ages===

Through maneuver and continuous assault, Chinese, [[Persia]]n, [[Arab]] and [[Eastern European]] armies were stressed by the [[Mongols]] until they collapsed, and were then annihilated in pursuit and encirclement.<ref>May (2007), pp. 115ff.</ref>

===Early Modern era===
In 1520 [[Niccolò Machiavelli]]'s ''Dell'arte della guerra'' (Art of War) dealt with the relationship between civil and military matters and the formation of grand strategy. In the [[Thirty Years' War]] (1618-1648), [[Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden]] demonstrated advanced operational strategy that led to his victories on the soil of the [[Holy Roman Empire]]. It was not until the 18th century that military strategy was subjected to serious study in Europe. The word was first used in German as "''Strategie''" in a translation of Leo VI's [[Tactica of Emperor Leo VI the Wise|''Tactica'']] in 1777 by Johann von Bourscheid. From then onwards, the use of the word spread throughout the West.<ref name="Heuser">Heuser (2010), p. 4-5</ref>

===Napoleonic===
{{See also|Napoleonic wars}}
====Waterloo====
[[File:Waterloo Campaign map-alt3.svg|thumb|280px|Map of the Waterloo campaign]]
[[File:Wellington at Waterloo Hillingford.jpg|thumb|right|275px|19th century musketeers from Wellington at Waterloo by Robert Alexander Hillingford, 18 June 1815]]
{{See also|Waterloo Campaign}}

===Clausewitz and Jomini===
[[File:Clausewitz.jpg|thumb|200px|[[Carl von Clausewitz]]]]
[[Carl von Clausewitz | Clausewitz]]'s ''[[On War]]'' has become a famous reference<ref>{{cite journal | url =https://www.jstor.org/stable/26746704 | jstor =26746704 | title =Clausewitz, War, and Strategy in the Twenty-first Century | last1 =Hughes | first1 =R. Gerald | journal =War in History | date =2019 | volume =26 | issue =2 | pages =287–296 | doi =10.1177/0968344518804624 | hdl =2160/dfc61137-9005-4346-9a91-353be2927e0f | hdl-access =free  | quote = [...] ''Vom Kriege'' remains the most important book on war ever written.}}
</ref><ref>
{{cite book
 |last1                = Brooks
 |first1               = M. Evan
 |date                 = 30 May 2002
 |chapter              = Military Theorists
 |title                = Military History's Most Wanted: The Top 10 Book of Improbable Victories, Unlikely Heroes, and Other Martial Oddities
 |url                  = https://books.google.com/books?id=aTmI3RmgBwAC
 |publication-place    = Washington, D.C.
 |publisher            = Potomac Books, Inc.
 |page                 = 164
 |isbn                 = 9781597974608
 |access-date          = 7 April 2024
 |quote                = [...Clausewitz] wrote ''On War'' (1819), an attempt to synthesize strategy and the conduct of war within the state [...] it has become the standard reference for military theory.
}} 
</ref>
for strategy, dealing with political, as well as military, [[leadership]],<ref>{{cite journal | url =https://www.jstor.org/stable/26746704 | jstor =26746704 | title =Clausewitz, War, and Strategy in the Twenty-first Century | last1 =Hughes | first1 =R. Gerald | journal =War in History | date =2019 | volume =26 | issue =2 | pages =287–296 | doi =10.1177/0968344518804624 | hdl =2160/dfc61137-9005-4346-9a91-353be2927e0f | hdl-access =free }}</ref> his most famous assertion being:

:"War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy by other means."

Clausewitz saw war first and foremost as a political act, and thus maintained that the purpose of all strategy was to achieve the political goal that the state was seeking to accomplish. As such, Clausewitz famously argued that war was the "continuation of politics by other means".<ref>
{{langx|de| Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln.}} - ''Vom Kriege'', 1. Buch, 1. Kapitel, Unterkapitel 24 (Überschrift). The German word {{lang | de | Politik}} can express either "politics" or "policy" - see [https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Politik Wiktionary].
</ref> Clausewitz and Jomini are widely read by US military personnel.<ref>See U.S. [[United States Army War College|Army War College]] http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081214054203/http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ |date=December 14, 2008 }} and [[Royal Military Academy Sandhurst]], U.K. {{failed verification|date=April 2024}}</ref>

===World War I===
{{main|World War I}}

===Interwar===
Technological change had an enormous effect on strategy, but little effect on [[leadership]]. The use of [[Telegraphy|telegraph]] and later radio, along with improved [[transport]], enabled the rapid movement of large numbers of men. One of Germany's key enablers in mobile warfare was the use of radios, where these were put into every tank. However, the number of men that one officer could effectively control had, if anything, declined. The increases in the size of the armies led to an increase in the number of officers. Although the officer ranks in the US Army did swell, in the German army the ratio of officers to total men remained steady.<ref>See Martin Van Creveld's ''Fighting Power'' for more on this topic.</ref>

===World War II===

Interwar Germany had as its main strategic goals the reestablishment of Germany as a European great power<ref>{{cite book |title=Die Errichtung der Hegemonie auf dem europäischen Kontinent |trans-title=Constructing hegemony on the European continent |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=DOhmAAAAMAAJ |series=Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte: Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg |language=de |volume=2 |publisher=Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt |publication-date=1979 |isbn=9783421019356 |access-date=2017-01-31 |year=1979}}</ref> and the complete annulment of the [[Versailles treaty]] of 1919. After [[Adolf Hitler]] and the Nazi party  [[Machtergreifung|took power in 1933]], Germany's political goals also included the accumulation of ''[[Lebensraum]]'' ("Living space") for the Germanic "race" and the elimination of [[communism]] as a political rival to  [[National Socialism|Nazism]].  The destruction of European Jewry, while not strictly a strategic objective, was a political goal of the Nazi regime linked to the vision of a German-dominated Europe, and especially to the [[Generalplan Ost]] for a depopulated east<ref>{{cite book|last=Snyder|first=Timothy |title=Bloodlands&nbsp;— Europe between Hitler and Stalin |year=2010|publisher=Vintage Books|location=London|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=BQ1HKmG9xZ8C |isbn=978-0-09-955179-9|pages=preface page ix–x|access-date=2017-01-31|quote=Hitler wanted not only to eradicate the Jews; he wanted also to destroy Poland and the Soviet Union as states, eliminate their ruling classes, and kill tens of millions of Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Poles). If the German war against the USSR had gone as planned, thirty million civilians would have been starved in the first winter, and tens of millions more expelled, killed, assimilated or enslaved thereafter.}}</ref> which Germany could colonize.

===Cold War===

Soviet strategy in the Cold War was dominated by the desire to prevent, at all costs, the recurrence of an invasion of Russian soil. The Soviet Union nominally adopted a policy of [[no first use]], which in fact was a posture of launch on warning.<ref name=autogenerated1>Beatrice Heuser, "Warsaw Pact Military Doctrines in the 70s and 80s: Findings in the East German Archives", ''Comparative Strategy'' Vol. 12 No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 1993), pp. 437–457.</ref> Other than that, the USSR adapted to some degree to the prevailing changes in the NATO strategic policies that are divided by periods as:<br /><ref>Pupkov, et al. Weapons of anti-missile defense of Russia</ref>
* Strategy of massive retaliation (1950s) ({{langx|ru|стратегия массированного возмездия}})
* Strategy of flexible reaction (1960s) ({{langx|ru|стратегия гибкого реагирования}})
* Strategies of realistic threat and containment (1970s) ({{langx|ru|стратегия реалистического устрашения или сдерживания}})
* Strategy of direct confrontation (1980s) ({{langx|ru|стратегия прямого противоборства}}) one of the elements of which became the new highly effective high-precision targeting weapons.
* Strategic Defense Initiative (also known as "Star Wars") during its 1980s development ({{langx|ru|стратегическая оборонная инициатива&nbsp;– СОИ}}) which became a core part of the strategic doctrine based on Defense containment.

All-out nuclear World War III between NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not take place. The United States recently (April 2010) acknowledged a new approach to its nuclear policy which describes the weapons' purpose as "primarily" or "fundamentally" to deter or respond to a nuclear attack.<ref>{{cite web |title=2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Fact Sheet |url=http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/NPR%20FACT%20SHEET%20April%202010.pdf |access-date=April 13, 2010 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100527200503/http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/NPR%20FACT%20SHEET%20April%202010.pdf |archive-date=May 27, 2010 |publisher=U.S. Department of Defense Office of Public Affairs}}</ref>

===Post–Cold War===
{{See also|Asymmetric warfare|Network-centric warfare}}

Strategy in the post Cold War is shaped by the global geopolitical situation: a number of potent powers in a [[Polarity in international relations#Multipolarity|multipolar]] array which has arguably come to be dominated by the hyperpower status of the United States.<ref>The term was coined by French politician Hubert Vérdine. See: ''International Herald Tribune'', "To Paris, U.S. Looks Like a 'Hyperpower'," February 5, 1999.</ref> 

Parties to conflict which see themselves as vastly or temporarily inferior may adopt a strategy of [[hunkering down (strategy)|"hunkering down"]] – witness [[Gulf War|Iraq]] in 1991<ref>
{{cite book |last1=Loges |first1=Marsha J. |title=The Persian Gulf War: Military Doctrine and Strategy |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8sYmAQAAMAAJ |series=Executive research project |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University |date=1996 |page=16 |access-date=2020-04-02 |quote=U.S. officials described Saddam Hussein's military strategy in Desert Storm as 'hunkering down.'}}</ref> or [[Kosovo War|Yugoslavia]] in 1999.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Daalder |first1=Ivo H. |author-link1=Ivo H. Daalder |last2=O'Hanlon |first2=Michael E. |author-link2=Michael E. O'Hanlon |year=2000 |chapter=Losing the War |title=Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aeQLUvtZnMcC |series=G - Reference, Information and Interdisciplinary Subjects Series |location=Washington, D.C. |publisher=Brookings Institution Press |publication-date=2004 |page=106 |isbn=9780815798422 |access-date=2020-04-02 |quote=[... Milosevic] had a fairly promising strategy: hunker down, tolerate the bombing, and wait for Russian pressure or NATO internal dissension to weaken the alliance's resolve. [...] Had Milosevic not thoroughly 'cleansed' Kosovo [...] a hunker-down strategy might well have succeeded, as a number of NATO officials with whom we spoke acknowledged.}}</ref>

The major militaries of today are usually built to fight the "last war" (previous war) and hence have huge armored and conventionally configured infantry formations backed up by air forces and navies designed to support or prepare for these forces.<ref>''The Utility of Force'', General Sir Rupert Smith, Allen Lane, London, 2005, {{ISBN|0-7139-9836-9}}</ref>

===Netwar===
A main point in asymmetric warfare is the nature of paramilitary organizations such as [[Al-Qaeda]] which are involved in guerrilla military actions but which are not traditional organizations with a central authority defining their military and political strategies. Organizations such as Al-Qaeda may exist as a sparse network of groups lacking central coordination, making them more difficult to confront following standard strategic approaches. This new field of strategic thinking is tackled by what is now defined as [[netwar]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Arquilla |first=John |title=The advent of netwar |last2=Ronfeldt |first2=David F. |date=1996 |publisher=Rand |isbn=978-0-8330-2414-5 |location=Santa Monica, Calif}}</ref>