Editing Luftwaffe (section)

====Wever years, 1933–1936====
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1976-026-04A, Walter Wever.jpg|thumb|upright|[[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]], Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, 1933–1936]]
The German officer corps was keen to develop [[strategic bombing]] capabilities against its enemies. However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities.<ref>{{harvnb|Murray|1983|p=1}}</ref>

For these reasons, between 1933 and 1934, the Luftwaffe's leadership was primarily concerned with tactical and operational methods. In aerial terms, the army concept of {{lang|de|[[Truppenführung]]}} was an operational concept, as well as a tactical doctrine. In World War I, the {{lang|de|Fliegertruppe's}} initial, 1914–15 era {{lang|de|[[Feldflieger Abteilung]]}} observation/reconnaissance air units, each with six two-seater aircraft apiece, had been attached to specific army formations and acted as support. [[Dive bomber]] units were considered essential to {{lang|de|Truppenführung}}, attacking enemy headquarters and lines of communications.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=129}}</ref> Luftwaffe "Regulation 10: The Bomber" ({{lang|de|Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug}}), published in 1934, advocated air superiority and approaches to ground attack tactics without dealing with operational matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued to act as the main guide for German air operations. The manual directed OKL to focus on limited operations (not strategic operations): the protection of specific areas and support of the army in combat.<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 129"/>

With an effective tactical-operational concept,<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=130}}</ref> the German air power theorists needed a strategic doctrine and organisation. {{ill|Robert Knauss|de}}, a serviceman (not a pilot) in the {{lang|de|Luftstreitkräfte}} during World War I, and later an experienced pilot with ''Lufthansa'',<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=132}}</ref> was a prominent theorist of air power. Knauss promoted the [[Giulio Douhet]] theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry and breaking enemy morale by "terrorising the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on civilians.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=133}}</ref> The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge strikes against German civilians and cities.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=133–134}}</ref>

In December 1934, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff [[Walther Wever (general)|Walther Wever]] sought to mold the Luftwaffe's battle doctrine into a strategic plan. At this time, Wever conducted war games (simulated against France) in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In 1935, "Luftwaffe Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War" was drawn up. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals."<ref name="Hooton 2007, ''Luftwaffe at War: Gathering Storm'', p. 34">{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=34}}</ref><ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2010|p=28}}</ref>

Historian [[James Corum]] states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of "[[Strategic bombing|terror bombing]]" (see [[Blitzkrieg#Luftwaffe|Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine]]).<ref name="Corum 1997, p. 7">{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=7}}</ref> According to Corum, terror bombing was deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|pp=143–144}}</ref> Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction of the enemy armed forces.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=146}}</ref>

Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of [[strategic bombing]]. In newly introduced doctrine, ''The Conduct of the Aerial Air War'' in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=143}}</ref> and outlined five key points to air strategy:<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=138}}</ref>
<blockquote>
#To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air forces attacking German targets
#To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces
#To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations
#To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and participating directly in naval battles
#To paralyze the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories
</blockquote>

Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called "[[Ural bomber]]", which could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. In 1935, this design competition led to the [[Dornier Do 19]] and [[Junkers Ju 89]] prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever issued requirements for the 'Bomber A' design competition: a range of {{convert|6,700|km|mi}} with a {{convert|900|kg|lb}} bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,<ref>{{harvnb|Hooton|2007a|p=33}}</ref> and his emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost.<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1997|p=224}}</ref> The only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A' that reached production was [[Heinkel]]'s ''Projekt 1041'', which culminated in the production and frontline service as Germany's only operational heavy bomber, the [[Heinkel He 177 Greif|Heinkel He 177]], on 5 November 1937, the date on which it received its [[List of RLM aircraft designations#101-200|RLM airframe number]].{{sfn|Griehl|Dressel1998|p=9}}

In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were grouped into the {{lang|de|[[Oberkommando der Luftwaffe]]}} (OKL; "Air Force High Command").

Following the untimely death of Wever in early June 1936 in an [[Gust lock#Safety|aviation-related accident]], by the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organisation capable of carrying out broad and general support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage more flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. In fact, on the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were devoted to ground support operations, counter to the long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational missions.<ref>{{harvnb|Buckley|1998|pp=85–86}}</ref>