Editing Karl Dönitz (section)

===Commander of the submarine fleet===
[[File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101II-MW-3491-06, St. Nazaire, Uboot U 94, Karl Dönitz.jpg|thumb|upright=1.6|left|Dönitz observing the arrival of [[German submarine U-94 (1940)|''U-94'']] at [[Saint-Nazaire]] in France in June 1941]]

On 1 October 1939, Dönitz became a {{lang|de|[[Konteradmiral]]}} (rear admiral) and "Commander of the Submarines" ({{lang|de|Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote}}, ''BdU''). For the first part of the war, despite disagreements with Raeder where best to deploy his men, Dönitz was given considerable [[Mission-type tactics|operational freedom]] for his junior rank.{{sfn|Gardner|1999|pp=58, 62}}

From September–December 1939 U-boats sank 221 ships for 755,237 gross tons, at the cost of nine U-boats.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=767}} Only 47 merchant ships were sunk in the [[North Atlantic]], a tonnage of 249,195.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=767}} Dönitz had difficulty in organising Wolfpack operations in 1939. A number of his submarines were lost en route to the Atlantic, through either the [[North Sea]] or the heavily defended [[English Channel]]. Torpedo failures plagued commanders during convoy attacks. Along with successes against single ships, Dönitz authorised the abandonment of pack attacks in the autumn.{{sfn|Milner|2011|pp=27–28}} The [[Norwegian campaign]] amplified the defects. Dönitz wrote in May 1940, "I doubt whether men have ever had to rely on such a useless weapon."{{sfn|Milner|2011|p=35}} He ordered the removal of magnetic pistols in favour of contact fuses and their faulty depth control systems.{{sfn|Milner|2011|p=35}} In no fewer than 40 attacks on Allied warships, not a single sinking was achieved.{{sfn|Morgan|Taylor|2011|p=61}} The statistics show that from the outbreak of war to approximately the spring, 1940, faulty German torpedoes saved 50–60 ships equating to {{GRT|300,000|link=off}}.{{sfn|Milner|2011|p=29}}

Dönitz was encouraged in operations against warships by the sinking of the [[aircraft carrier]] [[HMS Courageous (50)|''Courageous'']]. On 28 September 1939 he said, "it is not true Britain possesses the means to eliminate the U-boat menace."{{sfn|Milner|2011|pp=21–22}} The first specific operation—named "[[Special Operation P]]"—authorised by Dönitz was [[Günther Prien]]'s attack on [[Scapa Flow]], which sank the battleship [[HMS Royal Oak (08)|''Royal Oak'']].{{sfn|Roskill|1954|p=74}} The attack became a propaganda success though Prien purportedly was unenthusiastic about being used that way.{{sfn|Vause|1997|p=96}} [[Stephen Roskill]] wrote, "It is now known that this operation was planned with great care by Admiral Dönitz, who was correctly informed of the weak state of the defences of the eastern entrances. Full credit must also be given to Lieutenant Prien for the nerve and determination with which he put Dönitz's plan into execution."{{sfn|Roskill|1954|p=74}}

In May 1940, 101 ships were sunk—but only nine in the Atlantic—followed by 140 in June; 53 of them in the Atlantic for a total of {{GRT|585,496|link=off}} that month. The first six months in 1940 cost Dönitz 15 U-boats.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=767}} Until mid-1940 there remained a chronic problem with the reliability of the [[G7e torpedo]]. As the battles of Norway and Western Europe raged, the ''Luftwaffe'' sank more ships [[Operationsbefehl Hartmut|than the U-boats]]. In May 1940, German aircraft sank 48 ships ({{GRT|158|348|link=off}}), three times that of German submarines.{{clarify|date=August 2021}}{{citation needed|date=August 2021}} The Allied evacuations from western Europe and [[Scandinavia]] in June 1940 attracted Allied warships in large numbers, leaving many of the Atlantic convoys travelling through the [[Western Approaches]] unprotected. From June 1940, the German submarines began to exact a heavy toll. In the same month, the ''Luftwaffe'' sank just 22 ships ({{GRT|195,193|link=off}}) in a reversal of the previous months.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=261}}

Germany's [[Norwegian campaign|defeat of Norway]] gave the U-boats new bases much nearer to their main area of operations off the Western Approaches. The U-boats operated in groups or 'wolf packs' which were coordinated by radio from land.{{sfn|Tucker|2005|p=142}} With the [[fall of France]], Germany acquired U-boat bases at [[Lorient]], [[Brest, France|Brest]], [[Saint-Nazaire]], and [[La Pallice]]/[[La Rochelle]] and [[Bordeaux]]. This extended the range of Type VIIs.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=770}} Regardless, the war with Britain continued. The admiral remained sceptical of [[Operation Sea Lion]], a planned invasion and expected a long war.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=260}} The destruction of seaborne trade became German strategy against Britain after the defeat of the ''[[Luftwaffe]]'' in the [[Battle of Britain]].{{sfn|National Archives|2001|p=104}} Hitler was content with [[the Blitz]] and cutting off Britain's imports. Dönitz gained importance as the prospect of a quick victory faded.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=265}} Dönitz concentrated groups of U-boats against the convoys and had them attack on the surface at night.{{sfn|Tucker|2005|p=142}} In addition the Germans were helped by Italian submarines which in early 1941 actually surpassed the number of German U-boats.{{sfn|Tucker|2005|p=143}} Having failed to persuade the Nazi leadership to prioritise U-boat construction, a task made more difficult by military victories in 1940 which convinced many people that Britain would give up the struggle, Dönitz welcomed the deployment of 26 Italian submarines to his force.{{sfn|Milner|2011|pp=39–40}} Dönitz complimented Italian bravery and daring, but was critical of their training and submarine designs. Dönitz remarked they lacked the necessary toughness and discipline and consequently were "of no great assistance to us in the Atlantic."{{sfn|Terraine|1989|p=274}}

The establishment of German bases on the French Atlantic coast allowed for the prospect of aerial support. Small numbers of German aircraft, such as the long-range [[Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor]], sank a large number of ships in the Atlantic in the last quarter of 1940. In the long term, Göring proved an insurmountable problem in effecting cooperation between the navy and the ''Luftwaffe''.{{sfn|National Archives|2001|pp=104–117}} In early 1941, while Göring was on leave, Dönitz approached Hitler and secured from him a [[Kampfgeschwader 40|single bomber/maritime patrol unit]] for the navy. Göring succeeded in overturning this decision and both Dönitz and Raeder were forced to settle for a specialist maritime air command under ''Luftwaffe'' control.{{sfn|Hooton|2010|p=111}} Poorly supplied, {{lang|de|[[Fliegerführer Atlantik]]}} achieved modest success in 1941, but thereafter failed to have an impact as British counter-measures evolved.{{sfn|National Archives|2001|pp=104–117}} Cooperation between the {{lang|de|Kriegsmarine}} and {{lang|de|Luftwaffe}} remained dysfunctional to the war's end.{{sfn|Neitzel|2003|pp=448–462}} Göring and his unassailable position at the {{lang|de|Reichsluftfahrtministerium}} ([[Ministry of Aviation (Nazi Germany)|Air Ministry]]) prevented all but limited collaboration.{{sfn|Neitzel|2003|p=450}}

The U-boat fleet's successes in 1940 and early 1941 were spearheaded by a small number of highly trained and experienced pre-war commanders. [[Otto Kretschmer]], [[Joachim Schepke]], and [[Günther Prien]] were the most famous, but others included [[Hans Jenisch]], [[Victor Oehrn]], [[Engelbert Endrass]], [[Herbert Schultze]] and [[Hans-Rudolf Rösing]]. Although skilled and with impeccable judgement, the shipping lanes they descended upon were poorly defended.{{sfn|Terraine|1989|pp=261–262}} The U-boat force did not escape unscathed. Within the space of several days in March 1941, Prien and Schepke were dead and Kretschmer was a prisoner. All of them fell in battle with a convoy system.{{sfn|Milner|2011|pp=52–53}} The number of boats in the Atlantic remained low. Six fewer existed in May 1940 than in September 1939. In January 1941 there were just six on station in the Atlantic—the lowest during the war, while still suffering from unreliable torpedoes. Dönitz insisted that operations continue while "the smallest prospect of hits" remained.{{sfn|Milner|2011|p=36}}

For his part, Dönitz was involved in the daily operations of his boats and all the major [[operational level]] decisions. His assistant, [[Eberhard Godt]], was left to manage daily operations as the war continued.{{sfn|Stern|2003|p=137}} Dönitz was debriefed personally by his captains which helped establish a rapport between leader and led. Dönitz neglected nothing that would make the bond firmer. Often there would be a distribution of medals or awards. As an ex-submariner, Dönitz did not like to contemplate the thought of a man who had done well heading out to sea, perhaps never to return, without being rewarded or receiving recognition. Dönitz acknowledged where decorations were concerned there was no red tape and that awards were "psychologically important".{{sfn|Terraine|1989|pp=230–231}}