Editing First strike (nuclear strategy) (section)

=== 1970s/1980s ===
However, tensions were inflamed again in the late 1970s and early 1980s with the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]], the Soviet deployment of the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20 Saber]] and the [[SS-18 Satan]], and the decision of NATO to deploy the new [[Pershing II]] [[IRBM]] as well as the [[Tomahawk (missile family)|Tomahawk]] [[BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile|Ground Launched Cruise Missile]], along with U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]]'s talk of 'limited' nuclear war. This increased Soviet fears that NATO was planning an attack. NATO's deployment of these missiles was a response to the Soviet deployment of the [[RSD-10 Pioneer|SS-20 Saber]], which could hit most European NATO bases within minutes of launch. These mutual deployments led to a destabilizing strategic situation, which was exacerbated by malfunctioning U.S. and Soviet missile launch early warning systems, a Soviet intelligence gap that prevented the Soviets from getting a "read" on the strategic intentions of U.S. leaders, as well as inflammatory U.S. rhetoric combined with classical Soviet mistrust of the NATO powers. This culminated in a war scare that occurred during 1983 due to the inopportune timing of a NATO exercise called [[Able Archer]], which was a simulation of a NATO nuclear attack on the Soviet Union; this exercise happened to occur during a massive Soviet intelligence mobilization called [[VRYAN]], that was designed to discover intentions of NATO to initiate a nuclear first-strike. This poor timing drove the world very close to nuclear war, possibly even closer than the Cuban Missile Crisis over 20 years before.{{citation needed|date=October 2017}}