Editing Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi (section)

==Information provided==

According to ''[[The Washington Post]]'',

{{Blockquote|Under questioning, al-Libi provided the CIA with intelligence about an alleged plot to blow up the U.S. Embassy in [[Yemen]] with a truck bomb and pointed officials in the direction of [[Abu Zubaydah]], a top al Qaeda leader known to have been involved in the [[September 11 terrorist attacks|Sept. 11 plot]].<ref name=Wapo040801>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30909-2004Jul31.html |title=Al Qaeda-Iraq Link Recanted |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |first=Dana |last=Priest |author-link=Dana Priest |date=August 1, 2004 |access-date=April 23, 2009}}</ref>}}

On September 15, 2002, ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' published an article that detailed the CIA interrogations of [[Omar al-Faruq]]. It said,

<blockquote>On Sept. 9, according to a secret CIA summary of the interview, al-Faruq confessed that he was, in fact, al-Qaeda's senior representative in Southeast Asia. Then came an even more shocking confession: according to the CIA document, al-Faruq said two senior al-Qaeda officials, Abu Zubaydah and Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi, had ordered him to 'plan large-scale attacks against U.S. interests in [[Indonesia]], [[Malaysia]], the [[Philippines]], [[Singapore]], [[Thailand]], [[Taiwan]], [[Vietnam]] and [[Cambodia]].'<ref>{{cite magazine |url=http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,351169,00.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20020917103501/http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,351169,00.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=September 17, 2002 |title=Confessions of an al-Qaeda Terrorist |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |date=September 15, 2002 |access-date=April 23, 2009}}</ref></blockquote>

Al-Libi has been identified as a principal source of faulty prewar intelligence regarding chemical weapons training between Iraq and al-Qaeda that was used by the Bush administration to justify the [[2003 invasion of Iraq|invasion of Iraq]].<ref name=Newsweek20080611/> Specifically, he told interrogators that Iraq provided training to al-Qaeda in the area of "chemical and biological weapons".<ref name=Guardian2006-11-17/> In Cincinnati in October 2002, Bush informed the public: "Iraq has trained al Qaeda members in bomb making and poisons and gases."<ref>{{cite web|url=https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html|title=President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat|date=October 7, 2002|access-date=February 4, 2011}}</ref>

This claim was repeated several times in the run-up to the war, including in then-[[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]] [[Colin Powell]]'s speech to the [[UN Security Council]] on February 5, 2003, which concluded with a long recitation of the information provided by al-Libi. Powell's speech was made less than a month after a then-classified CIA report concluded that the information provided by al-Libi was unreliable, and about a year after a DIA report concluded the same thing.

Al-Libi recanted these claims in January 2004 after U.S. interrogators presented "new evidence from other detainees that cast doubt on his claims", according to ''[[Newsweek]]''.<ref name=Newsweek050705>{{cite news |first=Michael |last=Isikoff |author-link=Michael Isikoff |date=July 5, 2004 |title=Iraq and Al Qaeda |url=http://www.newsweek.com/id/54310 |work=[[Newsweek]] |access-date=April 23, 2009}}</ref> The DIA concluded in February 2002 that al-Libi deliberately misled interrogators, in what the CIA called an "attempt to exaggerate his importance".<ref name=Newsweek20080611/><ref name="senate2005">{{cite web|url=http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=249087 |title=Levin and Reed Compare Bush Administration Statements with Intelligence Community Statements on Pre-War Iraq Intelligence |date=November 18, 2005 |access-date=February 4, 2011 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110107082150/http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/release.cfm?id=249087 |archive-date=January 7, 2011 }}</ref> Some speculate that his reason for giving [[disinformation]] was to draw the U.S. into an attack on Iraq—Islam's "weakest" state, a remark attributed to al-Libi—which al-Qaeda believed would lead to a global [[jihad]].<ref name=Guardian2006-11-17/><ref>{{cite news|author1=<!--Staff writer(s); no by-line.-->|title=Newsnight reveals exclusive story of Al Qaeda spy|url=http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/pressreleases/stories/2006/11_november/17/newsnight.shtml|access-date=12 December 2014|work=[[BBC]]|date=17 November 2006|quote=where is the best country to fight the jihad? Then he will say but before to get them, we need to have back one of the Muslim country in our sight, and the weakest of them is Iraq.}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last1=Dyer|first1=Gwynne|author-link1=Gwynne Dyer|title=Al-Qaeda and Iraq: Suspicions Confirmed|url=http://gwynnedyer.com/2006/al-qaeda-and-iraq/|website=Gwynne Dyer - Author, Historian & Independent Journalist|access-date=12 December 2014|date=20 November 2006|quote=So Iraq was the right place to start the jihad.  For the extremists of al-Qaeda, the 'jihad' had to be waged first and foremost against the existing governments of Muslim countries}}</ref> Others, including al-Libi himself,<ref name=postwarFindingsReport/> have insisted that he gave false information due to the use of torture (so-called "[[enhanced interrogation techniques]]").<ref>{{cite news|first=Moazzam |last=Begg  |author-link=Moazzam Begg |title=Former Guantánamo Bay detainee speaks |url=http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/live-news/2014/12/former-guantanamobaydetaineespeakspartone.html |access-date=10 December 2014 |work=Al Jazeera America News |publisher=[[Al Jazeera]] |date=9 December 2014 |page=Part One of Two |format=Video Clip |quote=And I know that a man called Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi was sent (from Bagram, where I was held) to Egypt, and where he gave a confession—this is a crucial confession—that he was working with Saddam Hussein on obtaining weapons of mass destruction. Colin Powell used that statement—that false, tortured statement—which was delivered to the United Nations to argue for a case of war in Iraq. |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141210063652/http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/live-news/2014/12/former-guantanamobaydetaineespeakspartone.html |archive-date=December 10, 2014 |df=mdy-all }}</ref>

An article published in the November 5, 2005 edition of ''[[The New York Times]]'' quoted two paragraphs of a [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] report, declassified upon request by [[US Senator|Senator]] [[Carl Levin]], that expressed doubts about the results of al-Libi's interrogation in February 2002.<ref name="senate2005"/>

Al-Libi told a foreign intelligence service that:

<blockquote>Iraq &mdash; acting on the request of al-Qa'ida militant Abu Abdullah, who was [[Mohammed Atef|Muhammad Atif]]'s emissary &mdash; agreed to provide unspecified chemical or biological weapons training for two al-Qa'ida associates beginning in December 2000. The two individuals departed for Iraq but did not return, so al-Libi was not in a position to know if any training had taken place.<ref name="Terrorist Rehabilitation">{{cite book|last=Angell|first=Ami|title=Terrorist Rehabilitation: The U.S. Experience in Iraq|year=2012|publisher=[[CRC Press]]|isbn=978-1-4398-5249-1|page=4|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=9jMMCe3Sq78C|access-date=28 July 2013}}</ref> </blockquote>

The September 2002 version of ''Iraqi Support for Terrorism'' stated that al-Libi said Iraq had "provided" chemical and biological weapons training for two al-Qaeda associates in 2000, but also stated that al-Libi "did not know the results of the training."{{quote without source|date=April 2009}}

The 2006 Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq stated that "Although DIA coordinated on CIA's ''Iraqi Support for Terrorism'' paper, DIA analysis preceding that assessment was more skeptical of the al-Libi reporting." In July 2002, DIA assessed

<blockquote>It is plausible al-Qa'ida attempted to obtain CB assistance from Iraq and Ibn al-Shaykh is sufficiently senior to have access to such sensitive information. However, Ibn al-Shaykh's information lacks details concerning the individual Iraqis involved, the specific CB materials associated with the assistance and the location where the alleged training occurred. The information is also second hand, and not derived from Ibn al-Shaykh's personal experience.<ref>{{cite book |author=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence |date=September 8, 2006 |title=Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments |url=http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060921074629/http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=September 21, 2006 |page=75 |access-date=May 13, 2009|author-link=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence }}</ref></blockquote>

The Senate report also states "According to al-Libi, after his decision to fabricate information for debriefers, he 'lied about being a member of al-Qa'ida. Although he considered himself close to, but not a member of, al-Qa'ida, he knew enough about the senior members, organization and operations to claim to be a member.'"<ref>{{cite book |author=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence |date=September 8, 2006 |title=Report on Postwar Findings about Iraq's WMD Programs and Links to Terrorism and How they Compare with Prewar Assessments |url=http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060921074629/http://intelligence.senate.gov/phaseiiaccuracy.pdf |url-status=dead |archive-date=September 21, 2006 |page=80 |access-date=May 13, 2009|author-link=United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence }}</ref>