Editing Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 (section)

=== Soviet MiG-15s in the Korean War ===
{{more citations needed section|date=June 2017}}
[[File:MiG-15 USAF.jpg|thumb|[[No Kum-sok]]'s MiG-15 on display at the [[National Museum of the United States Air Force]].]]

==== Overview and background ====

For many years, the Soviet Union actively denied that its pilots flew in Korea during the Korean War; only China and North Korea took responsibility for Korean War operations. After the end of the [[Cold War]], Soviet pilots who participated in the conflict began to reveal their roles.{{sfn|Zaloga|1991|p=74}} Books by Chinese, Russian and ex-Soviet authors, such as Zhang Xiaoming, Leonid Krylov, Yuriy Tepsurkaev and Igor Seydov revealed details of the actual pilots and operations. From the beginning, Soviet pilots were ordered to avoid flying over areas in which they might be captured. Soviet aircraft were adorned with North Korean or Chinese markings and even the pilots inside the aircraft wore either North Korean uniforms or civilian clothes to disguise their nationality. For radio communication, they were given cards with common Korean words for various flying terms spelled out phonetically in [[Cyrillic]] letters.{{sfn|Zaloga|1991|p=76}} These subterfuges did not long survive the stresses of air-to-air combat, however. Pilots often inadvertently reverted to their native language. UN forces widely suspected the participation of Soviet aircrews, and intercepted radio traffic appeared to include combat pilots speaking Russian. In addition, USAF pilots claimed to have recognized techniques and tactics used by Soviet pilots, whom they referred to as "{{wikt-lang|en|honcho|honchos}}".<ref name="acepilots"/>

When the Korean War broke out on 25 June 1950, the North [[Korean People's Air Force]] (KPAF) was equipped with World War II-vintage Soviet propeller-driven fighters, including 93 [[Ilyushin Il-10|Il-10]]s and 79 [[Yak-9#Variants|Yak-9P]]s,<ref>[http://www.historic-battles.com/HBforum/index.php?topic=1799.0 "Historic Battles."]{{dead link|date=June 2017 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }} ''historic-battles.com.'' Retrieved: 12 September 2010.</ref> and "40–50 assorted transport/liaison/trainer aircraft".<ref name="nokoreaairforce">[http://www.korean-war.com/nokoreaairforce.html "Korean Air Force."] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090408021413/http://www.korean-war.com/nokoreaairforce.html |date=8 April 2009 }} ''korean-war.com.'' Retrieved: 12 September 2010.</ref> Propeller-driven, single-engine fighters were also numerically dominant amongst the air forces that would come under [[United Nations Command]] (UNC) – such as the [[North American P-51 Mustang]], [[Vought F4U Corsair]] and [[Hawker Sea Fury]]. Initially, the numerical and technical superiority of UNC fighter units gave them air supremacy, and laid North Korean targets bare to the destructive power of [[United States Air Force]] (USAF) [[Boeing B-29]] heavy bombers.

During 1950, the [[Kremlin]] agreed to supply China and North Korea with MiG-15s, as well as train their pilots. The 50th Fighter Aviation Division (50 IAD), equipped with the MiG-15, was already based near Shanghai, as it had taken part in the Chinese Civil War (see previous section). A detachment from the 50 IAD was moved to Antung, next to the border with North Korea in August 1950. They formed the 29th Guards Fighter Regiment (29 GvIAP). When China entered the war in support of North Korea, the Soviets agreed to provide 16 operational air regiments of MiG-15s, including combat pilots. In the meantime, more MiG-15 pilots were recruited; the squadrons earmarked for Korea were drawn from elite units. The pilots had to be younger than 27, and priority was given to World War II veterans. The first large Soviet aviation unit sent to Korea, the 324th IAD, was an air defense interceptor division commanded by Colonel [[Ivan Kozhedub]], who, with 62 victories, was the top Allied (and Soviet) ace of World War II. In November 1950, the 151st and 28th IADs plus the veteran 50th IAD were reorganized into the [[64th Fighter Aviation Corps]] (64 IAK).

[[File:MiG Alley Map (en).svg|thumb|upright=1.5|Map showing the general location of "[[MiG Alley]]".]]
Initially, the Soviet fighters operated close to their bases, limited by the range of their aircraft, and were guided to the air battlefield by good ground control, which directed them to the most advantageous positions. For political, security and logistical reasons, they were not allowed to cross an imaginary line drawn from [[Wonsan]] to [[Pyongyang]], and never to fly over the sea. The MiG-15s always operated in pairs, with an attacking leader covered by a wingman. The northwestern portion of North Korea where the [[Yalu River]] empties into the [[Yellow Sea]] was dubbed "[[MiG Alley]]" and became the site of numerous [[dogfight]]s.

MiG-15 pilots also proved very effective in the specific role for which the type was originally designed: intercepting formations of B-29s.
At the tactical level, large formations of MiGs would wait on the Chinese side of the border. When UN aircraft entered MiG Alley, the MiGs would swoop down from high altitude to attack. If they ran into trouble, they would try to escape back over the border into China. Soviet MiG-15 squadrons operated in big groups, but the basic formation was a six-aircraft group, divided into three pairs, each composed of a leader and a wingman:
* The first pair of MiG-15s attacked the enemy Sabres.
* The second pair protected the first pair.
* The third pair remained above, supporting the two other pairs when needed. This pair had more freedom and could also attack targets of opportunity, such as lone Sabres that had lost their wingmen.

After the MiG-15 entered the war, it was shown to be clearly superior to the best straight-wing jets operated by other countries, including the [[Gloster Meteor]], [[Lockheed F-80]], [[Republic F-84]] and [[F9F Panther|Grumman F9F]]. In most measures of performance, the [[North American F-86 Sabre]] – which was also a swept-wing design – was the only close contemporary that could match the MiG-15.

The USAF has claimed that the F-86 had the advantage in combat kills over Korea between 1950 and 1953. It has been acknowledged that many individual Soviet pilots had larger individual tallies than their UN counterparts, due to a number of factors, although the aggregated claims made by Soviet pilots were probably overstated.<ref name="acepilots">Zampini, Diego. [http://www.acepilots.com/russian/rus_aces.html "Russian [sic-Soviet&#93; Aces over Korea Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 Fagot pilots".] ''Acepilots.com'', 2008. Retrieved: 10 March 2009. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090123035544/http://acepilots.com/russian/rus_aces.html |date=23 January 2009 }}</ref>
According to Soviet/Russian sources, 335 Soviet-piloted MiG-15s were lost in Korea to all causes, including accidents, AA fire and ground attacks.<ref>Igor Seidov and Stuart Britton. Red Devils over the Yalu: A Chronicle of Soviet Aerial Operations in the Korean War 1950–53 (Helion Studies in Military History).  Helion and Company 2014. {{ISBN|978-1909384415}}. p. 554.</ref> Chinese sources claim that 224 Chinese-piloted MiG-15s were lost over Korea.<ref name="Zhang, Xiaoming 2002">Zhang, Xiaoming. Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea (Texas A&M University Military History Series). College Station: Texas A&M University, 2002. {{ISBN|978-1-58544-201-0}}.</ref> North Korean losses are not known, but according to North Korean defectors, their air force lost around 100 MiG-15s during the war.<ref>Kum-Suk No and J. Roger Osterholm. A MiG-15 to Freedom: Memoir of the Wartime North Korean Defector who First Delivered the Secret Fighter Jet to the Americans in 1953. McFarland, 2007.</ref> Thus, around 659 MiG-15s are admitted as being lost.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.dpaa.mil/portals/85/Documents/KoreaAccounting/korwald_all.pdf|title=Korean War Air Loss Database (KORWALD)|access-date=21 March 2016|archive-date=17 June 2019|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190617054359/https://www.dpaa.mil/portals/85/Documents/KoreaAccounting/korwald_all.pdf|url-status=dead}} {{ISBN|978-0786431069}}. p.9 142.</ref> While an overwhelming majority of the losses to UN fighters involved F-86 pilots, several MiG-15s were lost in, or immediately after, combat with each of several other UN fighters: F-80s, F-84s, F9Fs, Gloster Meteors and even propeller-driven F4Us and Sea Furies.

The Soviet [[64th Fighter Aviation Corps]] (64 IAK), which controlled all Soviet-piloted aircraft in the Korean War, claimed 1,106 aircraft shot down by MiG-15s. The records of USAF units confirm 139 US aircraft were shot down by MiGs, with another 68 lost due to unknown causes, 237 aircraft listed as missing due to unknown causes, and 472 aircraft classified as "other losses".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stats/USAF_Losses_Korea.htm|title=USAF Losses in Korea|access-date=6 March 2020|archive-date=18 November 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221118114017/https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stats/USAF_Losses_Korea.htm|url-status=live}}</ref> Data-matching with Soviet records suggests that US pilots routinely attributed their own combat losses to "landing accidents" and "other losses".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20130604071241/http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_315.shtml|archive-date = 4 June 2013|url-status=usurped|title = Welcome to the Air Combat Information Group}}</ref>

==== November 1950 to January 1952 ====

On 1 November 1950, the 50th IAD joined the war with its MiG-15s – their noses painted red and in North Korean markings. That day, eight MiG-15s intercepted about 15 USAF F-51D Mustangs, and [[First Lieutenant]] Fyodor V. Chizh shot down Aaron Abercombrie, killing the American pilot. The first-ever jet-versus-jet combat occurred that same day when three MiG-15s from the 50th IAD intercepted ten F-80 Shooting Stars. The F-80C piloted by 1st Lt Frank Van Sickle USAF was shot down by 1st Lt Semyon Fyodorovich Khominich, and Van Sickle was killed.<ref name="PW">{{cite web|url=https://pacificwrecks.com/date/1950/11-50.html|title=November 1950 {{!}} Korean War|work=Pacific Wrecks|date=29 March 2015|access-date=11 February 2022|archive-date=14 February 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220214234445/https://pacificwrecks.com/date/1950/11-50.html|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>MiG Alley: The US Air Force in Korea, 1950–53. McKelvey Cleaver, Thomas p. 119</ref> However, the USAF falsely attributed the loss to North Korean [[Anti-aircraft warfare|AA]] artillery.<ref name="KORWALD">Krylov, Leonid and Tepsurkaev, Yuriy. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20020502095946/http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmkor/korwald_date.htm ''Soviet MiG-15 Aces of the Korean War", Chapter 1''.]}} ''Korean War Resources (KORWALD).'' Retrieved: 11 March 2009.</ref><ref name="PW" />

However, on 9 November, the Soviet MiG-15 pilots suffered their first loss when [[Lieutenant Commander]] William T. Amen off the aircraft carrier {{USS|Philippine Sea|CV-47|6}} shot down and killed Captain Mikhail F. Grachev while flying a [[Grumman F9F Panther]].<ref name="Krylov and Tepsurkaev Combat">Krylov and Tepsurkaev 2009</ref>

To counter the MiG-15, three squadrons of the F-86 Sabre, America's only operational jet with swept wings, were quickly rushed to Korea in December.<ref name="Sabre: The F-86 in Korea"/> On 17 December, Lt Col. Bruce H. Hinton forced Maj. Yakov Nikanorovich Yefromeyenko to eject from his burning MiG.<ref name="KORWALD"/> Five days later, Capt. [[Nikolay Yefremovich Vorobyov]]<ref>Common misspelling in the English-language sources is Voro'''v'''yov, but the correct spelling is Voro'''b'''yov, as confirmed, e.g. here: {{cite web |url=http://soviet-aces-1936-53.ru/korea/index.html |title=Soviet Aces of the Korean War 1950–1953 (in Russian: Советские асы Корейской войны 1950–1953 гг.) |access-date=2013-07-10 |archive-date=19 January 2014 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140119105216/http://soviet-aces-1936-53.ru/korea/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> shot down the F-86A of Captain Lawrence V. Bach in his MiG-15bis.<ref name="KORWALD"/> Both sides exaggerated their claims of aerial victories that month. Sabre fliers claimed eight MiGs, and the Soviets 12 F-86s; the actual losses were three MiGs and at least four Sabres.

The British [[Chief of the Air Staff (United Kingdom)|Chief of the Air Staff]], Air Chief Marshal Sir [[John Slessor]], commented: "not only is it faster than anything we are building today, but it is already being produced in very large numbers [...] The Russians, therefore, have achieved a four year lead over British development in respect of the vitally important interceptor fighter".<ref name="aldrich199807">{{cite journal | title=British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War | author=Aldrich, Richard J. | journal=Review of International Studies |date=July 1998 | volume=24 | issue=3 | pages=331–351 | jstor=20097530 | doi=10.1017/s0260210598003313| s2cid=146376661 }}</ref>

At the end of 1950, the Soviet Union assigned a new unit to support China, the 324th IAD (made up of two regiments: the 176th GIAP and 196th IAP). At that time, a MiG-15 interceptor regiment had 35 to 40 aircraft, and a division was usually composed of three regiments. When the new unit arrived at air bases along the Yalu River in March 1951, it had undergone preliminary training at Soviet bases in the neighboring Maritime Military Districts and started an intense period of air-to-air training in the MiG-15. The Soviets trained alongside Chinese and Korean pilots. Both regiments of the 324th IAD redeployed to the forward airbase in Antung and entered combat in early April 1951. The 303rd IAD of General Georgiy A. Lobov arrived in Korea in June of that same year and commenced combat operations in August.
[[File:MiG-15s curving to attack B-29s over Korea c1951.jpg|thumb|Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15 fighters curving in to attack US Air Force Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers over Korea, c. 1951]]
[[File:B-29-44-61813-shotdown.jpg|thumb|A [[Boeing B-29 Superfortress variants#RB-29J (RB-29, FB-29J, F-13, F-13A)|photo-reconnaissance B-29]] that crash-landed at [[Iruma Air Base]], Japan after being severely damaged by MiG-15 fighters over the [[Yalu River]]; the B-29's tail gunner shot down one of the attackers (9 November 1950)<ref>{{cite web | url=http://www.rb-29.net/html/29wfw.htm | title=William F. (Bill) Welch – 31st and 91st SRS Recollections | publisher=rb-29.net | access-date=18 May 2015 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160622040317/http://www.rb-29.net/HTML/29wfw.htm | archive-date=22 June 2016 | url-status=dead }}</ref>]]

Soviet MiG pilots were trained to attack enemy formations in coordinated attacks from different directions, using both height and high speed to their advantage. The first encounters established the main features of the aerial battles of the next two and a half years. The MiG-15 and MiG-15bis had a higher [[Ceiling (aeronautics)|ceiling]] than all versions of the Sabre – {{convert|15500|m|abbr=on}} versus {{convert|49000|ft|m|abbr=on|order=flip}} of the F-86F – and accelerated faster than F-86A/E/Fs due to their better thrust-to-weight ratio – {{convert|1005|km/h|mph|abbr=on}} versus {{convert|972|km/h|mph|abbr=on}} of the F-86F. The MiG-15's {{convert|2800|m|abbr=on}} per minute climbing rate was also greater than the {{convert|2200|m|abbr=on}} per minute of the F-86A and -E (the F-86F matched the MiG-15). A better turn radius above {{convert|10000|m|abbr=on}} further distinguished the MiG-15. The MiG was slower at low altitude – {{convert|935|km/h|mph|abbr=on}} in the MiG-15bis configuration as opposed to the {{convert|1107|km/h|mph|abbr=on}} of the F-86F. All Sabres could also turn tighter below {{convert|8000|m|abbr=on}}.<ref>Thompson and McLaren 2002, Chapter 10.</ref> Thus, if the MiG-15 forced the Sabre to fight in the vertical plane or in the horizontal one above {{convert|10000|m|abbr=on}}, it gained a significant advantage. Furthermore, a MiG-15 could easily escape from a Sabre by climbing to its ceiling, knowing that the F-86 could not follow. Below {{cvt|8000|m|ft}}, however, the Sabre had a slight advantage over the MiG in most aspects excluding climb rate, especially if the Soviet pilot made the mistake of fighting in the horizontal. The MiG also had more powerful weaponry – one 37&nbsp;mm [[Nudelman N-37|N-37 cannon]] and two 23&nbsp;mm [[NR-23]] cannons, versus the six 12.7&nbsp;mm (.50&nbsp;in) machine guns of the Sabre. However, the Soviet World War II-era ASP-1N gyroscopic [[gunsight]] was less sophisticated than the accurate A-1CM and A4 radar ranging sights of the F-86E and -F.

The main mission of the MiG-15 was not to dogfight the F-86 but to counter the USAF [[Boeing B-29 Superfortress]] bombers. This mission was assigned to the elite of the Soviet Air Force (VVS), in April 1951 to the 324th IAD of Colonel Ivan Kozhedub, and later to the 303rd IAD of General Georgiy A. Lobov, who arrived in Korea in June of the same year.<ref name="KORWALD"/>

On 12 April 1951, 44 MiG-15s took on a USAF formation of 48 B-29 Superfortresses escorted by 18 F-86 Sabres, 54 F-84 Thunderjets and 24 F-80 Shooting Stars heading towards the bridge linking North Korea and Red China over the Yalu River in [[Uiju]]. The experienced Soviet fliers shot down or damaged beyond repair 10 B-29As, one F-86A and three F-80Cs for the loss of only one MiG.<ref name="KORWALD"/> The Soviet air units claimed to have shot down 29 American aircraft through the rest of the month: 11 F-80s, seven B-29s and nine F-51s.<ref name="KORWALD"/> 23 out of these 29 claims match acknowledged losses, but US sources assert that most of them were either operational or due to flak, admitting only four B-29s (a downed B-29, plus two B-29s and an RB-29 that crash-landed or were damaged beyond repair). US historians agree that the MiG-15 gained aerial superiority over northwestern Korea.<ref name="KORWALD"/>

US strategic bombers returned in the week of 22–27 October to neutralize the North Korean aerodromes of Namsi, [[Taechon]] and Saamchan, taking further losses to the MiG-15. On 23 October 1951, 56 MiG-15bis intercepted nine B-29s escorted by 34 F-86s and 55 [[Republic F-84 Thunderjet|F-84Es]]. In spite of their numerical inferiority, the Soviet airmen shot down or damaged beyond repair eight B-29As and two F-84Es, losing only one MiG in return and leading Americans to call that day "Black Tuesday".<ref>Nosatov, Victor Ivanovich. [http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2007-05-25/5_thursday.html "Черный четверг" стратегической авиации США ("Black Thursday" of US strategic aviation) (in Russian).] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120104120223/http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2007-05-25/5_thursday.html |date=4 January 2012 }} ''nvo.ng.ru,'' 25 May 2005. Retrieved: 11 December 2011.</ref> The most successful Soviet pilots that day were Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr P. Smorchkov and 1st Lieutenant Dmitriy A. Samoylov. The former shot down a Superfortress on each of 22, 23 and 24 October.<ref name="KORWALD"/> Samoylov added two F-86As to his tally on 24 October 1951,<ref name="Dmitriy Samoylov">Seydov, Igor. "Dmitriy Samoylov", Mir Aviatsiya, 1–2003, pp. 30–36.</ref><ref name="Thompson and McLaren 2002 Appendix B"/> and on 27 October shot down two more aircraft: a B-29A and an F-84E.<ref name="Dmitriy Samoylov"/><ref name="dtic.mil">{{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20020502095946/http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmkor/korwald_date.htm KORWALD]}} Retrieved: 12 September 2010.</ref> These losses among the heavy bombers forced the [[Pacific Air Forces|Far East Air Forces]] High Command to cancel the precision daylight attacks of the B-29s and only undertake radar-directed night raids.<ref>Davis 2001, p. 91.</ref>
From November 1951 to January 1952, both sides tried to achieve air superiority over the Yalu, or at least tried to deny it to the enemy, and in consequence, the intensity of the aerial combat reached peaks not seen before between MiG-15 and F-86 pilots. During the period from November 1950 to January 1952, no fewer than 40 Soviet MiG-15 pilots were credited as [[flying aces|aces]], with five or more victories. Soviet combat records show that the first pilot to claim his fifth aerial victory was Captain Stepan Ivanovich Naumenko on 24 December 1950.<ref name="Krylov and Tepsurkaev Combat"/><ref>Krylov and Tepsurkaev 2008, Chapter 1.</ref> The honor falls to Captain [[Sergey Kramarenko (pilot)|Sergei Kramarenko]], when on 29 July 1951, he scored his actual fifth victory.<ref>Zampini, Diego. "Red Stars over North Korea". ''Flieger Revue'' Xtra 22, November 2008.</ref> Approximately 16 out of those 40 pilots actually became aces, the most successful being Major [[Nikolay Sutyagin]], credited with 22 victories, 13 of which were confirmed by the US; Colonel [[Yevgeny Pepelyaev]] with 19 claims, 15 confirmed; and Major Lev Shchukin with 17 credited, 11 verified.<ref>Zampini, Diego. "Red Stars over North Korea". ''Flieger Revue'' Xtra 22, November 2008</ref>

The MiG leaders, enjoying the advantage from the ground and the tactical advantage of an aircraft with superior altitude performance were able to dictate the tactical situation at least until the battle was started. They could decide to fight or stay out as they wished. The advantage of radar control from the ground also allowed the MiGs, if desired, to pass through the gaps in the F-86 patrol pattern.

==== January 1952 to July 1952 ====
At the end of January 1952, the 303rd IAD was replaced by the 97th (16th and 148th IAP) and in February the 324th IAD was replaced by the 190th IAD (256th, 494th and 821st IAP). These new units were poorly trained, the bulk of the pilots having only 50–60 hours flying the MiG. Consequently, those units suffered great losses from the now better-prepared American Sabre pilots. At least two Soviet fliers became aces during that period: Majors Arkadiy S. Boytsov and Vladimir N. Zabelin, with six and nine victories respectively.<ref name="na 38-oy Parallel"/>

During the six months of February to July 1952, they lost 81 MiGs, and 34 pilots were killed by F-86s, and in return, they only shot down 68 UN aircraft (including 36 F-86s). The greatest losses came on 4 July 1952, when 11 MiGs were downed by Sabres, with one pilot killed in action. Contributing to all this was the secret "Maple Special" Operation, a plan by [[Gabby Gabreski|Colonel Francis Gabreski]] to cross the Yalu River into Manchuria (something officially forbidden) and catch the MiGs unaware during their takeoffs or landings, when they were at disadvantage: flying slow, at a low level, and sometimes short of ammunition and fuel.

Even under these circumstances, MiG-15 pilots would score at least two important victories against US aces:
* 10 February 1952: Major [[George Andrew Davis, Jr.]], an ace credited with 14 victories, 10 confirmed by communist sources, was shot down and killed. The victor's identity was disputed between 1st Lieutenant [[Mikhail Akimovich Averin]] and [[Zhang Jihui]].<ref name="na 38-oy Parallel">Seydov, Igor and Askold German. "Krasnye Dyaboly na 38-oy Parallel." Moscow: EKSMO, 1998.</ref><ref>Zampini, Diego. "Red Stars over North Korea", Flieger Revue Xtra 23, December 2008</ref><ref>Dorr et al. 1995, Chapter 3.</ref><ref>Zhang 2003, pp. 167–168.</ref>
* 4 July 1952: A few seconds after shooting down 1st Lieutenant M. I. Kosynkin, future ace Captain Clifford D. Jolley was forced to eject out of his crippled F-86E after being caught by surprise by MiG-15bis pilot 1st Lieutenant Vasily Romanovich Krutkikh.<ref name="Thompson and McLaren 2002 Appendix B">Thompson and McLaren 2002, Appendix B.</ref><ref name="na 38-oy Parallel"/><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.af.mil/News/story/id/123161805/ |title=Capt. Clifford D. Jolley |access-date=4 February 2015 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130711052813/http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123161805 |archive-date=11 July 2013 }}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/project/Biographies/J/Jolley_Cliff_335th/Jolley_Clifford.htm|title=Jolley|work=ejection-history.org.uk|access-date=6 April 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924010301/http://www.ejection-history.org.uk/project/Biographies/J/Jolley_Cliff_335th/Jolley_Clifford.htm|archive-date=24 September 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref>

==== July 1952 to July 1953 ====
In May 1952, new and better trained PVO divisions, the 133rd and 216th IADs, arrived in Korea. They would replace the 97th and 190th by July 1952, and if they could not take aerial superiority away from the now well-prepared Americans, then they certainly neutralized it between September 1952 and July 1953. In September 1952, the 32nd IAD also started combat operations. Again, the figures of victories and losses in the air are still debated by historians of the US and the former Soviet Union, but on at least three occasions, Soviet MiG-15 aces gained the upper hand against Sabre aces:
* 7 April 1953: The 10-kill ace Captain [[Harold E. Fischer]] was shot down over Manchuria shortly after causing damage to a Chinese and a Soviet MiG over [[Dapu, Chiayi|Dapu]] airbase in Manchuria. The attacker's identity was disputed between 1st Lieutenant Grigoriy Nesterovich Berelidze and Han Dechai.<ref name="Krylov Ch. 6">Krylov and Tepsurkaev 2008, Chapter 6.</ref><ref>Zhang 2003, pp. 192, 265.</ref>
* 12 April 1953: Captain [[Semyon Alekseyevich Fedorets]], a Soviet ace with eight victories, shot down the F-86E of Norman E. Green, but shortly afterward was attacked by the future top American ace of the Korean War, Captain [[Joseph C. McConnell]]. In the ensuing dogfight, they shot each other down, ejecting and being rescued safely.<ref name="na 38-oy Parallel"/>
* 20 July 1953: During a raid deep into Manchuria, and after shooting down two Chinese MiGs, Majors Thomas M. Sellers and [[Stephen L. Bettinger]] (the second an ace with five kills) tried to catch by surprise two Soviet MiG-15s that were landing in Dapu. The Soviet fliers skillfully forced the Americans to overshoot, reversed direction and shot both down: Captain [[Boris N. Siskov]] forced Bettinger to bail out and his wingman 1st Lieutenant Vladimir I. Klimov killed Major Sellers. This was Siskov's fifth victory, making him the last ace of the Korean War. Those were also the last Sabres downed by Soviet fliers in the war.<ref name="Thompson and McLaren 2002 Appendix B"/><ref name="Krylov Ch. 6"/><ref>Zampini, Diego. "Red Stars over North Korea", Flieger Revue Xtra 23, November 2008</ref>

[[File:MiG-15, Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum.jpg|thumb|left|MiG-15 from the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum in North Korea.]]
The MiG-15 threat forced the Far East Air Forces to cancel B-29 daylight raids in favor of night radar-guided missions from November 1951 onward. Initially, this presented a threat to Communist defenses, as their only specialized night-fighting unit was equipped with the prop-driven [[Lavochkin La-11]], inadequate for the task of intercepting the B-29. Part of the regiment was re-equipped with the MiG-15bis, and another night-fighting unit joined the fray, causing American heavy bombers to suffer losses again. Between 21:50 and 22:30 on 10 June 1952, four MiG-15bis attacked B-29s over [[Sonchon]] and [[Kwaksan]]. Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Ivanovich Studilin damaged a B-29A beyond repair, forcing it to make an emergency landing at [[Kimpo Air Base]].<ref name="KORWALD1">Seydov, Igor and German, Askold. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20020502095946/http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/pmkor/korwald_date.htm KORWALD]}} 1998.</ref> A few minutes later, Major Anatoly Karelin added two more Superfortresses to his tally.<ref name="KORWALD"/> Studilin and Karelin's wingmen, Major L. A. Boykovets and 1st Lieutenant Zhahmany Ihsangalyev, also damaged one B-29 each. Anatoly Karelin eventually became an ace with six kills (all B-29s at night).<ref>Krylov and Tepsurkaev 2008, Appendixes.</ref> In the aftermath of these battles, B-29 night sorties were cancelled for two months. Originally conceived to shoot down rather than escort bombers, both of America's state-of-the-art jet night fighters – the [[F-94 Starfire]] and the [[F3D Skyknight]] – were committed to protecting the Superfortresses against MiGs.

The MiG-15 was less effective in getting past the Marine Corps ground-based two-seat F3D Skyknight night fighters assigned to escort B-29s after the F-94 Starfires proved ineffective. What the squat aircraft lacked in sheer performance, it made up for with the advantage of a search radar that enabled the Skyknight to see its targets clearly, while the MiG-15's directions to find bomber formations were of little use in seeing escorting fighters. On the night of 2–3 November 1952, a Skyknight with pilot Major William Stratton and radar operator Hans Hoagland damaged the MiG-15 of Captain V. D. Vishnyak. Five days later, Oliver R. Davis and radar operator D.F. "Ding" Fessler downed a MiG-15bis; the pilot, Lieutenant Ivan P. Kovalyov, ejected safely. Skyknights claimed five MiG kills for no losses of their own,<ref name="Grossnick">Grossnick, Roy A. and William J. Armstrong. ''United States Naval Aviation, 1910–1995''. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Historical Center, 1997. {{ISBN|0-16-049124-X}}.</ref> and no B-29s escorted by them were lost to enemy fighters.<ref>Gobel, Greg. {{usurped|1=[https://web.archive.org/web/20090613005235/http://www.vectorsite.net/avskykt.html "The Douglas F3D Skyknight."]}} ''Vectorsite'', 1 August 2008. Retrieved: 2 May 2009.</ref> However, the duel was not one-sided: on the night of 16 January 1953, an F3D almost did fall to a MiG, when the Skyknight of Captain George Cross and Master Sergeant J. A. Piekutowski suffered serious damage in an attack by a Soviet MiG-15bis; with difficulty, the Skyknight returned to Kunsan Air Base.<ref>Dorr et al. 1995, p. 71.</ref> Three and a half months later, on the night of 29 May 1953, Chinese MiG-15 pilot Hou Shujun of the PLAAF shot down an F3D-2 over Anju; Sgt. James V. Harrell's remains were found on a beach during the summer of 2001 just miles from the Kunsan base. Captain James B. Brown is still missing in action.<ref name="dtic.mil"/><ref>Zhang 2002, pp. 194–195.</ref>

In a [[Royal Navy]] [[Hawker Sea Fury|Sea Fury]] flying from a light fleet carrier<ref name=unlim>[http://www.unlimitedair.com/Hawker_Sea_Fury_History.htm"Sea Fury History".] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090210040132/http://www.unlimitedair.com/Hawker_Sea_Fury_History.htm |date=10 February 2009 }} ''Unlimited Air Racing''. Retrieved: 9 March 2007.</ref> FAA pilot Lieutenant [[Peter Carmichael (Royal Navy officer)|Peter "Hoagy" Carmichael]] downed a MiG-15 on 8 August 1952, in air-to-air combat. The Sea Fury would be one of the few piston-engined fighter aircraft following World War II's end to shoot down a jet fighter. On 10 September 1952, Captain Jesse G. Folmar shot down a MiG-15 with an F4U Corsair but was himself downed by another MiG.<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3897/is_200208/ai_n9120634/print?tag=artBody;col1|title=Flight Journal Aug 2002 Corsairs to the rescue}}</ref>

The figures given by the Soviet sources indicate that the MiG-15s of the 64th IAK (the fighter corps that included all the divisions that rotated through the conflict) made 60,450 daylight combat sorties and 2,779 night ones and engaged the enemy in 1,683 daylight aerial battles and 107 at night, claiming to have shot down 1,097 [[UN]] aircraft over Korea, including 647 F-86s, 185 F-84s, 118 F-80s, 28 F-51s, 11 F-94s, 65 B-29s, 26 Gloster Meteors and 17 aircraft of different types.<ref name="Krylov Ch. 6"/> According to US, 57 B-29s and reconnaissance variants were lost in combat during the Korean war, almost all by MiG-15s.<ref name="alternatewars.com">{{Cite web|url=https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stats/USAF_Losses_Korea.htm|title=USAF Losses in Korea|website=www.alternatewars.com|access-date=6 March 2020|archive-date=18 November 2022|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221118114017/https://www.alternatewars.com/BBOW/Stats/USAF_Losses_Korea.htm|url-status=live}}</ref>