Editing Logrolling (section)

===Logrolling and the role of preference===
People have varying preferences, and make decisions at the margin to maximize their utility and improve their welfare. The same is true for legislators, who all enter office with different agendas, passions, and goals. Ideological diversity plays a significant role in the result of a vote and carries with it a significant cost. In addition, legislators will favor interests that offer them the most support. Legislative votes are determined by the intensity of personal preference, desires of constituents, and, ultimately, what will lead to the particular legislator's greatest utility. When people have ideologies at opposite ends of the political spectrum, it's difficult to ensure a simple majority, so buying a [[supermajority]] vote through logrolling may be the most cost effective (Buchanan and Tullock 1962<ref name="BuchananJames" />).

In the [[General Possibility Theorem]], Kenneth Arrow argues that if a legislative consensus can be reached through a simple majority, then minimum conditions must be satisfied, and these conditions must provide a superior ranking to any subset of alternative votes (Arrow 1963<ref>{{cite book|last=Arrow|first=Kenneth|title=Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd Ed.|year=1963|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|location=New York}}</ref>). A bill must be attractive to a legislator, or else he will not cast his vote for it. A vote, by the pure nature of the voting process, demonstrates explicit interest in whatever is voted upon. In logrolling, a superior ranking means that the marginal benefit of the vote is greater than any alternatives, so exchanging votes is worthwhile. The General Possibility Theorem necessitates that allocating one vote for another must constitute true utility and a sincere vote. Arrow's theory may place more restrictions and limitations on an individual voter's preferences than Buchanan and Tullock's; regardless, individuals will always choose the option they value most.