Editing Consciousness (section)

===From introspection to awareness and experience===
Prior to the 20th century, philosophers treated the phenomenon of consciousness as the "inner world [of] one's own mind", and [[introspection]] was the mind "attending to" itself,{{efn|From the ''Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy'' (1967): "Locke's use of 'consciousness' was widely adopted in British philosophy. In the late nineteenth century the term 'introspection' began to be used. [[G. F. Stout]]'s definition is typical: "To introspect is to attend to the workings of one's own mind" [... (1899)]".<ref name=Landesman67>{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Landesman|first1=Charles Jr.|editor1-last=Edwards|editor1-first=Paul|encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy|contribution=Consciousness|volume= 2|date=1967|publisher=Macmillan, Inc.|pages=191–195|edition=Reprint 1972}}</ref>{{rp|191–192}}}} an activity seemingly distinct from that of perceiving the 'outer world' and its physical phenomena. In 1892 [[William James]] noted the distinction along with doubts about the inward character of the mind:{{blockquote|'Things' have been doubted, but thoughts and feelings have never been doubted. The outer world, but never the inner world, has been denied. Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our thinking activity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with the outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure of this conclusion. [...] It seems as if consciousness as an inner activity were rather a ''postulate'' than a sensibly given fact...<ref name=WJames92>{{cite book|last1=James|first1=William|title=Psychology|date=1948|orig-date=1892|publisher=Fine Editions Press, World Publishing Co.|location=Cleveland}}</ref>{{rp|467}}}}
By the 1960s, for many philosophers and psychologists who talked about consciousness, the word no longer meant the 'inner world' but an indefinite, large category called ''[[awareness]]'', as in the following example:<!-- Without an established definition or an obvious thing, event or experience that consciousness must refer to, a number of items are often presented as examples, as in the following claim: -->
{{blockquote|It is difficult for modern Western man to grasp that the Greeks really had no concept of consciousness in that they did not class together phenomena as varied as problem solving, remembering, imagining, perceiving, feeling pain, dreaming, and acting on the grounds that all these are manifestations of being aware or being conscious.<ref name="EPhil-Psyc" >{{cite encyclopedia|last1=Peters|first1=R. S.|last2=Mace|first2=C. A.|editor1-last=Edwards|editor1-first=Paul|encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Philosophy|contribution=Psychology|volume= 7|date=1967|publisher=Macmillan, Inc.|pages=1–27|edition=Reprint 1972}}</ref>{{rp|4}}}}

Many philosophers and scientists have been unhappy about the difficulty of producing a definition that does not involve circularity or fuzziness.<ref name=Sutherland/> In The ''Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology'' (1989 edition), [[Stuart Sutherland]] emphasized external awareness, and expressed a skeptical attitude more than a definition:

{{blockquote|'''Consciousness'''—The having of perceptions, thoughts, and [[feelings]]; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with [[self-consciousness]]—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it.<ref name=Sutherland>{{cite book|author=Stuart Sutherland|title=Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology|publisher=Macmillan|chapter=Consciousness|year=1989|isbn=978-0-333-38829-7|author-link=Stuart Sutherland}}</ref>}}
Using 'awareness', however, as a definition or synonym of consciousness is not a simple matter:
{{blockquote|text=If awareness of the environment . . . is the criterion of consciousness, then even the protozoans are conscious. If awareness of awareness is required, then it is doubtful whether the great apes and human infants are conscious.<ref name=Thomas67>{{cite encyclopedia|last= Thomas|first= Garth J.|encyclopedia= Encyclopædia Britannica|date=1967|volume=6|pages=366|title= Consciousness}}</ref>}}
In 1974, philosopher [[Thomas Nagel]] used 'consciousness', 'conscious experience', 'subjective experience' and the 'subjective character of experience' as synonyms for something that "occurs at many levels of animal life&nbsp;... [although] it is difficult to say in general what provides evidence of it."<ref name=NagelBat1>{{cite journal | last1 = Nagel | first1 = Thomas | year = 1974 | title = What Is It Like to Be a Bat? | journal = The Philosophical Review | volume = 83 | issue = 4| pages = 435–450 | doi=10.2307/2183914 | jstor=2183914 |url={{google books |plainurl=y |id=fBGPBRX3JsQC|page=165}}}}</ref> Nagel's terminology also included what has been described as "the standard 'what it's like' locution"<ref name=Levine10>Levine, Joseph (2010). Review of Uriah Kriegel, Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. ''Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews'' 2010 (3).</ref> in reference to the impenetrable [[subjectivity]] of any organism's [[experience]] which Nagel referred to as "inner life" without implying any kind of introspection. On Nagel's approach, [[Peter Hacker]] commented:{{r|Hacker2002|p=158}} "Consciousness, thus conceived, is extended to the whole domain of 'experience'—of 'Life' {{em|subjectively understood}}." He regarded this as a "novel analysis of consciousness"{{r|Hacker2012|p=14}} and has been particularly critical of Nagel's terminology and its philosophical consequences.{{r|Hacker2012}} In 2002 he attacked Nagel's 'what it's like' phrase as "malconstructed" and meaningless English—it sounds as if it asks for an analogy, but does not—and he called Nagel's approach logically "misconceived" as a definition of consciousness.<ref name=Hacker2002>{{cite journal |author-link= Peter Hacker |last= Hacker |first= P.M.S. |url=http://www.phps.at/texte/HackerP1.pdf |title= Is there anything it is like to be a bat? |journal= Philosophy |volume= 77 |date= 2002 |issue= 2 |pages= 157–174 |doi=10.1017/s0031819102000220}}</ref> In 2012 Hacker went further and asserted that Nagel had "laid the groundwork for&nbsp;... forty years of fresh confusion about consciousness" and that "the contemporary philosophical conception of consciousness that is embraced by the 'consciousness studies community' is incoherent".{{r|Hacker2012|p=13-15}}