Editing Mayaguez incident (section)

==U.S. rescue preparations==
Following Schlesinger's instructions, [[P-3 Orion]] aircraft stationed at [[Naval Air Station Cubi Point|Naval Air Station (NAS) Cubi Point]] in the Philippines and at [[U-Tapao Royal Thai Navy Airfield]] in Thailand took off to locate ''Mayaguez''. The [[aircraft carrier]] {{USS|Coral Sea|CV-43|6}}, then en route to Australia, was ordered into the area.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|43}} The destroyer escort {{USS|Harold E. Holt|FF-1074|6}} and the guided missile destroyer {{USS|Henry B. Wilson|DDG-7|6}} were both ordered to proceed at high speed from the [[Philippine Sea]] towards ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s last known location.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|44–45}}

An alert order was sent to [[1st Battalion 4th Marines]] (1/4 Marines) at [[U.S. Naval Base Subic Bay|Subic Bay]] and to the [[9th Marine Regiment (United States)|9th Marine Regiment]] on [[Okinawa Prefecture|Okinawa]]. A reinforced company from 1/4 Marines was ordered to assemble at NAS Cubi Point for airlift to Thailand, while a 1,100-man [[Ground combat element|Battalion Landing Team]] (BLT) assembled in Okinawa.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|45}}

===Locating and stopping ''Mayaguez''===
On the early morning of 13 May, the P-3 Orions identified large [[Radar#Reflection|radar returns]] near Poulo Wai and dropped flares on the suspected location of ''Mayaguez'' provoking Khmer Rouge gunfire. Low on fuel, the two Orions returned to base and were replaced with another Orion from [[VP-17|Patrol Squadron 17]]. At 08:16 local time the Orion made a low pass over Poulo Wai positively identifying ''Mayaguez'' and again drawing Khmer Rouge gunfire.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|50–51}}

Shortly afterwards the Khmer Rouge leader, Sa Mean, ordered Captain Miller to get ''Mayaguez'' underway. At 08:45 ''Mayaguez'' set off towards the northeast following one of the Swift Boats.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|53}} The Orion continued to track ''Mayaguez'' as it left Poulo Wai. Once the location of ''Mayaguez'' was identified, Admiral Gayler ordered the commander of the [[Seventh Air Force]], [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] John J. Burns, at [[Korat Royal Thai Air Force Base]], to move combat aircraft to the area.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|54}}

At 13:00 two unarmed [[United States Air Force]] (USAF) [[General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark|F-111 fighter-bombers]] diverted from a training mission began making low-level high-speed passes by ''Mayaguez''. Once the F-111s had left, Sa Mean ordered Captain Miller to follow the Swift Boats around [[Koh Tang]] and drop anchor approximately 1.5&nbsp;km north of the island.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|54–55}} Two [[McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II|F-4 Phantoms]] soon arrived over ''Mayaguez'' and began firing their [[M61 Vulcan|20&nbsp;mm cannon]] into the water in front of the ship. The F-4s were followed by [[LTV A-7 Corsair II|A-7D Corsairs]] and more F-111s which continued to fire into the sea in front of and behind the ship indicating that no further movement should be attempted.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|55–56}}<ref name="Lavalle">{{cite book|last=Lavalle|first=A|title=USAF Southeast Asia Monograph Series Volume III, Fourteen Hours at Koh Tang|publisher=Office of Air Force History|year=1985|url=https://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/13/2001330009/-1/-1/0/AFD-101013-043.pdf|isbn=0912799285|access-date=2019-12-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170305014404/http://media.defense.gov/2010/Oct/13/2001330009/-1/-1/0/AFD-101013-043.pdf|archive-date=2017-03-05|url-status=live}}{{PD-notice}}</ref>{{rp|95}}

At 16:15, the Khmer Rouge ordered ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew onto two fishing boats which then took them closer to the shore of Koh Tang.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|56–58}}

===U.S. forces assemble===
U.S. Navy warships ''Coral Sea'', ''Harold E. Holt'' and ''Henry B. Wilson'' were all scheduled to arrive on station by 15 May, but none of these ships carried any troops.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|61}} {{USS|Hancock|CV-19|6}} carried a Marine contingent but could not arrive on station until 16 May, while {{USS|Okinawa|LPH-3|6}} also carried Marines but could not arrive until 18 May.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|61–62}}

[[III Marine Expeditionary Force|III Marine Amphibious Force]] (III MAF) assigned Task Force 79.9 with recovering ''Mayaguez'' and designated D Company 1/4 Marines in the Philippines as the unit that would actually retake ''Mayaguez'', but Burns wanted additional force and orders were sent to the [[3rd Marine Division (United States)|3rd Marine Division]] on Okinawa. [[1st Battalion 9th Marines|1st Battalion, 9th Marines]] (BLT 1/9) was then on alert as the primary "air contingency" reaction force, but most of BLT 1/9 were ending their tours of duty and were not subject to further extension of their tours except in the case of emergency. III MAF requested the extension of BLT 1/9's tour but this was refused.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|62}}

The [[2nd Battalion 9th Marines|2nd Battalion, 9th Marines]] (BLT 2/9) (commanded by [[Lieutenant colonel (United States)|Lieutenant Colonel]] Randall W. Austin) was then on a training exercise on Okinawa and it received orders on the night of 13 May to return to camp and prepare for departure by air at dawn on 14 May.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|63–65}} On the morning of 14 May BLT 2/9 boarded USAF [[Lockheed C-141 Starlifter|C-141s]] at [[Kadena Air Base]] to fly to Thailand.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|66}} The 9th Marine Regiment had been the first U.S. ground combat force committed to the [[Vietnam War]] in 1965, but in May 1975 only a few of the officers and [[non-commissioned officer]]s from BLT 2/9 had seen combat in Vietnam.<ref name="Wetterhahn" />{{rp|65–66}}

Nine USAF [[Sikorsky MH-53#HH-53C|HH-53C]] ''Jolly Green'' helicopters of the [[40th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron]] and 10 [[Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion|CH-53]] ''Knives'' of the [[21st Special Operations Squadron]] stationed at [[Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Navy Base]] were available for the rescue operation.<ref name="Dunham">{{cite book|last=Dunham|first=George R|title=U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Bitter End, 1973–1975 (Marine Corps Vietnam Operational Historical Series)|publisher=Marine Corps Association|year=1990|url=https://archive.org/details/TheBitterEnd|isbn=9780160264559|access-date=2018-06-19|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160310211317/https://archive.org/details/TheBitterEnd|archive-date=2016-03-10|url-status=live}}{{PD-notice}}</ref>{{rp|239}} There were differences between the two types which would become relevant during the battle: the HH-53 was air-refuellable, had 450 US gallon (1,700 L; 370 imp gal) [[Self-sealing fuel tank|self-sealing fuel tip tanks]], a tail [[minigun]] with armor plating, and two waist miniguns. The CH-53 was not air-refuellable, had 650 US gallon (2,500 L; 540 imp gal) non-self-sealing tip tanks and two waist miniguns. Thus, the HH-53's fuel tanks were less vulnerable to ground fire and, with their refueling capability, could remain in the area of operations indefinitely, so long as it had access to an aerial tanker.<ref name="Dunham" />{{rp|245}}

[[File:MayagüezIncident1.jpg|thumb|An aerial surveillance photo showing two [[Khmer Rouge]] [[Patrol Craft Fast|Swift Boats]] during the initial seizing of the {{SS|Mayaguez}}]]

On 13 May Burns and his Seventh Air Force staff developed a contingency plan to retake ''Mayaguez'' using an assault force composed of men of the USAF 56th Security Police Squadron. 75 volunteers from the 56th would be dropped onto the containers on the decks of ''Mayaguez'' on the morning of 14 May. In preparation for this assault five HH-53s and seven CH-53s were ordered to proceed to U-Tapao for staging.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|76–77}} At approximately 21:15, one of the 21st SOS CH-53s (68-10933, call sign ''Knife 13'') crashed en route to U Tapao, killing 18 security police and its five-man crew.<ref name=Dunham/>{{rp|240}}<ref>{{cite web|url=https://archive.org/details/reportofcollateralinvestigationch53sn6810933mayaguezincident|title=Report Of Collateral Investigation CH 53 SN 68 10933, Mayaguez Incident|publisher=US Air Force|date=11 September 1975|access-date=9 December 2019}}</ref>

[[File:US Airmen aboard CH-53, during Mayagüez incident 1975.jpg|thumb|right|These 23 USAF Security Policemen were killed when their helicopter crashed due to a mechanical failure.]]

===Third NSC meeting===
Just before 05:00 EDT on 14 May a message arrived in the Department of State from the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran|US embassy in Tehran]]. The subject line was "Chinese Embassy Tehran Believes Mayaguez to be Freed Soon." The [[Government of Pakistan|Pakistani]] first secretary had told an American diplomat that a senior Chinese embassy official in Tehran said China was "embarrassed" by the Cambodian seizure of the Mayaguez and expected it to be released soon.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|35}} The message was passed on to Kissinger who claimed it was of dubious reliability and it was not circulated among the NSC.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|76}}

Ford chaired an NSC meeting at 10:22 EDT (21:22 Cambodia), where the Air Force rescue plan was cancelled due to the loss of ''Knife 13'' and the fact that the containers on ''Mayaguez'' could not bear the weight of the helicopters while [[Abseiling|rappelling]] men down would expose them to gunfire.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|79}} It was decided that it was necessary to wait for the Navy ships to arrive off Koh Tang and for the Marines to assemble in Thailand before a rescue attempt would be mounted. Ford ordered the Air Force to sink any Cambodian boats moving between Koh Tang and the mainland.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|80}} Following this meeting Kissinger told Ford "This is your first crisis. You should establish a reputation for being too tough to tackle. This is a replay of the EC-121."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|70}} 

===Boats interdicted===
Early on the morning of 14 May, the Khmer Rouge loaded ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew onto one of the fishing boats and they left Koh Tang following two of the Swift Boats on a heading for [[Kampong Som]].<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|91}} Two F-111s swept past the fishing boat, followed by a pair of F-4s and a pair of A-7s, which began firing in front of the Swift Boats and then directly at the Swift Boats, causing one of them to turn back to Koh Tang. The jets were then joined by an [[AC-130H Spectre]] gunship from the [[388th Tactical Fighter Wing]] which proceeded to engage the second Swift Boat with its cannons.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|92}}

An A-7D then sprayed the Swift Boat with its 20&nbsp;mm cannon, sinking it.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|96}} The fighters then came at the fishing boat dropping bombs and firing their cannon into the water in front of it, spraying the boat with shrapnel.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|92}} The fighter crews reported back that 30 to 40 Caucasians had been seen on board the fishing boat.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|97}} Despite Ford's order to sink all boats, the jets sought orders from higher command.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|27-8}}

===Fourth NSC meeting===
In Washington, Ford convened another NSC meeting at 22:30 EDT (09:30 14 May Cambodia).<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|97}} A communication link had been established between the White House, Seventh Air Force at Nakhon Phanom, CINCPAC in Hawaii and the aircraft circling above Koh Tang allowing for near real-time communications.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|95–96}} The circling fighters reported that they could try to shoot the rudder off the fishing boat to stop its progress to Kampong Som, but the NSC decided that the risk of killing ''Mayaguez'' crew was too great. At 23:00 EDT (10:00 Cambodia) Ford ordered that only tear gas should be dropped on or near the fishing boat, while all patrol boats should be sunk.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|97–99}}

The NSC meeting continued to consider the appropriate course to resolve the crisis. It was informed that the Chinese Foreign Ministry in Beijing had refused to pass on the American note intended for the Khmer Rouge, but George Bush reported that they had read the note and that it might have been relayed to the Khmer Rouge.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|99}} With a diplomatic solution appearing unlikely, [[General (United States)|General]] [[David Charles Jones|David Jones]], acting [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], presented the NSC with a range of military options. Rescue planning was complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the location of ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew. It was believed that some were still on the ship, some on Koh Tang and others were on the fishing boat bound for Kampong Som. The NSC decided to proceed with a simultaneous attack by Marines to retake ''Mayaguez'' and attack Koh Tang, together with attacking Cambodian shipping and bombing mainland targets.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|100}} Kissinger emphasized they needed to "impress the Koreans and the Chinese" with the punitive strikes.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|34}}

The NSC debated whether to assault Koh Tang on the 15th or 16th. The Pentagon's option paper that Jones had distributed explained why a 48-hour delay was advantageous. The primary risk of military operations on the 15th was the "serious disadvantage of slow insertion (270 men per wave at 4+ hour intervals)." Alternatively, with the arrival of the USS ''Hancock'' in the area, a "coordinated assault at first light on 16 May would "carry lower military risks" and "enhance the prospects of quick success and minimize the loss of life." However, the paper noted that the disadvantage of going on the 16th was less chance of surprise and more time for the Cambodians to "put forward preconditions for the return of the ship and/or crew."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|86-7}}

When Ford asked for the Pentagon's recommendation, Schlesinger deferred to Jones who said "We recommend that we land [on the morning of the 15th] on the island and on the ship." He told the NSC members the island could be taken with "high assurance of success." He thought, "The 175 Marines can secure themselves, with gunships and tactical air... When the second group arrives, we can cut off the neck of the island and move out... With somewhat over 600 Marines by nightfall, we should have a good feel for what is there. We can perhaps withdraw the next day." Jones concluded his presentation by saying "that is the operation as we recommend it, as a joint recommendation from all the Joint Chiefs."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|90}}

At 10:10, despite having been hit by tear gas, the fishing boat arrived at Kampong Som.<ref name=paust-1976/> The Khmer Rouge commander at Kampong Som, apparently fearing attack by the Americans, refused to accept responsibility for ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew and so the fishing boat moved further down the coast, dropping anchor off the island of [[Koh Rong Sanloem]]. The circling fighters lost track of the fishing boat once it entered the port at Kampong Som, and so this was the location transmitted up the chain of command.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|104–109}} At 11:29, U.S. aircraft sank another patrol boat and damaged another four.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|337}}

1/4 Marines had arrived at U-Tapao from the Philippines at 05:45 on 14 May and had been waiting on standby for a helicopter assault on ''Mayaguez'', but as the news of the arrival of the fishing boat at Kampong Som came in the helicopter assault was cancelled.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|111–112}} At 14:00, BLT 2/9 began arriving at U-Tapao.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|112}}

===The rescue plan===
[[File:Koh Tang aerial view.jpg|thumb|right|USAF reconnaissance photo of [[Koh Tang]], showing East Beach and two downed CH-53s (left) and West Beach (right)]]

On the afternoon of 14 May, Burns received the order to proceed with a simultaneous assault on Koh Tang and ''Mayaguez'' timed to begin just before sunrise (05:42) on 15 May.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|112}} D Company, 1/4 Marines would retake ''Mayaguez'' while BLT 2/9 Marines would rescue the crew on Koh Tang.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|113}} With minimal intelligence available regarding the geography of Koh Tang, the commander of BLT 2/9 and his staff took off in a [[Beechcraft King Air#Military King Air versions|U-21]] to make an aerial reconnaissance of the island.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|114}}

Arriving over Koh Tang at 16:00, they were prevented from closely approaching the island in order not to compromise the secrecy of the mission or draw ground fire, but they determined that the island was so covered in jungle that the only two viable landing zones available were beaches on the west and east shores of the northern portion of Koh Tang.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|114}} The [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] had made an assessment, in part from [[RF-4C]] and [[Lockheed U-2|U-2]] reconnaissance flights, that between 150 and 200 Khmer Rouge backed by heavy weapons occupied Koh Tang. This report was conveyed to U-Tapao but was never briefed to the planners (probably due to security classification issues) who believed that only about 20 Cambodian irregulars armed with small arms were on the island.<ref name=dia-2012>{{cite report |pages=37–39, 49 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB534-DIA-Declassified-Sourcebook/documents/DIA-46.pdf |title=The Vietnam Cauldron: Defense Intelligence in the War for Southeast Asia |author=Michael B. Petersen |publisher=Defense Intelligence Agency |work=Defense Intelligence Historical Perspectives, Number 2 |year=2012 |access-date=30 August 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170825000235/http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB534-DIA-Declassified-Sourcebook/documents/DIA-46.pdf |archive-date=25 August 2017 |url-status=live }}</ref>

At 21:00, the rescue plan was finalized. Six hundred Marines from BLT 2/9 — composed of E and G Companies — were assigned to conduct a combat assault in five CH-53 ''Knives'' and three HH-53 ''Jolly Greens'' to seize and hold Koh Tang.<ref name=Dunham/>{{rp|245}} Two helicopters would make a diversionary assault on the West Beach ({{Coord|10.316|N|103.135|E|display=inline}}), while six helicopters would make the main assault on the wider East Beach ({{Coord|10.316|N|103.139|E|display=inline}}). The East Beach force would move to the nearby compound where ''Mayaguez''{{'}}s crew was believed to be held and then move across and link up with the West Beach force.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|120–121}}

Two more waves of helicopters would be required to deploy all of BLT 2/9 to Koh Tang. The flight from U-Tapao to Koh Tang was a four-hour round trip. It was estimated that only 20–30 Khmer Rouge were on Koh Tang; the information regarding the heavy anti-aircraft fire coming from Koh Tang and the number of gunboats present was not passed on to the Marines.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|120–121}} Preparatory airstrikes of the landing zones were ruled out for fear of hitting crew members who might be held nearby.<ref name=Lavalle/>{{rp|104}}

A unit of 57 Marines from D Company, 1/4 Marines together with volunteers from [[Military Sealift Command]] to get ''Mayaguez'' underway, an explosive ordnance disposal team and a Cambodian linguist would be transferred by three HH-53 ''Jolly Greens'' to the ''Holt'' which was scheduled to arrive on station at dawn for a ship-to-ship boarding of ''Mayaguez'' one hour after the assault on Koh Tang began.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|122}} Two additional CH-53s (because of their superior firepower, all the HH-53s were used for troop lift) were tasked as [[combat search and rescue]] helicopters, supported by an [[EC-130]] "King" airborne, command, control and communications (ABCCC) aircraft of the [[56th Rescue Squadron]].<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|119}}

USS ''Wilson'' was assigned to support the Koh Tang operation, and, after retaking ''Mayaguez'', USS ''Holt'' would be deployed in a blocking position between Koh Tang and the Cambodian mainland with the mission of intercepting and engaging any Khmer reaction forces. U.S. Navy aircraft from ''Coral Sea'' were given the mission of striking targets on the Cambodian mainland to prevent interference with the rescue.<ref name=Chun/>{{rp|27}}

In the afternoon in New York City, the [[List of ambassadors of the United States to the United Nations|US ambassador to the UN]], [[John A. Scali]], delivered a request for assistance to [[Secretary-General of the United Nations|UN Secretary-General]] [[Kurt Waldheim]] that noted the US reserved the right to act in self-defense in accordance with [[Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter#Article 51: Self-defence|Article 51 of the UN Charter]].<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|37}} Waldheim called the [[Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations|Chinese representative to the UN]] to his office and contacted the Cambodians via a channel used previously to secure the release of foreign citizens from Phnom Penh.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|48}}

At 15:52 EDT (02:52 15 May Cambodia), Ford convened the fourth and final NSC meeting regarding ''Mayaguez''. Jones briefed the NSC on the assault plan and plans for strikes by [[Andersen Air Force Base|Guam]]-based [[Boeing B-52 Stratofortress|B-52s]] on the port facilities at Kampong Som and the Ream Naval Base. Concerned that the use of B-52s might be excessive, Ford limited the bombing to attacks by carrier-based aircraft commencing at 07:45 (Cambodia) and gave the go-ahead to the rescue plan.<ref name=Wetterhahn/>{{rp|123–124}} Given the reports that the crew had probably been moved to the mainland, the NSC discussed whether any Americans were actually on Koh Tang. Kissinger pointed out there was no way to know and that "taking the island if they are not there is easier to explain than failing to take it if they are." Schlesinger agreed that "we have an obligation to get the Americans or to see if they are there."<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|41}}

At 19:00 EDT (06:00 15 May Cambodia) the UN issued a statement that the secretary-general was communicating with the Cambodians and that he encouraged all parties to refrain from further use of force.<ref name=Lamb/>{{rp|48}}