Editing Hilbert's second problem (section)

== Modern viewpoints on the status of the problem ==

While the theorems of Gödel and Gentzen are now well understood by the mathematical logic community, no consensus has formed on whether (or in what way) these theorems answer Hilbert's second problem. {{harvtxt|Simpson|1988}} argues that Gödel's incompleteness theorem shows that it is not possible to produce finitistic consistency proofs of strong theories.{{sfnp|Simpson|1988|loc= sec. 3}}  {{harvtxt|Kreisel|1976}} states that although Gödel's results imply that no finitistic syntactic consistency proof can be obtained, semantic (in particular, [[Second-order logic|second-order]]) arguments can be used to give convincing consistency proofs. {{harvtxt|Detlefsen|1990}} argues that Gödel's theorem does not prevent a consistency proof because its hypotheses might not apply to all the systems in which a consistency proof could be carried out.{{sfnp|Detlefsen|1990|p=65}} {{harvtxt|Dawson|2006}} calls the belief that Gödel's theorem eliminates the possibility of a persuasive consistency proof "erroneous", citing the consistency proof given by Gentzen and [[Dialectica interpretation|a later one given by Gödel in 1958]].{{sfnp|Dawson|2006|loc= sec. 2}}