Editing Joseph Stilwell (section)

===Burma retreat and offensive===
[[File:Stilwell and Merrill.jpg|250px|thumb|Gen. [[Frank Merrill]] (left) with Stilwell in Burma]]
In February 1942 Stilwell was promoted to lieutenant general and was assigned to the [[China-Burma-India Theater]] (CBI), where Stilwell had three major roles: commander of all US forces in China, Burma, and India; deputy commander of the Burma-India Theater under Admiral [[Louis Mountbatten]]; and military advisor to Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]], the commander of all Nationalist Chinese forces as well as commander of the Chinese Theater.

The CBI was a geographical administrative command on the same level as the commands of [[Dwight Eisenhower]] and [[Douglas MacArthur]], but unlike other combat theaters like the [[European Theater of Operations]], the CBI was never formally designated a "[[theater of operations]]" and did not report to an overall American commander. The China Theater came under the operational command of Chiang, the commander of the [[National Revolutionary Army]], and the Burma India Theater came under the operational command of the British (first [[GHQ India]] and later the Allied [[South East Asia Command]] whose supreme commander was Mountbatten). During his tenure, there were hardly any American combat forces in the theater, and Stilwell commanded Chinese troops almost exclusively.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bernstein |first1=Richard |title=China 1945 : Mao's revolution and America's fateful choice |date=2014 |location=New York |isbn=9780307595881 |pages=13 |edition=First}}</ref>

The British and the Chinese were ill-equipped and the targets of Japanese offensives. Chiang was interested in conserving his troops and Allied lend-lease supplies to be used against any sudden Japanese offensive and against Communist forces in a later civil war. His wariness increased after he had observed the disastrous Allied performance during the [[Japanese invasion of Burma]].<ref name="history.army.mil">''U.S. Army Operations in World War II: Burma, 1942'' http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110828045431/http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/burma42/burma42.htm |date=2011-08-28 }}</ref><ref name="cbi-history.com">Sherry, Mark D., ''China Defensive 1942–1945'', [[United States Army Center of Military History]], CBI Background http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_china_def.html {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210129145302/http://www.cbi-history.com/part_xii_china_def.html |date=2021-01-29 }}</ref> After fighting and resisting the Japanese for five years, many in the [[Nationalist government]] felt that it was time for the Allies to assume a greater burden in fighting the war.<ref>Tuchman, p. 303.</ref>

The Chinese and American commands were beset by a difference in strategies. Chiang, having fought against Japan since 1937, favored "[[defense in depth]]", an approach partially adopted by the British later in 1944. During the early stages of the conflict both the British and the Americans underestimated the Japanese. Captain [[Evans Carlson]], after observing the [[Battle of Shanghai]] in 1937, called the [[Imperial Japanese Army]] "third rate", while Stilwell wanted to go on the offensive to save Burma. The Japanese divisions there were proficient in both jungle and offroad warfare. They successfully outmaneuvred the road-bound British, coordinated with air support, and exploited local anticolonial sentiments.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 39-40.</ref>

The situation was not helped by miscommunication and insubordination. In February 1942, while retreating across the [[Sittaung River]], the main British force left two brigades on the wrong side after prematurely blowing up the bridge. During an ambush against incoming Japanese at [[Pyinmana]], only the Chinese 5th Army stayed in position. The British pulled back, fearing encirclement, while the [[200th Division (National Revolutionary Army)|Chinese 200th Division]] refused to rush in.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 40-42.</ref>

The first step for Stilwell was the reformation of the Chinese Army.<ref>Tuchman, p. 304.</ref> The reforms clashed with the delicate balance of political and military alliances in China, which kept Chiang in power. Reforming the army meant removing men who maintained Chiang's position as commander-in-chief.<ref>Tuchman, p. 306.</ref> Chiang gave Stilwell technical overall command of some Chinese troops but worried that the new US-led forces would become yet another independent force outside of his control.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Since 1942, members of his staff had continually objected to Chinese troops being used in Burma for what they viewed as returning the country to British colonial control.<ref name="history.army.mil"/><ref name="cbi-history.com"/>

Chiang therefore sided with Major General [[Claire Lee Chennault]]'s proposals for the war against the Japanese to be continued largely using existing Chinese forces supported by air forces, which Chennault assured Chiang to be feasible. The dilemma forced Chennault and Stilwell into competition for the valuable lend-lease supplies arriving over the [[Himalayas]] from British-controlled India, an obstacle referred to as "[[The Hump]]."<ref>Tuchman, p. 307.</ref>

George Marshall's biennial report covering 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1945, acknowledged that he had given Stilwell "one of the most difficult" assignments of any theater commander.<ref name="Eldridge, p. 160">Eldridge, p. 160.</ref>

[[File:General Stilwell marches out of Burma.jpg|250px|thumb|Stilwell marches out of Burma, May 1942]]
After the collapse of the Allied defenses in Burma cut China off from the remaining supply route, Stilwell declined an airlift offer from General Chennault and led his staff of 117 out of Burma into [[Assam]], India, on foot. They marched at what his men called the "Stilwell stride" of 105 paces per minute.<ref>[[Gordon Stifler Seagrave|Seagrave, Gordon S.]], ''Burma Surgeon'', W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1943</ref><ref name="ReferenceA">''Glimpse of an Epic'', Time Magazine, Monday, August 10, 1942</ref> Two of the men accompanying him, his aide [[Frank Dorn]] and the war correspondent [[Jack Belden]], wrote about their experiences in ''Walkout with Stilwell in Burma'' (1971) and ''Retreat with Stilwell'' (1943) respectively. The Assam route was used by other retreating Allied and Chinese forces.

Stilwell's walkout separated him from the approximately 100,000 Chinese troops still there. 25 thousand of them would later perish during their retreat due to the harsh jungle conditions, poor logistics, and Japanese military operations.<ref>Bernstein (2014), p. 43.</ref>

In India, Stilwell soon became well known for his no-nonsense demeanor and his disregard for military pomp and ceremony. His trademarks were a battered Army [[campaign hat]], GI shoes, and a plain service uniform with no insignia of rank. He frequently carried a [[M1903 Springfield|Model 1903, .30–06 Caliber, Springfield rifle]] in preference to a sidearm. His hazardous march out of Burma and his bluntly honest assessment of the disaster captured the imagination of the American public: "I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it."<ref name="ReferenceA"/> Stilwell's derogatory remarks on ''Limey'' forces, however, did not sit well with British and Commonwealth commanders.<ref name="Farquharson, 2004 p.59">Farquharson, ''For Your Tomorrow: Canadians and the Burma Campaign, 1941–1945'', Trafford Publishing, (2004), {{ISBN|1-4120-1536-7}}, {{ISBN|978-1-4120-1536-3}}, p. 59</ref>

After the Japanese occupied Burma, China was almost completely cut off from Allied aid and materiel except through the hazardous air route over the Hump. Early on, Roosevelt and the [[US War Department]] had given priority to other theaters for US combat forces, equipment, and logistical support. The closure of the Burma Road and the fall of Burma made it extremely difficult to replace Chinese war losses. This jeopardized the Allies' initial strategy, which was to maintain the Chinese resistance to the Japanese by providing logistical and air support.

In August 1942, Stilwell opened a training center in [[Ramgarh Cantonment|Ramgarh, India]], {{convert|200|mi}} west of [[Kolkata|Calcutta]], to train Chinese troops which had retreated to Assam from Burma. Stilwell's decision to establish the center at Ramgarh met with opposition from several senior British commanders, including Wavell, primarily due to logistical reasons. Chinese soldiers at the center received medical care along with new weapons and uniforms and were trained how to operate artillery, [[Universal Carrier]]s, and [[M3 Stuart]] tanks. By the end of December 1942, 32,000 Chinese troops were being trained at the center to create the 22nd and 38th Divisions along with three artillery regiments and a tank battalion.<ref>{{cite book | url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vTgRBQAAQBAJ&q=joseph+stilwell+ramgarh | isbn=978-1-4738-3871-0 | title=Stilwell and the Chindits: The Allies Campaign in Northern Burma, 1943–1944 | date=20 August 2014 | publisher=Pen and Sword }}</ref> From the outset, Stilwell's primary goals were the opening of a land route to China from northern Burma and India by means of a ground offensive in northern Burma to allow more supplies to be transported to China and to organize, equip, and train a reorganized and competent Chinese army that would fight the Japanese in the China-Burma-India theater (CBI).<ref name="cbi-history.com" /><ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190">Samson, Jack, ''The Flying Tiger: The True Story of General Claire Chennault and the U.S. 14th Air Force in China'', Globe Pequot Press (2005) {{ISBN|1-59228-711-5}}, {{ISBN|978-1-59228-711-6}}, p. 190</ref> Stilwell argued that the CBI was the only area with the possibility for the Allies to engage large numbers of troops against their common enemy, Japan. Unfortunately, the huge airborne logistical train of support from the US to British India was still being organized, and supplies being flown over the Hump were barely sufficient to maintain Chennault's air operations and replace some of the Chinese war losses, let alone equip and supply an entire army.<ref name="cbi-history.com" /><ref name="Samson, Jack 2005 p. 190" />

Additionally, critical supplies intended for the CBI were being diverted to other combat theaters.<ref name="cbi-history.com"/> Some Chinese and American soldiers diverted the supplies that made it over the Hump to the black market for their personal enrichment.<ref>Tuchman, p. 377.</ref> As a result, most Allied commanders in India, with the exception of General [[Orde Wingate]] and his [[Chindits|Chindit]] operations, focused on defensive measures.{{ref?|date=April 2025}}