Editing Epistemology (section)

==== Types ====
[[File:Honourable_Bertrand_Russell.jpg|thumb|upright=0.8|alt=Black and white photo of a man wearing a dark suit, a white shirt, and a tie|[[Bertrand Russell]] originated the distinction between propositional knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Brown|2016|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=gMdyCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA104 104]}} | {{harvnb|Hasan|Fumerton|2024|loc=§ 1. The Distinction}} }}</ref>]]

Epistemologists distinguish between different types of knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Barnett|1990|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=eTjlAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA40 40]}} | {{harvnb|Lilley|Lightfoot|Amaral|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=HT8VDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA162 162–163]}} }}</ref> Their primary interest is in knowledge of facts, called ''[[propositional knowledge]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Klein|1998|loc=§ 1. The Varieties of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} }}</ref> It is [[Theory|theoretical]] knowledge that can be expressed in [[Sentence (linguistics)#By function or speech act|declarative sentences]] using a that-clause, like "Ravi knows that kangaroos hop". For this reason, it is also called ''knowledge-that''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} }}</ref>{{efn|Other synonyms include ''declarative knowledge'' and ''descriptive knowledge''.<ref name="auto">{{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1b. Knowledge-That}}</ref>}} Epistemologists often understand it as a [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]] between a knower and a known [[proposition]], in the case above between the person Ravi and the proposition "kangaroos hop".<ref name="auto"/> It is use-independent since it is not tied to one specific purpose, unlike practical knowledge. It is a mental representation that embodies concepts and ideas to reflect reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Morrison|2005|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=znbkHaC8QeMC&pg=PA371 371]}} | {{harvnb|Reif|2008|p=33}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=93}} }}</ref> Because of its theoretical nature, it is typically held that only creatures with highly developed minds, such as humans, possess propositional knowledge.<ref>{{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}</ref>

Propositional knowledge contrasts with non-propositional knowledge in the form of [[Procedural knowledge|knowledge-how]] and [[knowledge by acquaintance]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1. Kinds of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ The Nature of Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Stanley|Willlamson|2001|pp=[https://philpapers.org/rec/WILKHV 411–412]}} }}</ref> Knowledge-how is a practical ability or skill, like knowing how to read or how to prepare [[lasagna]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1d. Knowing-How}} | {{harvnb|Pritchard|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sfUhAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA3 3]}} }}</ref> It is usually tied to a specific goal and not mastered in the abstract without concrete practice.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Merriënboer|1997|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=o0I3IXLfXuAC&pg=PA32 32]}} | {{harvnb|Klauer|Manstetten|Petersen|Schiller|2016|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=YjglDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA105 105–6]}} | {{harvnb|Pavese|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-how/ Lead section]}} }}</ref> To know something by acquaintance means to have an immediate familiarity with or awareness of it, usually as a result of direct experiential contact. Examples are "familiarity with the city of [[Perth]]", "knowing the taste of [[tsampa]]", and "knowing [[Marta Vieira da Silva]] personally".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|ref=Hetherington, "''Knowledge''"|loc=§ 1a. Knowing by Acquaintance}} | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ St. Anselm of Canterbury}} | {{harvnb|Zagzebski|1999|p=92}} | {{harvnb|Benton|2024|p=4}} }}</ref>

[[File:Immanuel Kant portrait c1790.jpg|upright=0.8|alt=Painting of a man with gray hair in a formal dark attire|thumb|The analytic–synthetic distinction has its roots in the philosophy of [[Immanuel Kant]].<ref>{{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA4 4]}}</ref>]]

Another influential distinction in epistemology is between [[A priori and a posteriori|''a posteriori'' and ''a priori'']] knowledge.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A Priori and a Posteriori Knowledge}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref>{{efn|The distinction came to prominence in the 17th century and acted as a crucial factor in the philosophies of [[David Hume]] and [[Immanuel Kant]].{{sfn|Stroll|2023|loc=§ A priori and a posteriori Knowledge}}}} ''A posteriori'' knowledge is knowledge of [[empirical]] facts based on sensory experience, like "seeing that the sun is shining" and "smelling that a piece of meat has gone bad".<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead section}} }}</ref> This type of knowledge is associated with the empirical science and everyday affairs. ''A priori'' knowledge, by contrast, pertains to non-empirical facts and does not depend on evidence from sensory experience, like knowing that <math>2 + 2=4</math>. It belongs to fields such as [[mathematics]] and [[logic]].<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Russell|2020|loc=Lead section}} | {{harvnb|Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|ref=Baehr, "''A Priori and A Posteriori''"|loc=Lead section, § 1. An Initial Characterization}} | {{harvnb|Moser|2016|loc=Lead section}}}}</ref> The distinction between ''a posteriori'' and ''a priori'' knowledge is central to the debate between [[Empiricism|empiricists]] and [[Rationalism|rationalists]] regarding whether all knowledge depends on sensory experience.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Carter|Littlejohn|2021|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=w98mEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA79 § 3. The Apriori]}} | {{harvnb|Popper|2014|loc=[https://books.google.com/books?id=pXd9AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA31 2. Deductivism and Inductivism]}} }}</ref>

A closely related contrast is between [[Analytic–synthetic distinction|analytic and synthetic truths]]. A sentence is analytically true if its truth depends only on the meanings of the words it uses. For instance, the sentence "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytically true because the word "bachelor" already includes the meaning "unmarried". A sentence is synthetically true if its truth depends on additional facts. For example, the sentence "snow is white" is synthetically true because its truth depends on the color of snow in addition to the meanings of the words ''snow'' and ''white''. ''A priori'' knowledge is primarily associated with analytic sentences, whereas ''a posteriori'' knowledge is primarily associated with synthetic sentences. However, it is controversial whether this is true for all cases. Some philosophers, such as [[Willard Van Orman Quine]], reject the distinction, saying that there are no analytic truths.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Juhl|Loomis|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8kiPAgAAQBAJ&pg=PR9 ix–x, 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Russell|2023}} | {{harvnb|Pradhan|2019|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DR-VDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA75 75]}} }}</ref>