Editing Lockheed U-2 (section)

===Approval===
Civilian officials including [[Trevor Gardner]], an aide to [[Secretary of the Air Force]] [[Harold E. Talbott]], were more positive about the CL-282 because of its higher potential altitude and smaller radar cross-section, and recommended the design to the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]'s [[Office of Scientific Intelligence]]. At that time, the CIA depended on the military for overflights, and [[Director of Central Intelligence]] [[Allen Dulles]] favored [[HUMINT|human]] over [[TECHINT|technical intelligence-gathering]] methods. However, the Intelligence Systems Panel, a civilian group advising the USAF and CIA on aerial reconnaissance, had recognized by 1954 that the RB-57D would not meet the {{convert|70000|ft|m|-2}} requirement that panel member [[Allen F. Donovan]] of [[Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory]] believed was necessary for safety. The CIA told the panel about the CL-282. The design elements that the USAF considered to be flaws (the single-engine and light load factor) appealed to Donovan. He was a sailplane enthusiast who believed that a [[sailplane]] was the type of high-altitude aircraft the panel was seeking.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=24–26}}

[[Edwin Land]], the developer of instant photography and another member of the panel, proposed to Dulles through Dulles' aide, [[Richard M. Bissell Jr.]], that his agency should fund and operate this aircraft. Land believed that if the military, rather than the CIA, operated the CL-282 during peacetime, such action could provoke a war. Although Dulles remained reluctant to have the CIA conduct its own overflights, Land and [[James Killian]] of [[MIT]] told [[President Eisenhower]] about the aircraft; Eisenhower agreed that the CIA should be the operator. Dulles finally agreed, but some USAF officers opposed the project because they feared it would endanger the RB-57D and X-16.

The USAF's Seaberg helped persuade his own agency to support the CL-282, albeit with the higher-performance J57 engine, and final approval for a joint USAF-CIA project (the first time the CIA dealt with sophisticated technology) came in November 1954. Lockheed had meanwhile become busy with other projects and had to be persuaded to accept the CL-282 contract after its approval.{{sfn|Pedlow|Welzenbach|1992|pp=29–37}}