Editing Egyptian Armed Forces (section)

=== Twenty-first century ===
[[File:CENTCOM Partner Nations Attend Static Display At Bright Star 2023.webp|thumb|Egyptian soldiers march during [[Exercise Bright Star#Bright Star 23|Bright Star 23]] static display]]
During the [[2011 Egyptian revolution]], the Egyptian Army was deployed to restore order in major cities. On 31 January 2011, Israeli media reported that the 9th, 2nd, and 7th Divisions were ordered into [[Cairo]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.mako.co.il/news-specials/egypt/Article-64af2c4c648dd21004.htm|title=צפו: סיור וירטואלי במוקדי המהפכה|date=30 January 2011|access-date=27 August 2016}}</ref> Subsequently, on 3 July 2013, the Armed Forces removed President [[Mohamed Morsi]] from office following mass protests demanding his resignation, an action widely described as a [[2013 Egyptian coup d'état|coup d’état]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Coup topples Egypt's Morsy; deposed president under 'house arrest'|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|first=Ben|last=Wedeman|work=CNN|date=4 July 2013|access-date=8 April 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304090828/http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/03/world/meast/egypt-protests|archive-date=4 March 2016|url-status=live}}</ref> In the days that followed, several violent incidents occurred, including the [[Republican Guard headquarters clashes]] on 8 July 2013, which resulted in the deaths of 61 protesters.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/08/12/egypt-raba-killings-likely-crimes-against-humanity|title=Egypt: Rab'a Killings Likely Crimes against Humanity|date=12 August 2014|website=Human Rights Watch}}</ref> On 14 August 2013, security forces, including the army and police, carried out the dispersal of pro-Morsi sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda Squares, resulting in large-scale casualties. Estimates of the death toll vary, with some reports stating over 2,600 fatalities.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |title=Egypt's Brotherhood to hold 'march of anger' |publisher=Al Jazeera |date=16 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130816123944/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381522364486906.html |archive-date=16 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |title=NSF spokesman quits over Rabaa, Nahda massacres |work=World Bulletin |date=14 August 2013 |access-date=18 August 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131002092241/http://www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=115257 |archive-date=2 October 2013 |url-status=usurped }}</ref> The events of 14 August 2013 are considered the deadliest day in Egypt since the 2011 revolution.<ref>{{cite news|title=Scores dead in Egypt after security forces launch assault on protesters' camp |first=Abigail |last=Hauslohner |author2=Sharaf al-Hourani |date=14 August 2013 |newspaper=The Washington Post|access-date=14 August 2013 |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130815001337/http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/egyptian-security-forces-move-against-protesters-camps/2013/08/14/bc079750-04a7-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html |archive-date=15 August 2013 |url-status=live}}</ref> The international response included widespread condemnation from foreign governments and human rights organizations.<ref>{{Cite news|url=http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|title=Global condemnation of Egypt crackdown|publisher=Al Jazeera|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130825125046/http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381505130985967.html|archive-date=25 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news|url=http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|title=Most world states condemn Egypt's violence|newspaper=Al-Ahram|date=15 August 2013|access-date=7 September 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130823002801/http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/79105/Egypt/Politics-/Most-world-states-condemn-Egypts-violence-.aspx|archive-date=23 August 2013|url-status=live}}</ref>

Since the [[2013 Egyptian coup d'etat]], the Egyptian Armed Forces has maintained a prominent role within the state, enjoying a high degree of institutional autonomy and influence across multiple sectors.<ref name="NYT 2011">{{cite news|last=Cambanis|first=Thanassis|title=Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/12/world/middleeast/12egypt.html?_r=1&ref=global-home&pagewanted=all|access-date=11 September 2010|newspaper=[[The New York Times]]|date=11 September 2010}}</ref> The military also holds a substantial presence in the economy, participating in areas such as infrastructure, housing, consumer goods, and tourism,<ref name="NYT 2011" /> and possesses large real estate holdings. Information regarding its budget, leadership, and force size remains largely undisclosed and is considered classified.<ref name="NYT 2011" /> 
[[File:Bright Star 18 Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise rehearsal 180916-Z-IX878-0026.jpg|thumb|right|An Egyptian [[M1 Abrams]] tank]]
Estimates of the military's economic reach vary; journalist Joshua Hammer reported that the armed forces may control up to 40% of the Egyptian economy,<ref>[http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/aug/18/egypt-who-calls-shots/ Egypt: Who Calls the Shots?] Joshua Hammer | nybooks.com | 18 August 2011</ref> though such figures have been criticized for lacking empirical foundations and for rarely being grounded in systematic analysis.<ref name=carniege>{{cite web | url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/11/owners-of-the-republic-an-anatomy-of-egypts-military-economy?lang=en&center=middle-east | title=Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of Egypt’s Military Economy | website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | date=November 2019 | access-date=April 4, 2025 }}</ref> These estimates often fail to distinguish between different forms of military economic engagement, such as the annual output of goods and services versus ownership of physical assets.<ref name=carniege/> They also tend to conflate three distinct domains of economic involvement: formally registered military-owned enterprises under the [[Ministry of Military Production (Egypt)|Ministry of Military Production]], the [[Arab Organization for Industrialization]], and other affiliated agencies whose actual production is significantly more modest than often portrayed; a wider group of public and private sector entities led or influenced by retired military officers, whose revenues do not belong to the armed forces; and regulatory privileges that generate income through licensing, leasing, tolls, and partnerships with national and international firms.<ref name=carniege/> 

In 2016, President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]] and military officials estimated that the formal military economy accounted for between 1% and 2% of Egypt’s [[GDP]], likely encompassing the combined output of military agencies and revenues from public works. According to [[Yezid Sayigh]], senior fellow at the [[The Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center|Carnegie Middle East Center]], this estimate is likely closer to the actual scale of the military's formal economic activity.<ref name=carniege/> While the military has expanded its access to extra-budgetary resources and assumed a growing role in state capital expenditure since 2013, analysts argue that its economic footprint is generally smaller, less efficient, and less productive than widely believed, though still of considerable significance.<ref name=carniege/>
[[File:USS Delbert D. Black (DDG 119), top, is underway with the Egyptian navy ships ENS Gamal Adbel Nasser (L 1010) and ENS Al-Galala (FFG 1002) in the Mediterranean Sea.jpg|thumb|left|Egyptian [[Mistral class]] [[ENS Gamal Abdel Nasser]] (middle) sails alongside [[ENS Al-Galala]] (bottom) and American [[USS Delbert D. Black]] (top) and in the Mediterranean Sea, August 29, 2022, during joint operations to enhance regional maritime security.]]
By 2018, analysts observed no overt signs of institutional fragmentation within the Armed Forces. According to Hussein and Martino, the military's entrenched dominance in political and security affairs may be attributed to a combination of factors: its expansive economic interests, long-standing national legitimacy reinforced by its role in welfare and development programs, and a conscription-based recruitment system that facilitates cross-class integration within the armed services.{{sfn|Hussein|Martino|2019}}

In 2019, it was reported that the Egyptian Armed Forces had begun a broad modernization effort under President [[Abdel Fattah el-Sisi]], following a long period of operational stagnation, since the 1970s.<ref name="modernizationcarniege">{{cite web |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2019/02/the-egyptian-military-a-slumbering-giant-awakes?lang=en&center=middle-east |title=The Egyptian Military: A Slumbering Giant Awakes |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |date=February 2019 |access-date=2025-04-04}}</ref> This initiative has included a notable increase in military procurement, with purchases from France, Russia, and Germany that have added new fighter aircraft, naval vessels, submarines, and surveillance systems to Egypt’s inventory.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> These acquisitions have supplemented longstanding military assistance from the United States and reflect a shift toward a more diversified supply strategy.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Parallel efforts have focused on doctrinal and structural reforms, including greater emphasis on interoperability, air mobility, maritime operations, and special forces.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Joint exercises with both regional and international partners have also expanded during this period.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> However, the modernization program faces ongoing structural obstacles, such as entrenched command hierarchies, insufficient training regimes, and limited investment in logistical sustainment.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/> Despite these limitations, the current scope of reform is regarded as the most extensive military overhaul in Egypt in decades.<ref name="modernizationcarniege"/>

In March 2021, [[Human Rights Watch]] published a report alleging that the Egyptian Armed Forces had committed violations of international law during operations in North Sinai, including the demolition of more than 12,300 residential and commercial structures and the clearance of approximately 6,000 hectares of farmland since 2013.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/17/egypt-massive-sinai-demolitions-likely-war-crimes|title=Egypt: Massive Sinai Demolitions Likely War Crimes|date=17 March 2021|accessdate=17 March 2021|publisher=Human Rights Watch}}</ref>