Editing Bell Boeing V-22 Osprey (section)

===Discussions===
[[File:CV-22 Osprey - RIAT 2017 (38727361971).jpg|thumb|CV-22 at RIAT 2017]]
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Development was protracted and controversial, partly because of large cost increases,<ref name=texasobs>Bryce, Robert. [http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=1679 "Review of political forces that helped shape V-22 program"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927194024/http://www.texasobserver.org/article.php?aid=1679 |date=27 September 2007}}''Texas Observer'', 17 June 2004.</ref> some of which were caused by a requirement to fold wings and rotors to fit aboard ships.<ref name=nyp2015>Whittle, Richard. "[https://nypost.com/2015/05/24/the-osprey-half-airplane-half-helicopter-totally-badass/ Half-airplane, half-helicopter, totally badass]" NY Post, 24 May 2015. [https://web.archive.org/web/20150525104748/http://nypost.com/2015/05/24/the-osprey-half-airplane-half-helicopter-totally-badass/ Archived] on 25 May 2015.</ref> The development budget was first set at US$2.5&nbsp;billion in 1986, increasing to a projected US$30&nbsp;billion in 1988.<ref name=Wired_200507/> By 2008, US$27&nbsp;billion had been spent and another US$27.2&nbsp;billion was required for planned production numbers.<ref name=V-22_CRS_RL31384/> Between 2008 and 2011, the V-22's estimated lifetime cost grew by 61%, mostly for maintenance and support.<ref>Capaccio, Tony. [http://www.star-telegram.com/2011/11/29/3559148/lifetime-cost-of-v-22s-rose-61.html "Lifetime cost of V-22s rose 61% in three years"]. {{dead link|date=March 2018 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes}} ''Bloomberg News'', 29 November 2011.</ref>

{{Blockquote||text=Its [The V-22's] production costs are considerably greater than for helicopters with equivalent capability{{snd}}specifically, about twice as great as for the [[Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion|CH-53E]], which has a greater payload and an ability to carry heavy equipment the V-22 cannot&nbsp;... an Osprey unit would cost around $60&nbsp;million to produce, and $35&nbsp;million for the helicopter equivalent.<ref name="ohanlon 119">O'Hanlon 2002, p. 119.</ref>|author=Michael E. O'Hanlon, 2002}}

In 2001, Lieutenant Colonel Odin Leberman, commander of the V-22 squadron at [[Marine Corps Air Station New River]], was relieved of duty after allegations that he instructed his unit to falsify maintenance records to make it appear more reliable.<ref name=V-22_CRS_RL31384/><ref>Ricks, Thomas E. [https://web.archive.org/web/20121105114126/http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/66970987.html?dids=66970987:66970987&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Jan+19,+2001&author=Thomas+E.+Ricks&pub=The+Washington+Post&desc=Marines+Fire+Commander+Of+Ospreys%3B+Alleged+Falsification+Of+Data+Investigated&pqatl=google "Marines Fire Commander Of Ospreys; Alleged Falsification Of Data Investigated"]. ''The Washington Post'', 19 January 2001.</ref> Three officers were implicated for their roles in the falsification scandal.<ref name= texasobs/>

[[File:V-22 Osprey wing rotated.jpg|thumb|left|A V-22 in a compact storage configuration during the Navy's evaluation, 2002|alt= A V-22 with its wing rotated 90 degrees so it runs the length of the fuselage.]]
In October 2007, a ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine article condemned the V-22 as unsafe, overpriced, and inadequate;<ref name=time/> the USMC responded that the article's data was partly obsolete, inaccurate, and held high expectations for any new field of aircraft.<ref name=MCT_Hoellwarth_20071016>Hoellwarth, John. [http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/10/marine_osprey_071014/ "Leaders, experts slam Time article on Osprey"]. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071210130333/http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2007/10/marine_osprey_071014/ |date=10 December 2007}} ''[[Marine Corps Times]]'' (Army Times Publishing Company), 16 October 2007.</ref> In 2011, the controversial defense industry-supported [[Lexington Institute]]<ref name="POL1">{{cite web|author1=DiMascio, Jen|title=Playing defense – but at a price?|url=http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46155.html|work=[[Politico]]|date=9 December 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150525224040/http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1210/46155.html|archive-date=25 May 2015|url-status=live}}</ref><ref name="WIR1">{{cite magazine|author1=Ackerman, Spencer|title=Defense Industry's Favorite Think Tank Daydreams of Obama Defeat|url=https://www.wired.com/2012/04/lexington-obama/|magazine=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]|date=12 April 2012|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160416231844/http://www.wired.com/2012/04/lexington-obama/|archive-date=16 April 2016|url-status=live|author1-link=Spencer Ackerman}}</ref><ref name="HAR1">{{cite magazine|author1=Silverstein, Ken|title=Mad men – Introducing the defense industry's pay-to-play ad agency|magazine=[[Harper's Magazine]]|date=1 April 2010|author1-link=Ken Silverstein}}</ref> reported that the average mishap rate per flight hour over the past 10 years was the lowest of any USMC rotorcraft, approximately half of the average fleet accident rate.<ref>[http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/v-22-is-the-safest-most-survivable-rotorcraft-the-marines-have?a=1&c=1171 "V-22 Is The Safest, Most Survivable Rotorcraft The Marines Have"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110303034110/http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/v-22-is-the-safest-most-survivable-rotorcraft-the-marines-have?a=1&c=1171 |date=3 March 2011}} [[Lexington Institute]], February 2011.</ref> In 2011, ''[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]]'' magazine reported that the safety record had excluded ground incidents;<ref>Axe, David. [https://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/marines-respond-osprey-safety/ "Marines: Actually, Our Tiltrotor Is 'Effective And Reliable' (Never Mind Those Accidents)"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131209023744/http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/marines-respond-osprey-safety/ |date=9 December 2013}}''Wired'', 13 October 2011.</ref> the USMC responded that MV-22 reporting used the same standards as other Navy aircraft.<ref>[http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Pages/USMCSTATEMENTINRESPONSETOARTICLEONTHESAFETYRECORDOFTHEMARINEV-22OSPREY.aspx "USMC Statement in Response to Article on the Safety Record of the Marine V-22 Osprey"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120116172050/http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Pages/USMCSTATEMENTINRESPONSETOARTICLEONTHESAFETYRECORDOFTHEMARINEV-22OSPREY.aspx |date=16 January 2012}} ''USMC'', 13 October 2011.</ref>

By 2012, the USMC reported fleetwide readiness rate had risen to 68%;<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130813/NEWS04/308130010/DoD-watchdog-audits-Osprey-readiness|title=Pentagon watchdog to release classified audit on V-22 Osprey|work=Marine Corps Times|access-date=6 April 2015|url-status=dead|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130817095918/http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130813/NEWS04/308130010/DoD-watchdog-audits-Osprey-readiness|archive-date=17 August 2013}}</ref> however, the DOD's Inspector General later found 167 of 200 reports had "improperly recorded" information.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-25/pentagon-s-inspector-general-finds-v-22-readiness-rates-flawed |archive-url=https://archive.today/20131025231009/http://www.businessweek.com/news/2013-10-25/pentagon-s-inspector-general-finds-v-22-readiness-rates-flawed |url-status=dead |archive-date=25 October 2013 |title=Pentagon's Inspector General Finds V-22 Readiness Rates Flawed |last1=Capaccio |first1=Tony |date=25 October 2013 |website=Bloomberg BusinessWeek |publisher=Bloomberg News}}</ref> Captain Richard Ulsh blamed errors on incompetence, saying that they were "not malicious" or deliberate.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.stripes.com/news/us/are-the-marines-faking-the-reliability-record-of-their-79-million-superplane-1.250587 |title=Are the Marines faking the reliability record of their $79 million superplane? |last1=Lamothe |first1=Dan |date=2 November 2013 |work=Foreign Policy |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131103045618/http://www.stripes.com/news/us/are-the-marines-faking-the-reliability-record-of-their-79-million-superplane-1.250587 |archive-date=3 November 2013 |url-status=dead}}</ref> The required mission capable rate was 82%, but the average was 53% from June 2007 to May 2010.<ref name=shal>Shalal-Esa, Andrea. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bell-boeing-v22-international-idUSTRE81P0ND20120226 "U.S. eyes V-22 aircraft sales to Israel, Canada, UAE"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150924162523/http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/26/us-bell-boeing-v22-international-idUSTRE81P0ND20120226 |date=24 September 2015}}''[[Reuters]]'', 26 February 2012.</ref> In 2010, [[Naval Air Systems Command]] aimed for an 85% reliability rate by 2018.<ref>Reed, John. [https://archive.today/20120919002442/http://www.navytimes.com/news/2010/05/military_osprey_boeing_050510w/ "Boeing to make new multiyear Osprey offer"]. ''[[Navy Times]]'', 5 May 2010.</ref> From 2009 to 2014, readiness rates rose 25% to the "high 80s", while [[operating cost|cost per flight hour]] had dropped 20% to $9,520 through a rigorous maintenance improvement program that focused on diagnosing problems before failures occur.<ref>Hoffman, Michael. "[http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/04/09/osprey-readiness-rates-improved-25-over-5-years/ Osprey Readiness Rates Improved 25% over 5 years] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140413124502/http://www.dodbuzz.com/2014/04/09/osprey-readiness-rates-improved-25-over-5-years/ |date=2014-04-13}}" ''DODbuzz'', 9 April 2014.</ref> {{as of|2015}}, although the V-22 requires more maintenance and has lower availability (62%) than traditional helicopters, it also has a lower mishap rate. The average cost per flight hour is {{usd|9,156}},<ref name="whittle2015-05">Whittle, Richard. "[http://vtol.org/74BFE740-E9BA-11E4-8AB70050568D0042 Osprey Shows Its Mettle] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240125033114/https://vtol.org/files/dmfile/VertifliteMJ15-OspreyWhittle1.pdf |date=25 January 2024}}" pp. 23–26. ''[[American Helicopter Society]]'' / Vertiflite May/June 2015, Vol. 61, No. 3.</ref> whereas the [[Sikorsky CH-53E Super Stallion]] cost about $20,000 (~${{Format price|{{Inflation|index=US-GDP|value=20000|start_year=2007}}}} in {{Inflation/year|US-GDP}}) per flight hour in 2007.<ref name=op>Whittle, Richard. [http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/commercial/eng/Rotorcraft-Report_7571.html USMC CH-53E Costs Rise With Op Tempo] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140502013618/http://www.aviationtoday.com/rw/commercial/eng/Rotorcraft-Report_7571.html |date=2 May 2014}}''Rotor & Wing, Aviation Today'', January 2007. Quote: For every hour the Corps flies a −53E, it spends 44 maintenance hours fixing it. Every hour a Super Stallion flies it costs about $20,000.</ref> V-22 [[Total cost of ownership|ownership cost]] was $83,000 per hour in 2013.<ref name=mag2015>Magnuson, Stew. "[http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/July/Pages/FutureofTiltRotorAircraftUncertainDespiteV22sSuccesses.aspx Future of Tilt-Rotor Aircraft Uncertain Despite V-22's Successes]" ''National Defense Industrial Association'', July 2015. [https://web.archive.org/web/20150621212900/http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2015/July/Pages/FutureofTiltRotorAircraftUncertainDespiteV22sSuccesses.aspx Archive]</ref> In 2022, the Pentagon evaluated its cost per flight hour at $23,941.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2022/2022_b_c.pdf|title=Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 Department of Defense (DoD) Fixed Wing and Helicopter Reimbursement Rates|access-date=29 August 2023|archive-date=12 November 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211112120521/https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/rates/fy2022/2022_b_c.pdf|url-status=live}}</ref><!--TCO includes purchase price, running cost does not-->

[[File:Bell-Boeing CVM-22B Osprey of VRM-50 lands on USS Nimitz (CVN-68) on 12 March 2022 (220312-N-DU622-1010).JPG|thumb|A CMV-22B lands on USS ''Nimitz'' in March 2022.]]
While technically capable of [[autorotation]] if both engines fail in helicopter mode, a safe landing is difficult.{{r|v22fly}} In 2005, a director of the Pentagon's testing office stated that in a loss of power while hovering below {{convert|1600|ft|m|sigfig=2}}, emergency landings "are not likely to be survivable." V-22 pilot Captain Justin "Moon" McKinney stated that: "We can turn it into a plane and glide it down, just like a [[Lockheed C-130 Hercules|C-130]]."<ref name=time>Thompson, Mark. [http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835-1,00.html "V-22 Osprey: A Flying Shame"]. {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081011055732/http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1665835-1,00.html |date=11 October 2008}} ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'', 26 September 2007. Retrieved 8 August 2011.</ref> A complete loss of power requires both engines to fail, as one engine can power both proprotors via interconnected drive shafts.<ref name=Norton_p98-9/> Though [[Vortex ring state#Vortex ring effect in helicopters|vortex ring state]] (VRS) contributed to [[Accidents and incidents involving the V-22 Osprey|a deadly V-22 accident]], flight testing found it to be less susceptible to VRS than conventional helicopters.<ref name=AF_mag_Finally/> A GAO report stated that the V-22 is "less forgiving than conventional helicopters" during VRS.<ref>Schinasi 2008, p. 16.</ref> Several test flights to explore VRS characteristics were canceled.<ref>Schinasi 2008, p. 11.</ref> The USMC trains pilots in the recognition of and recovery from VRS, and has instituted operational envelope limits and instrumentation to help avoid VRS conditions.<ref name=Wired_200507/><ref name=Proceedings_Sept2004>Gross, Kevin, Lt. Col. U.S. Marine Corps and Tom Macdonald, MV-22 test pilot and Ray Dagenhart, MV-22 lead government engineer. [http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190, NI_Myth_0904,00.html "Dispelling the Myth of the MV-22"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240125033111/https://www.military.com/benefits |date=25 January 2024}}. ''Proceedings: The Naval Institute''. September 2004.</ref>