Editing Intellectual history (section)

==== Unit-idea ====
In the History of Ideas, Lovejoy used the ''unit-idea'' (concept) as the basic unit of historical analysis. The unit-idea is the building block of the history of ideas; though relatively stable in itself, the unit-idea combines with other unit-ideas into new patterns of meaning in the context of different historical eras. Lovejoy said that the historian of ideas is tasked with identifying unit-ideas and with describing their historical emergence and development into new conceptual forms and combinations. The methodology of the unit-idea means to extract the basic idea from a work of philosophy and from a philosophical movement, with the investigative principles of the methodology being: (1) assumptions, (2) dialectical motives, (3) metaphysical pathos, and (4) philosophical [[semantics]]. The principles of methodology define the overarching philosophical movement in which the historian can find the unit-idea, which then is studied throughout the history of the particular idea.<ref name="greatchain" />

The British historian [[Quentin Skinner]] criticized Lovejoy's unit-idea methodology as a "reification of doctrines" that has negative consequences.<ref>Skinner, Quentin. (1969) "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", ''History and Theory'' '''8''' (1): 3–53.</ref> That the historian of ideas must be sensitive to the cultural context of the texts and ideas under analysis. Skinner's [[historical method]] is based upon the theory of speech acts, proposed by [[J.L. Austin]]. In turn, scholars criticized Skinner's historical method because of his inclination to [[Reification (knowledge representation)|reify]] social structures and sociological constructs in place of the historical actors of the period under study. The philosopher [[Andreas Dorschel]] said that Skinner's restrictive approach to ideas, through verbal language, and notes that ideas can materialize in non-linguistic media and genres, such as music and architecture.<ref>Dorschel, Andreas. ''Ideengeschichte.'' Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht,  2010. {{ISBN|978-3-8252-3314-3}}</ref> The historian [[Dag Herbjørnsrud]] said that "the Skinner perspective is in danger of shutting the door to comparative philosophy, and the search for common problems and solutions across borders and time."<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Herbjørnsrud|first=Dag.|date=2019-05-10|title=Beyond Decolonizing: Global Intellectual History and Reconstruction of a Comparative Method|journal=Global Intellectual History|volume=6 |issue=5 |pages=614–640|doi=10.1080/23801883.2019.1616310|s2cid=166543159|issn=2380-1883}}</ref>

The historian [[Peter Gordon (historian)|Peter Gordon]] said that unlike Lovejoy's practise of the History of Ideas, the praxis of Intellectual History studies and deals with ideas in broad historical contexts.<ref name="history.fas.harvard.edu">Gordon, Peter E. [http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/history/files/what_is_intell_history_pgordon_mar2012.pdf "What is intellectual history? A Frankly Partisan Introduction to a Frequently Misunderstood Field"]. Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.</ref> That unlike historians of ideas and philosophers ([[Philosophy#History|History of Philosophy]]), intellectual historians, "tend to be more relaxed about crossing the boundary between philosophical texts and non-philosophical contexts . . . [Intellectual historians regard] the distinction between 'philosophy' and 'non-philosophy' as something that is, itself, historically conditioned, rather than eternally fixed." Therefore, intellectual history is a means for reproducing a historically valid interpretation of a philosophical argument, by implementation of a context in which to study ideas and philosophical movements.<ref name="history.fas.harvard.edu"/>