Editing Iran–Iraq War (section)

===Iranian military preparations===

In Iran, severe officer purges, including numerous executions ordered by [[Sadegh Khalkhali]], the new [[Islamic Revolutionary Court|Revolutionary Court]] judge, and shortages of spare parts for Iran's American and British-made equipment had crippled Iran's once-mighty [[military of Iran|military]]. Between February and September 1979, Iran's government executed 85 senior generals and forced all [[Major general|major-generals]] and most [[Brigadier general|brigadier-generals]] into early retirement.<ref name=efraimkarsh />

[[File:Abulhassan Banisadr iran iraq war.jpg|thumb|Iranian President [[Abolhassan Banisadr]], who was also commander-in-chief, inspecting a Jeep-mounted [[M40 recoilless rifle|106mm recoilless anti-tank gun]]]]

By September 1980, the revolutionary government had purged some 12,000 officers of all levels from the army. These purges drastically reduced the Iranian military's operational capacities.<ref name="efraimkarsh" />

On the eve of the revolution in 1978, international experts in military science had deemed Iran's armed forces the world's fifth most powerful.<ref name="farmanfarmaian11">{{cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|publisher=Al Jazeera|title=What makes a revolution succeed?|date=14 February 2011|last=Farmanfarmaian|first=Roxane|access-date=1 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121105001633/http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201121393446561799.html|archive-date=5 November 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> However, by the eve of war with Iraq, the recently formidable Iranian army was in many crucial ways a shell of its former self, having been badly weakened by losses in experienced personnel. The desertion rate had reached 60%, the officer corps was devastated and its most highly skilled soldiers and aviators had been exiled, imprisoned, or executed. When the invasion occurred, many pilots and officers were released from prison, or had their executions commuted to combat the Iraqis. Throughout the war, Iran never managed to fully recover from this [[brain drain|flight of human capital]].<ref name="parstimes">{{cite web|url=http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|title=National Security|work=Pars Times|access-date=8 September 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130515172515/http://www.parstimes.com/history/national_security.html|archive-date=15 May 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

Many junior officers were promoted to generals, resulting in the army being more integrated as a part of the regime by the war's end.<ref name="parstimes" /> Meanwhile, a new [[paramilitary]] organisation gained prominence in Iran, the [[Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps]].<ref name="Ottolenghi 2011">{{cite web|last=Ottolenghi|first=Emanuelle|title=The Pasdaran: Inside Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps|url=http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps/|date=3 September 2011|publisher=Foundation for Defense of Democracies|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120625224142/http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/the-pasdaran-inside-irans-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps|archive-date=25 June 2012|url-status=live}}</ref> Created to protect the new regime and serve as a counterbalance to the army, the ''Revolutionary Guards''{{efn| Also known in Iran as the ''Sepah-e-Pasdaran''}} (IRGC) had been trained to act only as a militia and struggled to adapt as needed following the Iraqi invasion, initially refusing to fight alongside the regular army, resulting in many defeats. It was not until 1982 that the two groups began carrying out combined operations.<ref name="pollack04">{{cite book|last=Pollack|first=Kenneth M.|title=Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991|year=2004|publisher=University of Nebraska Press|location=Lincoln|isbn=978-0-8032-8783-9|chapter=Iraq}}</ref>

An additional paramilitary militia was founded in response to the invasion, the "Army of 20 Million", commonly known as the [[Basij]].<ref name="Alfoneh 2010">{{cite web|last=Alfoneh|first=Ali|title=The Basij Resistance Force|url=http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|work=The Iran Primer|date=6 October 2010|publisher=United States Institute of Peace|access-date=13 October 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130120132917/http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/basij-resistance-force|archive-date=20 January 2013|url-status=dead}}</ref> The Basij were poorly armed and had members as young as 12 and as old as 70. They often acted in conjunction with the Revolutionary Guard, launching so-called [[human wave attack]]s and other campaigns against the Iraqis.<ref name="Alfoneh 2010" /> They were subordinate to the Revolutionary Guard, and they made up most of the manpower that was used in the Revolutionary Guard's attacks.<ref name="Farrokh 03" />

Stephen Pelletiere wrote in his 1992 book ''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum'':

{{blockquote|The human wave has been largely misconstrued both by the popular media in the West and by many scholars. The Iranians did not merely assemble masses of individuals, point them at the enemy, and order a charge. The waves were made up of the 22-man squads mentioned above [in response to Khomeini's call for the people to come to Iran's defence, each mosque organised 22 volunteers into a squad]. Each squad was assigned a specific objective. In battle, they would surge forward to accomplish their missions, and thus gave the impression of a human wave pouring against enemy lines.<ref>''The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum''. Stephen C. Pelletiere{{ISBN missing|date=September 2024}}</ref>{{page needed|date=September 2024}}}}

Despite neglect by the new regime, at the outset of the conflict, Iran still had at least 1,000 operational tanks and several hundred functional aircraft and could [[cannibalization (parts)|cannibalise]] equipment to procure spare parts.{{efn| A resort that became increasingly necessary as the war continued. Though Iran could and did acquire weapons from multiple foreign manufacturers; the pre-revolution arsenal was composed overwhelmingly of US made weaponry, meaning obtaining additional spare parts was not an option.}}<ref name="pollack04" /> Continuous sanctions greatly limited Iran from acquiring many additional heavy weapons, including tanks and aircraft.<ref name="parstimes" />