Editing Chandrakirti (section)

=== Two Truths ===
Like all madhyamikas, Chandrakirti defends a [[Two truths doctrine|theory of two truths]] with a strict [[Anti-foundationalism|anti-foundationalist]] character.<ref name=":7">Thakchoe 2017</ref> According to Chandrakirti, all things (''bhāva'') have two natures, the conventional and the ultimate.<ref name=":5">Ruegg 1981, p. 72.</ref><ref name=":7" />

The conventional truth ([[Samvrti|''saṁvṛti'']] ''satya'') is the fact that, provisionally speaking, phenomena have a nature or existence (''bhāva'').<ref name=":2" /> For example, a property of fire is heat and so on. This is the truth of the everyday world (''lokasaṁvṛtisatya'') and the truth of conventional transaction (''vyavahārasatya'').<ref name=":5" /> However, these conventional properties are not intrinsic natures or ''svabhāvas'' (even conventionally speaking), since for Chandra, even conventional truth is empty of intrinsic natures. This view differentiates Chandrakirti from other madhyamikas like [[Bhāviveka]] which affirm the ''conventional existence'' of intrinsic natures.<ref name=":7" /><ref name="ReferenceA">Padmakara Translation Group 2005, p. 28.</ref>

Regarding the ultimate truth (''paramārtha satya''), when fire is analyzed to find its ultimate nature, no independent essence is found that makes fire hot, and thus fire (and all things, including the most basic concepts like time and causality) have no ultimate essence or nature. This is the ultimate truth i.e. [[Śūnyatā|emptiness]] (''śūnyatā'') or the lack of self-existence (''niḥsvabhāva'').<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":7" /> It is this very lack of inherent nature in conventional truth that allows it to change and have causal efficacy (''arthakriya'') and thus, to be a dependent arising (''[[pratītyasamutpāda]]'').<ref name=":7" />

==== The nature of conventional truth ====
The conventional is the "domain of mundane cognitive process, and is readily accessible for ordinary beings" according to Sonam Thakchoe.<ref name=":7" /> The conventional truth can be contrasted with conventional falsehood based on erroneous cognitions.<ref name=":5" /> Correct cognition is differentiated from false cognitions by sense faculties that are not impaired. A related distinction which Chandrakirti makes is that between worldly conventions (''lokasaṃvṛti''), which are epistemically reliable from the point of view of ordinary beings and conventions that do not reflect the world (''alokasaṃvṛti)'' and are thus deceptive even by worldly standards.<ref name=":7" />

"Conventional" ''(saṁvṛti)'' can also mean "covering" according to Chandrakirti and is also associated with delusion or ignorance ([[Avidyā (Buddhism)|''avidyā'']]).<ref name=":5" /><ref name=":7" /> Furthermore, he also glosses the term as codependent (''paraparasaṃbhavana)'' and as being signified ''(saṁket)'' or worldly convention ''(lokavyavahāra).<ref name=":7" />''

The conventional truth, especially as experienced by ordinary people (who reify reality), is a concealing and deluded kind of truth which may act as an obstacle to understanding the ultimate.<ref name=":4">Hayes 2019</ref>''<ref name=":7" />'' From the ultimate point of view in fact, ''saṁvṛtisatya'' is not really true.<ref name=":5" /> Indeed, Chandrakirti explains that conventional phenomena are illusory and unreal and can be compared to a [[mirage]]. The only difference is that conventional phenomena have some causal efficacy from the mundane point of view (for example, water can help a thirsty person, a mirage cannot)''.<ref name=":7" />''

Furthermore, these conventional phenomena are to be differentiated from conventionally illusory entities, such as intrinsic natures or essences that are imputed on to things (which do not exist at all, even conventionally) and conventionally unreal entities (like the horns of a rabbit, which also do not exist at all)''.<ref name=":7" />'' The main difference between these latter two unreal phenomena is that the conventionally unreal entities are understood to be unreal by ordinary people, whereas intrinsic nature is not understood to be unreal by ordinary persons. Instead, ordinary persons impute intrinsic nature on to conventional phenomena (such as water etc.) and perceive them as being intrinsically real (only noble beings realize that this is illusory). As such, intrinsic nature is a conceptual fiction in the minds of ordinary beings.''<ref name=":7" />''

In spite of the unreality of the conventional, Chandrakirti states that the Buddha taught using language and conventional expressions as a way to guide people to the ultimate truth, which is beyond language and cannot be expressed through words.<ref name=":4" />

For Chandrakirti, the way that ordinary beings experience the conventional is very different from the way that awakened saints or noble beings (''āryas'') experience the conventional. Chandrakirti introduced the concept of ''mere convention'' (Tibetan: ''kun rdzob tsam'') to refer to how noble ones experience conventionality, which is quite different to what is held to be ''conventionally real'' or ''conventional true'' (''kun rdzob bden pa''). Ordinary beings grasp at and misconstrue phenomena as being intrinsically real, thus they experience conventional ''reality.'' Enlightened beings meanwhile, only experience a non-reified kind of appearance, which is perceived as being an unreal construct, like a reflected image.<ref name=":7" />''

==== The nature of the ultimate truth ====
Chandrakirti defines ultimate reality as "the nature of things found by particular exalted cognitive processes (yeshes) of those who perceive reality." He further defines it as follows:<ref name=":7" /><blockquote>“Ultimate is the object, the nature of which is found by ''particular'' exalted cognitive processes of those who perceive reality. But it does not exist by virtue of its ''intrinsic objective reality'' (''svarūpatā'' / ''bdag gi ngo bo nyid'')."</blockquote>As such, the ultimate truth for Chandra is the nature of all conventional things that is found by a particular exalted perception which sees how things really are. However, as indicated by Chandra, this nature is also not truly real.<ref name=":7" />

According to Chandrakirti, the ultimate truth, emptiness, is seen as having two aspects: [[Anattā|selflessness]] of persons (''pudgalanairātmya'') and selflessness of phenomena (''dharmanairātmya''). Chandrakirti provides various arguments to show that persons, phenomena (dharmas) and emptiness itself are all unreal and empty.<ref name=":7" />

The ultimate truth, the lack of self-nature in all phenomena, also refers to the fact that phenomena do not arise or cease at all. Even though conventional phenomena appear to arise and pass away through dependent arising, this appearance is in fact unreal and illusory.<ref name=":7" /> Thus, for Chandrakirti, the wisdom which realizes the ultimate truth is the realization that phenomena (dharmas) do not arise or come into being from themselves, from another thing, from both themselves and another thing, or without a cause.<ref name=":4" /> Just like Nagarjuna, Chandrakirti refutes all positions regarding the arising of phenomena, summing up his position as follows:<blockquote>Entities do not arise causelessly, and they do not arise through causes like [[God]], for example. Nor do they arise out of themselves, nor from another, nor from both. They arise codependently.<ref name=":7" /></blockquote>In this sense then, all phenomena are intrinsically unreal and like illusions, since they truly are not what they appear to be.<ref name=":7" />

According to Chandrakirti, this very ultimate truth (i.e. emptiness and non-arising), is also empty, in the sense that it is also dependent on the provisional truth of dependent imputation. Another way to state this is that only what lacks inherent nature is dependently originated and causally efficacious.<ref name=":7" />

Chandrakirti explains the emptiness of emptiness as follows:<blockquote>The emptiness of intrinsic reality of things is itself called by the wise as ‘emptiness,’ and this emptiness also is considered to be empty of any intrinsic reality. The emptiness of that which is called ‘emptiness’ is accepted as ‘the emptiness of emptiness’ (''śūnyatāśūnyatā''). It is explained in this way for the purpose of controverting objectification of the emptiness as intrinsically real (''bhāva'').<ref name=":7" /></blockquote>Thus, according to Chandrakirti's doctrine of "the emptiness of emptiness", the ultimate truth is not some [[Absolute (philosophy)|absolute]] reality, existential [[Paul Tillich#God as the ground of being|ground]] or [[Ontology|ontological]] foundation, but refers to a mere absence of nature, and thus to the illusory and unreal character of things.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":7" />

Because of the unreality of the conventional and the ineffability of the ultimate, Chandrakirti holds that madhyamikas do not formally put forth any elaborate theory of the conventional truth apart from the ordinary worldly experience that is accepted by worldly convention or common consensus.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> According to Chandrakirti, theories which seek to explain the workings of the conventional truth (like the metaphysics of [[samkhya]] or [[Yogachara|yogacara]]) actually obscure and undermine our understanding of conventional truth, since it is at variance with direct experience. These theories also undermine our understanding of the ultimate truth (which is the very nature of our experience) since the ultimate cannot be understood conceptually and can only be accessed through the gateway of one's conventional direct experience.<ref>Padmakara Translation Group 2005, pp. 29-30.</ref>