Editing Islamism (section)

==Ideology==
===Islamic revival===
{{further|Islamic revival}}
[[File:A public demonstration calling for Sharia Islamic Law in Maldives 2014.jpg|thumb|upright=1.3|Islamist demonstrators carry signs reading "Islam will dominate the world" and "To hell with democracy" in [[Maldives]], September 2014]]
The modern revival of Islamic devotion and the attraction to things Islamic can be traced to several events.

By the end of World War I, most Muslim states were seen to be dominated by the Christian-leaning Western states. Explanations offered were: that the claims of Islam were false and the Christian or post-Christian West had finally come up with another system that was superior; or Islam had failed through not being true to itself. The second explanation being preferred by Muslims, a redoubling of faith and devotion by the faithful was called for to reverse this tide.<ref>Edward Mortimer in ''Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam'', in Wright, ''Sacred Rage'', Simon & Schuster, (1985), pp. 64–66</ref>

The connection between the lack of an Islamic spirit and the lack of victory was underscored by the disastrous defeat of Arab nationalist-led armies fighting Israel under the slogan "Land, Sea and Air" in the 1967 [[Six-Day War]], compared to the (perceived) near-victory of the [[Yom Kippur War]] six years later. In that war the military's slogan was "God is Great".<ref>Wright, ''Sacred Rage'', pp. 64–66</ref>

Along with the Yom Kippur War came the [[1973 oil crisis|Arab oil embargo]] where the (Muslim) Persian Gulf oil-producing states' dramatic decision to cut back on production and quadruple the price of oil, made the terms oil, Arabs and Islam synonymous with power throughout the world, and especially in the Muslim world's public imagination.<ref>Wright, ''Sacred Rage'', p. 66 from Pipes, Daniel, ''In the Path of God'', Basic Books, (1983), p. 285</ref> Many Muslims believe as Saudi Prince Saud al Faisal did that the hundreds of billions of dollars in wealth obtained from the Persian Gulf's huge oil deposits were nothing less than a gift from God to the Islamic faithful.<ref>from interview by Robin Wright of UK Foreign Secretary (at the time) Lord Carrington in November 1981, ''Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam'', by Robin Wright, Simon & Schuster, (1985), p. 67</ref>

As the [[Islamic revival]] gained momentum, governments such as Egypt's, which had previously repressed (and was still continuing to repress) Islamists, joined the bandwagon. They banned alcohol and flooded the airwaves with religious programming,<ref name="Mu">Murphy, ''Passion for Islam'', (2002), p. 36</ref> giving the movement even more exposure.

===Restoration of the Caliphate===
{{See also|Khilafat Movement|}}
[[File:Cover_of_the_second_issue_of_al-Manar_magazine,_1899.jpg|thumb|''[[Al-Manār (magazine)|Al-Manār]]'' magazine, the most popular 20th century Islamic journal that called for the restoration of Caliphate]]
The [[abolition of the Ottoman Sultanate]] by the [[Grand National Assembly of Turkey]] on 1 November 1922 ended the [[Ottoman Empire]], which had lasted since 1299. On 11 November 1922, at the [[Lausanne Conference of 1922–1923|Conference of Lausanne]], the sovereignty of the Grand National Assembly exercised by the [[Ankara Government|Government in Angora]] (now [[Ankara]]) over Turkey was recognized. The last sultan, [[Mehmed VI]], departed the Ottoman capital, [[Ottoman Constantinople|Constantinople]] (now [[Istanbul]]), on 17 November 1922. The legal position was solidified with the signing of the [[Treaty of Lausanne]] on 24 July 1923. In March 1924, [[Abolition of the Caliphate|the Caliphate was abolished]] legally by the Turkish National Assembly, marking the end of Ottoman influence. This shocked the Sunni clerical world, and many felt the need to present Islam not as a traditional religion but as an [[Bidʻah|innovative]] socio-political ideology of a modern nation-state.{{sfn|Rahnema|2005|p=101}}

The reaction to new realities of the modern world gave birth to Islamist ideologues like [[Rashid Rida]] and [[Abul A'la Maududi]] and organizations such as the [[Muslim Brotherhood]] in Egypt and [[Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam]] in India. Rashid Rida, a prominent Syrian-born Salafi theologian based in [[Egypt]], was known as a revivalist of [[Hadith studies]] in Sunni seminaries and a pioneering theoretician of [[Islamic state|Islamism]] in the modern age.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Olidort |first=Jacob |title=In Defense of Tradition: Muḥammad Nāșir AL-Dīn Al-Albānī and the Salafī Method |publisher=Princeton University |year=2015 |location=Princeton, NJ, U.S.A |pages=52–62 |chapter=A New Curriculum: Rashīd Riḍā and Traditionalist Salafism |quote="Rashīd Riḍā presented these core ideas of Traditionalist Salafism, especially the purported interest in ḥadīth of the early generations of Muslims, as a remedy for correcting Islamic practice and belief during his time."}}</ref> During 1922–1923, Rida published a series of articles in seminal ''[[Al-Manār (magazine)|Al-Manar]]'' magazine titled "''[[The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate (book)|The Caliphate or the Supreme Imamate]]''". In this highly influential treatise, Rida advocates for the restoration of Caliphate guided by [[Faqīh|Islamic jurists]] and proposes gradualist measures of education, reformation and purification through the efforts of ''[[Salafiyya]]'' reform movements across the globe.<ref name="Willis 2010 711–732">{{Cite journal |last=Willis |first=John |date=2010 |title=Debating the Caliphate: Islam and Nation in the Work of Rashid Rida and Abul Kalam Azad |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25762122 |journal=The International History Review |volume=32 |issue=4 |pages=711–732 |doi=10.1080/07075332.2010.534609 |jstor=25762122 |s2cid=153982399 |issn=0707-5332 |access-date=7 May 2023 |archive-date=27 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327015041/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25762122 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Sayyid Rashid Rida had visited India in 1912 and was impressed by the [[Darul Uloom Deoband|Deoband]] and [[Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulama|Nadwatul Ulama]] seminaries.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Allāh |first='Abd |date=29 February 2012 |title=Shaykh Rashid Rida on Dar al-'Ulum Deoband |url=https://friendsofdeoband.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/rashid-rida-and-dar-al-ulum-deoband/ |access-date=7 May 2022 |website=Friends of Deoband|archive-date=27 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327015044/https://friendsofdeoband.wordpress.com/2012/02/29/rashid-rida-and-dar-al-ulum-deoband/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These seminaries carried the legacy of [[Sayyid Ahmad Shahid]] and his pre-modern Islamic emirate.<ref>B. Metcalf, "Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860–1900", pp. 50–60, Princeton University Press (1982).</ref> In [[British Raj|British India]], the [[Khilafat movement]] (1919–24) following [[World War I]] led by [[Shaukat Ali (politician)|Shaukat Ali]], Maulana [[Mohammad Ali Jauhar]], [[Hakim Ajmal Khan]] and [[Maulana Azad]] came to exemplify South Asian Muslims' aspirations for [[Caliphate]].

===Anti-Westernization===
{{Further|Anti-Western sentiment}}
Muslim alienation from Western ways, including its political ways.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2500?_hi=19&_pos=1 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120528231208/http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t125/e2500?_hi=19&_pos=1 |url-status=dead |archive-date=28 May 2012 |title=From the article on westernization in Oxford Islamic Studies Online |publisher=Oxfordislamicstudies.com |access-date=21 April 2012}}</ref>
* The memory in Muslim societies of the many centuries of "cultural and institutional success" of Islamic civilization that have created an "intense resistance to an alternative 'civilizational order'", such as Western civilization.<ref>Fuller, E., ''The Future of Political Islam'', (2003), p. 15</ref>
* The proximity of the core of the Muslim world to Europe and Christendom where it first conquered and then was conquered. [[Al-Andalus|Iberia]] in the eighth century, the [[Crusades]] which began in the eleventh century, then for centuries the [[Ottoman Empire]], were all fields of war between Europe and Islam.<ref>''Islam and the Myth of Confrontation'', Fred Halliday; (2003) p. 108</ref>

:In the words of [[Bernard Lewis]]:
:<blockquote>For almost a thousand years, from the first Moorish landing in Spain to the second Turkish siege of Vienna, Europe was under constant threat from Islam. In the early centuries it was a double threat—not only of invasion and conquest, but also of conversion and assimilation. All but the easternmost provinces of the Islamic realm had been taken from Christian rulers, and the vast majority of the first Muslims west of Iran and Arabia were converts from Christianity ... Their loss was sorely felt and it heightened the fear that a similar fate was in store for Europe.<ref>Lewis, Bernard, ''Islam and the West'' Oxford University Press, p. 13, (1993)</ref></blockquote>

For Islamists, the primary threat of the West is cultural rather than political or economic. Cultural dependency robs one of faith and identity and thus destroys Islam and the Islamic community (''[[ummah]]'') far more effectively than political rule.<ref name="Haddad/Esposito1">Haddad/Esposito p. xvi</ref>

===Strength of identity politics===
Islamism is described by Graham E. Fuller as part of [[identity politics]], specifically the religiously oriented nationalism that emerged in the Third World in the 1970s: "[[Hindu nationalism|resurgent Hinduism]] in India, [[Religious Zionism]] in Israel, [[Origins of the Sri Lankan civil war|militant Buddhism in Sri Lanka]], resurgent [[Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale|Sikh nationalism]] in the [[Punjab region|Punjab]], '[[Liberation Theology]]' of [[Catholicism]] in Latin America, and Islamism in the Muslim world."<ref>Fuller, Graham E., ''The Future of Political Islam'', Palgrave MacMillan, (2003), pp. 70–71</ref>

===Anti-communist stances===
{{Further|Anti-communism}}
By the late 1960s, non-Soviet Muslim-majority countries had won their independence and they tended to fall into one of the two cold-war blocs – with "Nasser's Egypt, Baathist Syria and Iraq, Muammar el-Qaddafi's Libya, Algeria under Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne, [[South Yemen|Southern Yemen]], and Sukarno's Indonesia" aligned with Moscow.<ref>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p.46</ref> Aware of the close attachment of the population with Islam, "school books of the 1960s in these countries "went out of their way to impress upon children that socialism was simply Islam properly understood."<ref>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, p. 47</ref>
[[Olivier Roy (political scientist)|Olivier Roy]] writes that the "failure of the 'Arab socialist' model ... left room for new protest ideologies to emerge in deconstructed societies ..."<ref name=ORFPI1994:52>[[#ORFPI1994|Roy, ''Failure of Political Islam'', 1994]]: p. 52</ref> Gilles Kepel notes that when a collapse in oil prices led to widespread violent and destructive rioting by the urban poor in Algeria in 1988, what might have appeared to be a natural opening for the left, was instead the beginning of major victories for the Islamist [[Islamic Salvation Front]] (FIS) party. The reason being the corruption and economic malfunction of the policies of the [[Third World socialism|Third World socialist]] ruling party (FNL) had "largely discredited" the "vocabulary of socialism".<ref>Kepel, ''Jihad'', 2002, pp. 160–1</ref>
In the [[Postcolonialism|post-colonial]] era, many Muslim-majority states such as Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, were ruled by authoritarian regimes which were often continuously dominated by the same individuals or their cadres for decades. Simultaneously, the military played a significant part in the government decisions in many of these states ([[Deep state in Turkey|the outsized role played by the military]] could be seen also in democratic Turkey).<ref name="Wi">''The History of the Modern Middle East'' by William L. Cleveland and Martin Bunton, 2008, p. 371.</ref>

The authoritarian regimes, backed by military support, took extra measures to silence leftist opposition forces, often with the help of foreign powers. Silencing of leftist opposition deprived the masses a channel to express their economic grievances and frustration toward the lack of democratic processes.<ref name="Wi"/> As a result, in the [[Post–Cold War era|post-Cold War era]], civil society-based Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood were the only organizations capable to provide avenues of protest.<ref name="Wi"/>

The dynamic was repeated after the states had gone through a [[democratization|democratic transition]]. In Indonesia, some secular political parties have contributed to the enactment of religious bylaws to counter the popularity of Islamist oppositions.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/19/political-parties-clash-over-sharia-based-bylaws.html |title=Political parties clash over sharia-based bylaws |work=The Jakarta Post |access-date=6 March 2021 |archive-date=11 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210411130737/https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/11/19/political-parties-clash-over-sharia-based-bylaws.html |url-status=live }}</ref> In Egypt, during the short period of the [[2012 Egyptian presidential election|democratic experiment]], Muslim Brotherhood seized the momentum by being the most cohesive political movement among the opposition.<ref>The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt. by Eric Trager, ''Foreign Affairs'', 2011.</ref>