Editing Edward Teller (section)

===Decision to drop the bombs===
In the days before and after the first demonstration of a nuclear weapon (the [[Trinity test]] in July 1945), Hungarian [[Leo Szilard]] circulated the [[Szilard petition|Szílard petition]], which argued that [[Atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki#Proposed demonstration|a demonstration to the Japanese of the new weapon]] should occur prior to [[Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki|actual use on Japan]], and that the weapons should never be used on people. In response to Szilard's petition, Teller consulted his friend Robert Oppenheimer. Teller believed that Oppenheimer was a natural leader and could help him with such a formidable political problem. Oppenheimer reassured Teller that the nation's fate should be left to the sensible politicians in Washington. Bolstered by Oppenheimer's influence, he decided to not sign the petition.{{sfn|Blumberg|Panos|1990|pp=82–83}}

Teller therefore penned a letter in response to Szilard that read:{{blockquote|I am not really convinced of your objections. I do not feel that there is any chance to outlaw any one weapon. If we have a slim chance of survival, it lies in the possibility to get rid of wars. The more decisive a weapon is the more surely it will be used in any real conflict and no agreements will help.

Our only hope is in getting the facts of our results before the people. This might help to convince everybody that the next war would be fatal. For this purpose actual combat-use might even be the best thing.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/1945-Teller-to-Szilard.pdf |archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20221009/http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/1945-Teller-to-Szilard.pdf |archive-date=2022-10-09 |url-status=live |title=Edward Teller to Leo Szilard |date=July 2, 1945 |publisher=Nuclear Secrecy blog |access-date=November 15, 2015}} Copy in the J. Robert Oppenheimer papers (MS35188), Library of Congress, Washington, DC, Box 71, Folder, Teller, Edward, 1942–1963</ref>}}

On reflection on this letter years later when he was writing his memoirs, Teller wrote:{{blockquote|First, Szilard was right. As scientists who worked on producing the bomb, we bore a special responsibility. Second, Oppenheimer was right. We did not know enough about the political situation to have a valid opinion. Third, what we should have done but failed to do was to work out the technical changes required for demonstrating the bomb [very high] over Tokyo and submit that information to President Truman.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|p=206}} }}

Unknown to Teller at the time, four of his colleagues were solicited by the then secret May to June 1945 [[Interim Committee]]. It is this organization which ultimately decided on how the new weapons should initially be used. The committee's four-member ''Scientific Panel'' was led by Oppenheimer, and concluded immediate military use on Japan was the best option:{{blockquote|The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender&nbsp;... Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use&nbsp;... We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/interim-committee/interim-committee-recommendations_1945-06-16.htm |title=Recommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons by the Scientific Panel of the Interim Committee, June 16, 1945 |publisher=[[Nuclear Age Peace Foundation]] |access-date=March 2, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110204224440/http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/history/pre-cold-war/interim-committee/interim-committee-recommendations_1945-06-16.htm |archive-date=2011-02-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref>}}

Teller later learned of Oppenheimer's solicitation and his role in the Interim Committee's decision to drop the bombs, having secretly endorsed an immediate military use of the new weapons. This was contrary to the impression that Teller had received when he had personally asked Oppenheimer about the Szilard petition: that the nation's fate should be left to the sensible politicians in Washington. Following Teller's discovery of this, his relationship with his advisor began to deteriorate.{{sfn|Blumberg|Panos|1990|pp=82–83}}

In 1990, the historian [[Barton Bernstein]] argued that it is an "unconvincing claim" by Teller that he was a "covert dissenter" to the use of the bomb.<ref>{{cite journal |title=Essay Review-From the A-Bomb to Star Wars: Edward Teller's History. Better A Shield Than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology |journal=Technology and Culture |volume=31 |issue=4 |date=October 1990 |page=848}}</ref> In his 2001 ''Memoirs'', Teller claims that he did lobby Oppenheimer, but that Oppenheimer had convinced him that he should take no action and that the scientists should leave military questions in the hands of the military; Teller claims he was not aware that Oppenheimer and other scientists were being consulted as to the actual use of the weapon and implies that Oppenheimer was being hypocritical.{{sfn|Teller|Shoolery|2001|pp=206–209}}