Editing Carl von Clausewitz (section)

===Principal ideas===
[[File:CarlvonClausewitz.jpg|thumb|upright|Clausewitz as a young man]]

Key ideas discussed in ''On War'' include:<ref>This list is from "[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/faqs.htm#Ideas Frequently Asked Questions about Clausewitz]," ''ClausewitzStudies.org,'' edited by Christopher Bassford.</ref>
* the [[dialectic]]al approach to military analysis
* the methods of "critical analysis"
* the economic profit-seeking logic of commercial enterprise is equally applicable to the waging of war and negotiating for peace
* the nature of the balance-of-power mechanism
* the relationship between political objectives and military objectives in war
* the asymmetrical relationship between attack and defense
* the nature of "military genius" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)
* the "fascinating trinity" (''wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit'') of war<ref name=TipToe>[https://www.clausewitzstudies.org/mobile/trinity8.htm Tip-Toe Through the Trinity: The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare] by Christopher Bassford</ref>
* philosophical distinctions between "[[absolute war]]," "ideal war," and "real war"
* in "real war," the distinctive poles of a) limited objectives (political and/or military) and b) war to "render the enemy helpless"
* the idea that war and its conduct belong fundamentally to the social realm rather than to the realms of art or science
* "strategy" belongs primarily to the realm of art, but is constrained by quantitative analyses of political benefits versus military costs & losses
* "tactics" belongs primarily to the realm of science (most obvious in the development of siege warfare)
* the importance of "moral forces" (more than simply "morale") as opposed to quantifiable physical elements
* the "military virtues" of professional armies (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)
* conversely, the very real effects of a superiority in numbers and "mass"
* the essential unpredictability of war
* the "fog of war"{{refn |group=note |"[T]he great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in addition not unfrequently—like the effect of a fog or moonshine—gives to things exaggerated dimensions and an unnatural appearance."<ref name=OnWar1873/>{{rp|Vol. I p. 54}}}}
* "friction" – the disparity between the ideal performance of units, organisations or systems and their actual performance in real-world scenarios (Book I, Chapter VII)
* strategic and operational "[[center of gravity (military)|centers of gravity]]"{{refn|group=note|"As the centre of gravity is always situated where the greatest mass of matter is collected, and as a shock against the center of gravity of a body always produces the greatest effect, and further, as the most effective blow is struck with the center of gravity of the power used, so it is also in war. The armed forces of every belligerent, whether of a single state or of an alliance of states, have a certain unity, and in that way, connection; but where connection is there come in analogies of the center of gravity. There are, therefore, in these armed forces certain centers of gravity, the movement and direction of which decide upon other points, and these centers of gravity are situated where the greatest bodies of troops are assembled. But just as, in the world of inert matter, the action against the center of gravity has its measure and limits in the connection of the parts, so it is in war, and here as well as there the force exerted may easily be greater than the resistance requires, and then there is a blow in the air, a waste of force."<ref name="OnWar1873"/>{{rp|Vol. II p. 180}}}}
* the "[[culminating point]] of the offensive"
* the "culminating point of victory"