Editing Joseph Luns (section)

===NATO Secretary-General (1971–1984)===
In 1971, Luns was appointed as [[NATO]] secretary-general. At the time of his appointment, public protests against American policies in Vietnam were vehement throughout Western Europe and among European politicians the credibility of the American nuclear protection was in doubt. Though there were initial doubts about his skills for the job he soon proved that he was capable of managing the alliance in crisis. He regarded himself as the spokesman of the alliance and he aimed at balancing the security and political interests of the alliance as a whole.

Luns was in favour of negotiating with the [[Soviet Union]] and the [[Warsaw Pact]] members on the reduction of armaments if the Western defence was kept in shape during such negotiations. European members of NATO, according to Luns, should understand that the United States carried international responsibilities while the latter should understand that in-depth consultation with the European governments was conditional to forging a united front on the international stage, which could be accepted and endorsed by all members of NATO.

US-Soviet negotiations on mutual troop reductions and the strategic nuclear arsenal caused severe tensions. Luns convinced American leaders that it undermined the credibility in Western Europe of their nuclear strategy by neglecting European fears of a change of strategy which would leave Europe unprotected in case of a Soviet nuclear attack. The modernisation of the [[tactical nuclear weapon|tactical nuclear forces]] by the introduction of the neutron bomb and cruise missiles caused deep divisions. In the end, Luns succeeded in keeping NATO together in the so-called [[NATO Double-Track Decision|Double-Track Decision]] of December 1979.<ref>Kersten, A.E., ''Luns. A political biography.'' Amsterdam 2010 p.592</ref> The deployment of these new weapon systems was linked to success in American-Soviet arms reduction talks.

It was also the duty of the secretary-general to mediate in cause of conflicts within the alliance. He was successful in the conflict between Great Britain and Iceland, the so-called [[Cod War|Second Cod War]] not by pressuring the Icelandic government to end its aggressive behaviour against British trawlers but by convincing the British government that it had to take the first step by calling back its destroyers to open the way to negotiations. Luns failed however in the conflict between Greece and Turkey over the territorial boundaries and Cyprus. Lack of co-operation on both sides made Luns unable to mediate or advise on procedures to find a way out.

Between 1964 and 1984 he participated in every annual conference of the [[Bilderberg Group]].