Editing Foundationalism (section)

===Modest foundationalism===
As an alternative to the classic view, modest foundationalism does not require that basic perceptual beliefs are infallible, but holds that it is reasonable to assume that perceptual beliefs are justified unless evidence to the contrary exists.<ref name=OB>O'Brien 2006, pp. 72–74</ref> This is still foundationalism because it maintains that all non-basic beliefs must be ultimately justified by basic beliefs, but it does not require that basic beliefs are infallible and allows [[inductive reasoning]] as an acceptable form of inference.<ref>Lemos 2007, p.55</ref> For example, a belief that 'I see red' could be defeated with psychological evidence showing my mind to be confused or inattentive. Modest foundationalism can also be used to avoid the problem of inference. Even if perceptual beliefs are infallible, it is not clear that they can infallibly ground empirical knowledge (even if my belief that the table looks red to me is infallible, the inference to the belief that the table actually is red might not be infallible). Modest foundationalism does not require this link between perception and reality to be so strong; our perception of a table being yellow is adequate justification to believe that this is the case, even if it is not infallible.<ref name=OB/>

[[Reformed epistemology]] is a form of modest foundationalism which takes religious beliefs as basic because they are non-inferentially justified: their justification arises from [[religious experience]], rather than prior beliefs. This takes a modest approach to foundationalism – religious beliefs are not taken to be infallible, but are assumed to be ''[[prima facie]]'' justified unless evidence arises to the contrary.<ref>O'Brien 2006, p. 184</ref>