Editing Chinese room (section)

=== Strong AI ===<!--This section title is linked to from several places -->
Searle identified a philosophical position he calls "strong AI":
{{Blockquote|
The appropriately programmed computer with the right inputs and outputs would thereby have a mind in exactly the same sense human beings have minds.{{efn|name="Strong AI"|This version is from Searle's ''Mind, Language and Society''{{sfn|Searle|1999|p={{Page needed|date=February 2012}}}} and is also quoted in [[Daniel Dennett]]'s ''[[Consciousness Explained]]''.{{sfn|Dennett|1991|p=435}} Searle's original formulation was "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states."{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=1}} Strong AI is defined similarly by [[Stuart J. Russell]] and [[Peter Norvig]]: "weak AI—the idea machines could act a <em>as if</em> they were intelligent—and strong AI—the assertions that do so are <em>actually</em> consciously thinking (not just <em>simulating</em> thinking)."{{sfn|Russell|Norvig|2021|p=981}}}}
}}
The definition depends on the distinction between simulating a mind and actually having one. Searle writes that "according to Strong AI, the correct simulation really is a mind. According to Weak AI, the correct simulation is a model of the mind."{{sfn|Searle|2009|p=1}}

The claim is implicit in some of the statements of early AI researchers and analysts. For example, in 1955, AI founder [[Herbert A. Simon]] declared that "there are now in the world machines that think, that learn and create".<ref>Quoted in {{Harvnb|McCorduck|2004|p=138}}.</ref> Simon, together with [[Allen Newell]] and [[Cliff Shaw]], after having completed the first program that could do [[formal reasoning]] (the [[Logic Theorist]]), claimed that they had "solved the venerable mind–body problem, explaining how a system composed of matter can have the properties of mind."<ref>Quoted in {{Harvnb|Crevier|1993|p=46}}</ref> [[John Haugeland]] wrote that "AI wants only the genuine article: <em>machines with minds</em>, in the full and literal sense. This is not science fiction, but real science, based on a theoretical conception as deep as it is daring: namely, we are, at root, <em>computers ourselves</em>."{{sfn|Haugeland|1985|p=2|ps=&nbsp;(Italics his)}}

Searle also ascribes the following claims to advocates of strong AI:
* AI systems can be used to explain the mind;{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=1}}
* The study of the brain is irrelevant to the study of the mind;{{efn|Searle believes that "strong AI only makes sense given the dualistic assumption that, where the mind is concerned, the brain doesn't matter." {{sfn|Searle|1980|p=13}} He writes elsewhere, "I thought the whole idea of strong AI was that we don't need to know how the brain works to know how the mind works." {{sfn|Searle|1980|p=8}} This position owes its phrasing to Stevan Harnad.{{sfn|Harnad|2001}}}} and
* The [[Turing test]] is adequate for establishing the existence of mental states.{{efn|"One of the points at issue," writes Searle, "is the adequacy of the Turing test."{{sfn|Searle|1980|p=6}}}}