Editing Camp David Accords (section)

===Sadat Initiative===
[[File:Camp David, Menachem Begin, Anwar Sadat, 1978.jpg|right|thumb|250px|[[Anwar Sadat]], [[Jimmy Carter]] and [[Menachem Begin]] (left to right), at [[Camp David]], 1978]]

Sadat first spoke about the possibility of peace with Israel in February 1971; Egypt was the initiator of many moves in the 1970s.{{sfn|Quandt|1988|p=2}} On 9 November 1977, he startled the world by announcing his intention to go to [[Jerusalem]] and speak before the [[Knesset]]. Shortly afterward, the Israeli government cordially invited him to address the Knesset in a message passed to Sadat via the US ambassador to Egypt. Ten days after his speech, Sadat arrived for the groundbreaking three-day visit, which launched the first peace process between Israel and an Arab state. As would be the case with later Israeli–Arab peace initiatives, Washington was taken by surprise; the White House and State Department were particularly concerned that Sadat was merely reaching out to reacquire Sinai as quickly as possible, putting aside the Palestinian problem. Considered as a man with strong political convictions who kept his eye on the main objective, Sadat had no ideological base, which made him politically inconsistent.<ref>Stein 1999, p. 7.</ref> The Sadat visit came about after he delivered a speech in Egypt stating that he would travel anywhere, "even Jerusalem," to discuss peace.<ref>Feron, James. [https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE3DC1E30F93AA35750C0A964958260&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2 "Menachem Begin, Guerrilla Leader Who Became Peacemaker."] ''[[The New York Times]]''.  9 March 1992.  15 February 2009.</ref> That speech led the Begin government to declare that, if Israel thought that Sadat would accept an invitation, Israel would invite him. In Sadat's [[Knesset]] speech he talked about his views on peace, the status of [[Israeli occupied territories|Israel's occupied territories]], and the Palestinian refugee problem. This tactic went against the intentions of both the West and the East, which were to revive the [[Geneva Conference (1973)|Geneva Conference]].

The gesture stemmed from an eagerness to enlist the help of the NATO countries in improving the ailing Egyptian economy, a belief that Egypt should begin to focus more on its own interests than on the interests of the Arab world, and a hope that an agreement with Israel would catalyze similar agreements between Israel and her other Arab neighbors and help solve the Palestinian problem. Prime Minister Begin's response to Sadat's initiative, though not what Sadat or Carter had hoped, demonstrated a willingness to engage the Egyptian leader. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger [[Arab]] delegation that might try to use its size to make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders&nbsp;– summit diplomacy&nbsp;– would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. Carter's people apparently had no inkling of the secret talks in Morocco between Dayan and Sadat's representative, Hassan Tuhami, that paved the way for Sadat's initiative. Indeed, in a sense Egypt and Israel were ganging up to push Carter off his Geneva track. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the [[Knesset]] were the request for the implementation of [[U.N. Resolution 242|Resolutions 242]] and [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 338|338]]. Sadat's visit was the first step to negotiations such as the preliminary Cairo Conference in December 1977.{{citation needed|date=September 2020}}