Editing Gulf War (section)

==Background==
{{See also|Rationale for the Gulf War|Iraq–Kuwait relations|Iraq–United States relations}}

Throughout the [[Cold War]], Iraq had been an ally of the [[Soviet Union]], and there was a history of friction between Iraq and the United States.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]]|year=1991|isbn=978-0-471-54299-5|page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/160 160]}}</ref> The US was concerned with Iraq's position on Israeli–[[Palestinians|Palestinian]] politics. The US also disliked Iraqi support for [[Palestinian fedayeen|Palestinian militant]] groups, which led to Iraq's inclusion on the developing US list of [[State Sponsors of Terrorism (U.S. list)|State Sponsors of Terrorism]] in December 1979.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]]|year=1991|isbn=978-0-471-54299-5|pages=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/161 161]-[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/162 162]}}</ref>

[[File:Saddam rumsfeld.jpg|thumb|left|[[Donald Rumsfeld]], US special envoy to the Middle East, meets [[Saddam Hussein]] on 19–20 December 1983.]]
The US remained officially neutral after Iraq's invasion of Iran in 1980, which became the Iran–Iraq War, although it provided resources, political support, and some "non-military" aircraft to Iraq.<ref name="stork">{{cite journal |title=Background to the Crisis: Why War? |first1=Joe |last1=Stork|first2=Ann M. |last2=Lesch |journal=Middle East Report |issue=167, November–December 1990 |pages=11–18 |publisher=Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)|jstor=3012998|year=1990 |doi=10.2307/3012998 | issn = 0899-2851 }} {{subscription required}}</ref> In March 1982, Iran began a successful [[counteroffensive]] ([[Operation Undeniable Victory]]), and the US [[United States support for Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war|increased its support for Iraq]] to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender. In a US bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the US list of State Sponsors of Terrorism.<ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]]|year=1991 |isbn=978-0-471-54299-5|page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/163 163]}}</ref> Ostensibly, this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former US Assistant Defense Secretary Noel Koch later stated: "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in [[State-sponsored terrorism|terrorism]]&nbsp;... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."<ref name="Borer">{{cite web |url=http://www.army.mil/professionalWriting/volumes/volume1/july_2003/7_03_2v2.html |title=Inverse Engagement: Lessons from U.S.-Iraq Relations, 1982–1990 |access-date=12 October 2006 |author=Douglas A. Borer |year=2003 |work=U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection |publisher=US Army |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061011195656/http://www.army.mil/professionalwriting/volumes/volume1/july_2003/7_03_2v2.html |archive-date=11 October 2006 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author-link=Elaine Sciolino|last=Sciolino|first=Elaine|title=The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis|publisher=[[Wiley (publisher)|John Wiley & Sons]]|year=1991 |isbn=978-0-471-54299-5|page=[https://archive.org/details/outlawstate00elai/page/164 164]}}</ref>

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, [[International aid to combatants in the Iran–Iraq War|arms sales to Iraq]] reached a record spike in 1982. When Iraqi President [[Saddam Hussein]] expelled [[Abu Nidal]] to Syria at the US's request in November 1983, the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] sent [[Donald Rumsfeld]] to meet Saddam as a special envoy and to cultivate ties. By the time the [[Iran–Iraq War#1987–88: Towards a ceasefire|ceasefire with Iran]] was signed in August 1988, Iraq was heavily debt-ridden and tensions within society were rising.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=333}} Most of its [[Government debt|debt]] was owed to [[Saudi Arabia]] and Kuwait.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=341–342}} Iraq's debts to Kuwait amounted to $14&nbsp;billion.<ref>{{cite news |title=On this day in 1990: The world decides to stop Saddam Hussein's forces marauding around Kuwait |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/30/day-world-decided-stop-saddam-husseins-forces-marauding-around/ |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220110/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/30/day-world-decided-stop-saddam-husseins-forces-marauding-around/ |archive-date=10 January 2022 |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |work=The Daily Telegraph |date=30 November 2017}}{{cbignore}}</ref> Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=341–342}}<ref name="airCombatInformationGroup2">{{cite journal |last1=Cooper |first1=Tom |author-link1=Tom Cooper (author) |last2=Sadik |first2=Ahmad |date=6 August 2007 |title=Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait; 1990 |url=http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=1 |url-status=live |journal=Air Combat Information Group Journal |archive-url=https://archive.today/20130706142817/http://www.acig.info/CMS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=47 |archive-date=6 July 2013 |access-date=27 October 2016}}</ref>

The Iraq–Kuwait border dispute involved Iraqi claims to Kuwaiti territory.<ref name="stork" /> Kuwait had been a part of the [[Ottoman Empire]]'s [[Basra Vilayet|province of Basra]], something that Iraq claimed made Kuwait rightful Iraqi territory.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=343–344}} Kuwait's ruling dynasty, the [[House of Sabah|al-Sabah family]], had concluded a [[protectorate]] agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for Kuwait's foreign affairs to the United Kingdom. The UK drew the border between Kuwait and Iraq in 1922, making Iraq almost entirely landlocked.<ref name="stork" /> Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the region.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=343–344}}

Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its [[OPEC]] quotas for oil production.<ref name="OPEC2">"OPEC pressures Kuwait to moderate quota demand", ''New Straits Times'', 7 June 1989</ref> In order for the cartel to maintain its desired price of $18 per barrel, discipline was required. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait were consistently overproducing; the latter at least in part to repair losses caused by Iranian attacks in the Iran–Iraq War and to pay for the losses of an economic scandal. The result was a slump in the oil price{{snd}}as low as {{convert|10|$/oilbbl|$/m3}}{{snd}}with a resulting loss of $7&nbsp;billion a year to Iraq, equal to its 1989 [[balance of payments]] deficit.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=339–340}} Resulting revenues struggled to support the government's basic costs, let alone repair Iraq's damaged infrastructure. [[Jordan]] and Iraq both looked for more discipline, with little success.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=341}} The Iraqi government described it as a form of economic warfare,{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=341}} which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait [[Directional drilling|slant-drilling]] across the border into Iraq's [[Rumaila oil field]].<ref>Cleveland, William L. ''A History of the Modern Middle East. 2nd Ed'' pg. 464</ref> According to oil workers in the area, Iraq's slant drilling claim was fabricated, as "oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques."<ref name=hayes>{{cite news|last=Hayes |first=Thomas C.|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=3 September 1990|title=Confrontation in the Gulf; The Oilfield Lying Below the Iraq-Kuwait Dispute|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/03/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-the-oilfield-lying-below-the-iraq-kuwait-dispute.html|quote=Oil formations frequently run beneath political boundaries, whether they involve unfriendly leaseholders in West Texas or neighboring Arab states, and procedures have existed for years to settle disputes that arise. Typically, participants in the same field share both production costs and revenues, using a formula that sets percentages of ownership. But Iraq refused to negotiate with Kuwait on such an agreement. So Kuwait produced oil from Rumaila without any agreement, and then adopted a policy of producing far more oil than it was allowed under the quota system of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.&nbsp;... But during the [Iran–Iraq War] Iraq mined its giant share of the Rumaila field to keep it from falling into Iranian hands, Western political experts say. Kuwait stepped up its total oil production, capturing some of Iraq's customers and pumping millions of barrels from the Rumaila field.&nbsp;... Some Iraqi officials have accused Kuwait in the past of using advanced drilling techniques developed by American oilfield specialists to siphon oil from the Rumaila field, a charge that American drillers deny, noting that the oil flows easily from the Rumaila field without any need for these techniques.&nbsp;... W. C. Goins, senior vice president of OGE Drilling Inc., a Houston company that provided oilfield supervisors and workers for Kuwait in the same area, said he was 'positive' all of the wells his employees drilled and operated ran vertically down to the Rumaila pay zone. 'That field crosses the border in north Kuwait,' he added. 'Iraqis were drilling on one side, and Kuwaitis on the other side.'}}</ref> At the same time, Saddam looked for closer ties with those Arab states that had supported Iraq in the war. This move was supported by the US, who believed that Iraqi ties with pro-Western Gulf states would help bring and maintain Iraq inside the US' sphere of influence.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=334}}

In 1989, it appeared that [[Iraq–Saudi Arabia relations|Saudi–Iraqi relations]], strong during the war, would be maintained. A pact of non-interference and non-aggression was signed between the countries, followed by a Kuwaiti-Iraqi deal for Iraq to supply Kuwait with water for drinking and irrigation, although a request for Kuwait to lease Iraq [[Umm Qasr]] was rejected.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=334}} Saudi-backed development projects were hampered by Iraq's large debts, even with the [[demobilization]] of 200,000 soldiers. Iraq also looked to increase arms production so as to become an exporter, although the success of these projects was also restrained by Iraq's obligations; in Iraq, resentment to OPEC's controls mounted.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=335}}

Iraq's relations with its Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, were degraded by mounting violence in Iraq against expatriate groups, who were well-employed during the war, by unemployed Iraqis, among them demobilized soldiers. These events drew little notice outside the Arab world because of fast-moving events directly related to the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe. However, the US did begin to condemn Iraq's human rights record, including the well-known use of torture.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=336}} The UK also condemned the execution of [[Farzad Bazoft]], a journalist working for the British newspaper ''[[The Observer]]''.<ref name="stork" /> Following Saddam's declaration that "binary chemical weapons" would be used on Israel if it used military force against Iraq, Washington halted part of its funding.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|pp=337–338}} A UN mission to the [[Israeli-occupied territories]], where riots had resulted in Palestinian deaths, was [[United Nations Security Council veto power|vetoed]] by the US, making Iraq deeply skeptical of US foreign policy aims in the region, combined with the reliance of the US on Middle Eastern energy reserves.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=338}}

[[File:Ku-map.gif|thumb|left|Map of Kuwait]]
In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the US naval fleet in the [[Persian Gulf]] was placed on alert. Saddam believed an anti-Iraq conspiracy was developing{{snd}}Kuwait had begun talks with Iran, and Iraq's rival Syria had arranged a visit to Egypt.{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=343}} On 15 July 1990, Saddam's government laid out its combined objections to the [[Arab League]], including that policy moves were costing Iraq $1&nbsp;billion a year, that Kuwait was still using the Rumaila oil field, and that loans made by the UAE and Kuwait could not be considered debts to its "Arab brothers".{{sfnp|Simons|2004|p=343}} He threatened force against Kuwait and the UAE, saying: "The policies of some Arab rulers are American&nbsp;... They are inspired by America to undermine Arab interests and security."<ref>Yousseff M. Ibrahim, [https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/18/business/iraq-threatens-emirates-and-kuwait-on-oil-glut.html "Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630060909/http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/18/business/iraq-threatens-emirates-and-kuwait-on-oil-glut.html |date=30 June 2017 }} ''New York Times'', 18 July 1990</ref> The US sent [[aerial refuelling]] planes and combat ships to the Persian Gulf in response to these threats.<ref>Michael R. Gordon, [https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/25/world/us-deploys-air-and-sea-forces-after-iraq-threatens-2-neighbors.html "U.S. Deploys Air and Sea Forces After Iraq Threatens 2 Neighbors"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170630054533/http://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/25/world/us-deploys-air-and-sea-forces-after-iraq-threatens-2-neighbors.html |date=30 June 2017 }} ''New York Times'', 25 July 1990</ref> Discussions in [[Jeddah]], Saudi Arabia, mediated on the Arab League's behalf by Egyptian President [[Hosni Mubarak]], were held on 31 July and led Mubarak to believe that a peaceful course could be established.{{sfnp|Finlan|2003|pp=25–26}}

During Saddam Hussein's 2003–2004 interrogation following his capture he claimed that in addition to economic disputes, an insulting exchange between the Kuwaiti [[emir]] [[Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah|Al Sabah]] and the Iraqi foreign minister – during which the emir stated his intention to turn "every Iraqi woman into a $10 prostitute" by bankrupting the country – was a decisive factor in triggering the Iraqi invasion.<ref>{{Cite web |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/interrogator-shares-saddams-confessions/4/|title=Interrogator Shares Saddam's Confessions |website=cbsnews.com|date=24 January 2008}}</ref>

On the 25th, Saddam met with [[April Glaspie]], the [[United States Ambassador to Iraq|US Ambassador to Iraq]], in Baghdad. The Iraqi leader attacked American policy with regards to Kuwait and the UAE:
{{blockquote|So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights&nbsp;... If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you&nbsp;... We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.<ref name="nytimes.com">[https://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html "CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF; Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170111062914/http://www.nytimes.com/1990/09/23/world/confrontation-in-the-gulf-excerpts-from-iraqi-document-on-meeting-with-us-envoy.html |date=11 January 2017 }} ''New York Times'', 23 September 1990</ref>}}

Glaspie replied:
{{blockquote|I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait&nbsp;... Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the UAE and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned.<ref name="nytimes.com" />}}

Saddam stated that he would attempt last-ditch negotiations with the Kuwaitis but Iraq "would not accept death."<ref name="nytimes.com" />

According to Glaspie's own account, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq, "...&nbsp;that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; 'then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs'."{{citation needed|date=November 2023}} Glaspie similarly believed that war was not imminent.{{sfnp|Finlan|2003|pp=25–26}}

Saddam's foreign minister [[Tariq Aziz]] later told [[Public Broadcasting Service|PBS]] ''[[Frontline (U.S. TV series)|Frontline]]'' in 1996 that the Iraqi leadership was under "no illusion" about America's likely response to the Iraqi invasion: "She [Glaspie] didn't tell us anything strange. She didn't tell us in the sense that we concluded that the Americans will not retaliate. That was nonsense you see. It was nonsense to think that the Americans would not attack us."<ref>"The Gulf War", PBS ''Frontline''. January 9, 1996.</ref> Then in a second 2000 interview with the same television program, Aziz said:<blockquote>There were no mixed signals. We should not forget that the whole period before August 2 witnessed a negative American policy towards Iraq. So it would be quite foolish to think that, if we go to Kuwait, then America would like that. Because the American tendency&nbsp;... was to untie Iraq. So how could we imagine that such a step was going to be appreciated by the Americans? It looks foolish, you see, this is fiction. About the meeting with April Glaspie—it was a routine meeting...She didn't say anything extraordinary beyond what any professional diplomat would say without previous instructions from his government...what she said were routine, classical comments on what the president was asking her to convey to President Bush. He wanted her to carry a message to George Bush—not to receive a message through her from Washington.<ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/aziz.html "The survival of Saddam"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170808105053/http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/saddam/interviews/aziz.html|date=2017-08-08}}, PBS ''Frontline''. January 25, 2000.</ref></blockquote> On 26 July 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates had agreed to a proposal to limit their oil output to {{convert|1.5|e6oilbbl|m3}} per day, "down from the nearly 2 million barrels a day they had each been pumping," thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq.<ref name=NY>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/1990/07/26/world/iraq-said-to-prevail-in-oil-dispute-with-kuwait-and-arab-emirates.html?pagewanted=1|work=The New York Times|first=Youssef M.|last=Ibrahim|title=Iraq Said to Prevail in Oil Dispute With Kuwait and Arab Emirates|date=26 July 1990}}</ref>