Editing Battle of Wagram (section)

=== Towards another battle ===
{{cquote|Should another battle be unavoidable, I will strike one more blow against the French, though you may rest assured that I shall risk nothing or as little as possible.|20|20|[[Archduke Charles, duke of Teschen|Archduke Charles]], writing to his uncle and mentor, [[Prince Albert of Saxony, Duke of Teschen|Prince Albert, Duke of Teschen]].{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|p=152}}}}

[[File:Johann Peter Krafft 003.jpg|thumb|A triumphant [[Archduke Charles of Austria-Teschen]] led the Austrians to victory at the [[Battle of Aspern-Essling]].]]
The [[Battle of Aspern-Essling]] was costly for both sides. It resulted in some 53,000 casualties, almost equally divided between the two armies. For the [[Austrian Empire|Austrians]], Aspern-Essling was a costly victory. Crucially, it improved the overall morale of the troops as it proved that, despite their early string of defeats, the army could fight extremely well and win battles against formidable enemies. However, in the weeks following the battle, [[Archduke Charles of Austria-Teschen|Archduke Charles]] became increasingly skeptical about his chances of winning the war. His analysis of the battle revealed that he had been unable to capitalise on his numerical superiority and had thus failed to achieve more than a tactical victory.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=127–129}}{{sfn|Castle|1990|pp=54–55}}{{ref label|Aspern-Essling|Note 1|1}} Also of great significance, despite Austrian attempts to trumpet their victory against Napoleon, its political consequences remained limited: there were no signs of a general uprising in [[Confederation of the Rhine|Germany]], [[Prussia]] was still unwilling to enter the war and the [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|United Kingdom]] was not ready to launch its promised land expedition in northern Europe, while [[Russian Empire|Russia]], France's ally since 1807, was becoming increasingly aggressive against the Austrian forces in [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]]. Thus, Charles's skepticism stemmed from the realisation that none of the strategic prerequisites for an Austrian victory in this war had materialised. He came to believe that his country's best option was to open negotiations with Napoleon but, despite his warning that "the first battle lost is a death sentence for the monarchy", his brother, [[Francis I of Austria|Emperor Francis]] repeatedly refused to consider the option.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|p=145}}

Although a [[generalissimus]], with supreme authority over the entire Austrian army, Charles's position was constantly undermined by his imperial brother and the war party at the court, who were corresponding directly on military matters with his [[chief of staff]], ''[[General Major]]'' [[Maximilian von Wimpffen|Wimpffen]] and some of the corps commanders. The constant flow of information from the front maintained a bellicose atmosphere in the high political circles and an erroneously optimistic opinion about Austria's military situation, which hindered Charles's best attempts to get his brother to sue for peace.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}}

It thus became clear to the Archduke that another battle would be forthcoming, although he still nourished hopes that Napoleon himself might make peace overtures. Although morale among the rank and file remained fair following Aspern-Essling, the atmosphere among the Austrian senior commanders was particularly rotten and Charles's insufficiently assiduous preparations for another battle further sapped their confidence in him. One of the senior generals, [[Johann von Hiller]], commander of VI Korps was overtly critical of Charles's strategy and resigned on 4 July, on the eve of the battle of Wagram, giving health reasons as a pretext.{{ref label|Hiller-Klenau|Note 2|2}} Archduke Charles did make considerable efforts to rebuild his army and, despite the slow arrival of reinforcements, by the end of June, it was close to full strength again. Overall, Archduke Charles was well aware that he did not possess the means necessary to lead any offensive actions, so he promptly dismissed suggestions to run any major operations against the French base on [[Lobau]] island. A plan to march to Pressburg, cross the [[Danube]] and launch operations against the enemy's rear from there was also dismissed as strategically unsound after ''General Major'' Wimpffen noted that such a plan would leave [[Bohemia]], the richest province still under the Austrian Empire's control, open to a French invasion.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}} By the end of June, Archduke Charles was still hoping that Napoleon might opt to negotiate, a misapprehension that the latter encouraged through a series of ruses. In the event that a battle would indeed occur, Charles planned to remain on the defensive and thus his actions depended on the moves of the enemy. A member of the [[House of Habsburg]], Archduke Charles saw the army as an invaluable tool, meant to protect the existence of the Monarchy. He was thus a cautious commander, never willing to risk it all in order to obtain a decisive victory, a commitment that he reiterated towards the end of June, when he wrote to his uncle and mentor, [[Prince Albert of Saxony, Duke of Teschen]], stating that, should another battle be unavoidable, he would "strike one more blow against the French" but "risk nothing or as little as possible". Although he reckoned that Austria would need a major victory in order to turn the tide of the war, he believed that another battle against Napoleon would have doubtful results.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=143–148}}

[[File:Lannes mortally wounded at Essling (E. Boutigny).jpg|thumb|left|Napoleon with ''[[Marshal of the Empire|Maréchal]]'' [[Jean Lannes]]. One of the Emperor's personal friends, Lannes was severely wounded while leading his men at Aspern-Essling. He died in extreme pain, nine days after the battle.]]
Meanwhile, having retreated to the island of Lobau after the battle of Aspern-Essling, Napoleon knew that he had failed in his attempt to cross the [[Danube]] and was so astonished by the severity of the setback that he remained in unaccustomed inaction for 36 hours.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=706}} After recovering his usual drive, his immediate concern was to improve the dire situation of his army, which was in very bad shape and virtually trapped on Lobau island, after the Danube had swollen. With his usual tireless activity, he supervised the transformation of [[Lobau]] island into a huge army base. The French built temporary campaign hospitals for his 20,000 wounded, as well as warehouses and barracks, which sheltered a numerous permanent military garrison. As soon as a secure bridge was built, the Emperor had the wounded and a part of the troops transferred to the mainland, but maintained IV Corps on the island. He did not intend to abandon this position, as he was planning to use it as a springboard for his upcoming crossing. His next task was to rebuild the army. Casualties had been roughly equal to those of the enemy, but, with fewer troops engaged, some of Napoleon's battalions needed rebuilding from scratch. Losses in officers in particular had been extremely high and proved difficult to replace. ''[[Marshal of the Empire|Maréchal]]'' [[Jean Lannes]], one of Napoleon's ablest commanders and a personal friend, had been mortally wounded in action and died nine days after the battle.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=127–129}}{{ref label|Lannes|Note 3|3}} Another irreplaceable loss was [[Louis-Vincent-Joseph Le Blond de Saint-Hilaire]], who had been created a Marshal of the Empire just a month before, in recognition of his brilliant conduct during the earlier campaign, but received a mortal wound during the battle and died before the coveted baton could arrive from Paris.{{sfn|Chandler|1998|p=692}} [[Jean-Louis-Brigitte Espagne]], another famous general was killed in action at the head of his ''cuirassiers''{{ref label|Slain commanders|Note 4|4}} and the commander in chief of the artillery, [[Nicolas-Marie Songis des Courbons]], became severely ill and had to leave his command a few weeks after the battle. Despite all these setbacks, the army and its officers retained total confidence in Napoleon's ability to lead them to victory and morale remained high. Evidence of this came a couple of days before the newly planned crossing of the Danube, when Napoleon's most senior Corps commander, ''Maréchal'' [[André Masséna]] fell from his horse and badly injured his foot, rendering him unable to ride for some time. In sheer contrast with Hiller's gesture, Masséna, although in significant pain, made arrangements to lead his men in battle from a [[Phaeton (carriage)|phaeton]] and vowed to retain his command, much to the Emperor's relief.{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=131–143}}

Napoleon reckoned that he would need careful planning and superior forces, before he could attempt another crossing of the Danube. In order to achieve that, he needed to secure his island-base at Lobau. Following the Emperor's orders, the commander of the {{lang|fr|[[Grande Armée]]}} artillery, General Songis and his successor, General [[Jean Ambroise Baston de Lariboisière|Lariboisière]], installed a massive 124-gun battery on the island. They also carefully scouted the shores and small islands of the [[Danube]] and installed batteries in strategic positions, in a bid to cover [[Vienna]], but above all with the aim of keeping the enemy guessing about the exact location of the upcoming crossing. The French also needed reliable bridges. Starting work on 1 June, General [[Henri Gatien Bertrand|Bertrand]] led vast military engineering works that resulted in the building of two strong bridges from the south bank to Lobau island. These were to be used to transfer supplies and troops onto the island. Bertrand secured these bridges against any floating barges that the Austrians might have launched to destroy them, by building palisades upstream. In order to cross from the island to the northern bank, a series of pivoting bridges and [[landing craft]] were also built. The French also captured a Danube flotilla and built additional patrol ships, which meant that they were, by the end of June, in almost complete control of the river, allowing Napoleon to write in the Army Bulletin of 2 July that "the Danube no longer exists for the French army".{{sfn|Rothenberg|1995|pp=131–143}}