Editing Epicureanism (section)

===Epistemology===
Epicurean philosophy employs an [[Empiricism|empirical]] epistemology, one based on the senses.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010p">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|page=85}}</ref>

====Sense perception====
Epicureans believed that senses also relied on atoms. Every object was continually emitting particles from itself that would then interact with the observer.<ref name="Wilson-2015c">{{harvnb|Wilson|2015|pp=54–55}}</ref> All sensations, such as sight, smell, or sound, relied on these particles.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" /> While the atoms that were emitted did not have the qualities that the senses were perceiving, the manner in which they were emitted caused the observer to experience those sensations, e.g. red particles were not themselves red but  were emitted in a manner that caused the viewer to experience the color red.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" /> The atoms are not perceived individually, but rather as a continuous sensation because of how quickly they move.<ref name="Wilson-2015c" />

The Epicureans believed that all sense perceptions were true,<ref>{{Cite book |title = The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited | last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James|page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n93 84]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref><ref name="O'Keefe-2010q">{{harvnb|O'Keefe| 2010 | pp=97–98}}</ref> and that errors arise in how we judge those perceptions.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/> When we form judgments about things (''hupolepsis''), they can be verified and corrected through further sensory information.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/><ref name="Bakalis-2005">{{Cite book|title=Handbook of Greek Philosophy: From Thales to the Stoics Analysis and Fragments|last=Bakalis|first=Nikolaos|publisher=Trafford Publishing|year=2005|location=Canada|pages=193–197}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|title=Epicurus and the Epicurean Tradition|url=https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish|url-access=limited|last=Konstan|first=David|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2011|editor-last=Fish|editor-first=Jeffrey|location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/epicurusepicurea00fish/page/n75 62]–63|isbn=9780521194785|editor-last2=Sanders|editor-first2=Kirk R.}}</ref> For example, if someone sees a tower from far away that appears to be round, and upon approaching the tower they see that it is actually square, they would come to realize that their original judgement was wrong and correct their wrong opinion.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010r">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=103–104}}</ref>

====Criterion of truth====
Epicurus is said to have proposed three [[Problem of the criterion|criteria of truth]]: sensations (''aisthêsis''), preconceptions (''prolepsis''), and feelings (''pathê'').<ref name="Sharples-1996f">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|page=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n32 19]}}</ref> A fourth criterion called "presentational applications of the mind" (''phantastikai epibolai tês dianoias'') was said to have been added by later Epicureans.<ref name="Sharples-1996f"/><ref name="Asmis-2009">{{Cite book| title = The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited|last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher = Cambridge University Press|year=2009|editor-last=Warren|editor-first=James | location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n102 93]–94|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref> These criteria formed the method through which Epicureans thought we gained knowledge.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010p"/>

Since Epicureans thought that sensations could not deceive, sensations are the first and main criterion of truth for Epicureans.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010q"/> Even in cases where sensory input seems to mislead, the input itself is true and the error arises from our judgments about the input. For example, when one places a straight oar in the water, it appears bent. The Epicurean would argue that the image of the oar, that is, the atoms traveling from the oar to the observer's eyes, has been shifted and thus really does arrive at the observer's eyes in the shape of a bent oar.<ref name="Sharples-1996c">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n25 12]–13}}</ref> The observer makes the error in assuming that the image he or she receives correctly represents the oar and has not been distorted in some way.<ref name="Sharples-1996c" /> In order to not make erroneous judgments about perceivable things and instead verify one's judgment, Epicureans believed that one needed to obtain "clear vision" (''enargeia'') of the perceivable thing by closer examination.<ref name="Sharples-1996d">{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n25 12]–16}}</ref> This acted as a justification for one's judgements about the thing being perceived.<ref name="Sharples-1996d" /> ''Enargeia'' is characterized as sensation of an object that has been unchanged by judgments or opinions and is a clear and direct perception of that object.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Epicureanism|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995|url-access=limited | last=Asmis|first=Elizabeth|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2009 | editor-last=Warren|editor-first = James | page=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00warr_995/page/n94 85]|chapter=Epicurean empiricism}}</ref>

An individual's preconceptions are his or her concepts of what things are, e.g. what someone's idea of a horse is, and these concepts are formed in a person's mind through sensory input over time.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics: An Introduction to Hellenistic Philosophy|url=https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar|url-access=limited|last=Sharples|first=R. W.|publisher=Routledge|year=1996|location=New York, NY|pages=[https://archive.org/details/stoicsepicureans0000shar/page/n31 18]–19}}</ref> When the word that relates to the preconception is used, these preconceptions are summoned up by the mind into the person's thoughts.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m">{{harvnb|O'Keefe|2010|pp=101–103}}</ref> It is through our preconceptions that we are able to make judgments about the things that we perceive.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010r"/> Preconceptions were also used by Epicureans to avoid the paradox proposed by Plato in the ''[[Meno]]'' regarding learning.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" /> Plato argues that learning requires us to already have knowledge of what we are learning, or else we would be unable to recognize when we had successfully learned the information.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" /> Preconceptions, Epicureans argue, provide individuals with that pre-knowledge required for learning.<ref name="O'Keefe-2010m" />

Our feelings or emotions (''pathê'') are how we perceive pleasure and pain.<ref name="Asmis-2009"/> They are analogous to sensations in that they are a means of perception, but they perceive our internal state as opposed to external things.<ref name="Asmis-2009" /> According to Diogenes Laertius, feelings are how we determine our actions. If something is pleasurable, we pursue that thing, and if something is painful, we avoid that thing.<ref name="Asmis-2009" />

The idea of "presentational applications of the mind" is an explanation for how we can discuss and inquire about things we cannot directly perceive.<ref name="Tsouna-2016">{{Cite journal|last=Tsouna|first=Voula|date=2016|title=Epicurean Preconceptions|journal=Phronesis|volume= 61| issue = 2 | page=215 | doi=10.1163/15685284-12341304}}</ref> We receive impressions of such things directly in our minds, instead of perceiving them through other senses.<ref name="Sharples-1996f"/> The concept of "presentational applications of the mind" may have been introduced to explain how we learn about things that we cannot directly perceive, such as the gods.<ref name="Sharples-1996f" /><ref name="Tsouna-2016" />