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Embargo Act of 1807
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==Case studies== A case study of Rhode Island shows the embargo to have devastated shipping-related industries, wrecked existing markets, and broadened opposition to the [[Democratic–Republican Party]]. Much of the U.S. approved of [[smuggling]], holding that the embargo violated their rights. Public outcry helped the Federalists regain control of Rhode Island state government in 1808–1809. The case is a rare example of American national foreign policy altering local patterns of political allegiance. Despite its unpopularity, the Embargo Act yielded limited and unintended benefits to the Northeast, driving capital and labor into New England textile and other manufacturing industries. It reduced U.S. reliance on British manufactured goods.<ref name=Strum>{{cite journal |first=Harvey |last=Strum |title=Rhode Island and the Embargo of 1807 |journal=Rhode Island History |date=May 1994 |volume=52 |issue=2 |pages=58–67 |issn=0035-4619 |url=http://www.rihs.org/assetts/files/publications/1994_May.pdf#page=28 |quote=Although the state's manufacturers benefited from the embargo, taking advantage of the increased demand for domestically produced goods (especially cotton products), and merchants with idle capital were able to move from shipping and trade into manufacturing, this industrial growth did not compensate for the considerable distress that the embargo caused.}}</ref> In Vermont, the embargo was doomed to failure on the Lake Champlain–Richeleiu River water route because of the state's dependence on a Canadian outlet for produce. At St. John, Lower Canada, £140,000 worth of goods smuggled by water were recorded there in 1808, a 31% increase over 1807. Shipments of ashes to make soap nearly doubled to £54,000, but those of lumber dropped by 23% to £11,200. Manufactured goods, which had expanded to £50,000 since [[Jay's Treaty]] in 1795, fell by over 20%, especially articles made near tidewater. Newspapers and manuscripts recorded more lake activity than usual, despite the theoretical reduction in shipping that should accompany an embargo. The smuggling was not restricted to water routes, as herds were readily driven across the uncontrollable land border. Southbound commerce gained two thirds overall, but furs dropped a third. Customs officials maintained a stance of vigorous enforcement throughout, and Gallatin's Enforcement Act (1809) was a party issue. Many Vermonters preferred the embargo's exciting game of revenuers versus smugglers, which brought high profits, versus mundane, low-profit normal trade.<ref>{{cite journal |first=H. Nicholas III |last=Muller |title=Smuggling into Canada: How the Champlain Valley Defied Jefferson's Embargo |journal=Vermont History |date=Winter 1970 |volume=38 |issue=1 |pages=5–21 |url=http://vermonthistory.org/journal/misc/SmugglingIntoCanada.pdf}}</ref> The New England merchants who evaded the embargo were imaginative, daring, and versatile in their violation of federal law. Gordinier (2001) examines how the merchants of New London, Connecticut, organized and managed the cargoes purchased and sold and the vessels that were used during the years before, during, and after the embargo. Trade routes and cargoes, both foreign and domestic, along with the vessel types, and the ways that their ownership and management were organized show the merchants of southeastern Connecticut evinced versatility in the face of crisis.<ref name="Gordinier">{{cite thesis|first=Glenn Stine|last=Gordinier|title=Versatility in Crisis: The Merchants of the New London Customs District Respond to the Embargo of 1807–1809|type=PhD dissertation|publisher=U. of Connecticut|date=January 2001|id=AAI3004842|url=https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/AAI3004842/|url-access=subscription}}<!-- Extra text "DAI 2001 62(2): 739-A." not converted. Was it in a journal that it was published?--></ref> Gordinier (2001) concludes that the versatile merchants sought alternative strategies for their commerce and, to a lesser extent, for their navigation. They tried extralegal activities, a reduction in the size of the foreign fleet, and the redocumentation of foreign trading vessels into domestic carriage. Most importantly, they sought new domestic trading partners and took advantage of the political power of [[Jedidiah Huntington]], the Customs Collector. Huntington was an influential member of the Connecticut leadership class (called "the Standing Order") and allowed scores of embargoed vessels to depart for foreign ports under the guise of "special permission". Old modes of sharing vessel ownership to share the risk proved to be difficult to modify. Instead, established relationships continued through the embargo crisis despite numerous bankruptcies.{{r|Gordinier}}
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