Editing G. E. Moore (section)

====Naturalistic fallacy====
{{Main|Naturalistic fallacy}}
Moore asserted that philosophical arguments can suffer from a confusion between the use of a term in a particular argument and the definition of that term (in all arguments). He named this confusion the [[naturalistic fallacy]]. For example, an ethical argument may claim that if an item has certain properties, then that item is 'good.' A [[hedonism|hedonist]] may argue that 'pleasant' items are 'good' items. Other theorists may argue that 'complex' things are 'good' things. Moore contends that, even if such arguments are correct, they do not provide definitions for the term 'good'. The property of 'goodness' cannot be defined. It can only be shown and grasped. Any attempt to define it (X is good if it has property Y) will simply shift the problem (Why is Y-ness good in the first place?).