Editing Battle of Verdun (section)

==Prelude==

===German preparations===
[[File:Map commune FR insee code 55545.png|thumb|{{centre|Map of Verdun and the vicinity (commune FR insee code 55545)}}]]
Verdun had been isolated on three sides since 1914 and the mainline Paris–[[Sainte-Menehould|St Menehould]]–[[Les Islettes]]–[[Clermont-en-Argonne]]–Aubréville–Verdun railway in the Forest of Argonne was closed in mid-July 1915, by the right flank divisions of the [[5th Army (German Empire)|5th Army]] ([[Generalmajor]] [[Wilhelm, Crown Prince of Germany|Crown Prince Wilhelm]]) when it reached the {{lang|fr|La Morte Fille}}–Hill 285 ridge, after continuous local attacks, rendering the railway unusable.{{sfn|Sheldon|2012|pp=164, 200–201}} Only a light railway remained to the French to carry bulk supplies; German-controlled mainline railways lay only {{cvt|24|km|order=flip}} to the north of the front line. A corps was moved to the 5th Army to provide labour for the preparation of the offensive. Areas were emptied of French civilians and buildings requisitioned. Thousands of kilometres of telephone cable were laid, a huge amount of ammunition and rations was dumped under cover and hundreds of guns were emplaced and camouflaged. Ten new rail lines with twenty stations were built and vast underground shelters ({{lang|de|Stollen}}) {{cvt|4.5|–|14|m|order=flip}} deep were dug, each to accommodate up to {{nowrap|1,200 infantry.}}{{sfn|Mason|2000|pp=21, 32}}

The III Corps, VII Reserve Corps and XVIII Corps were transferred to the 5th Army, each corps being reinforced by {{nowrap|2,400 experienced}} troops and {{nowrap|2,000 trained}} recruits. V Corps was placed behind the front line, ready to advance if necessary when the assault divisions were moving up. XV Corps, with two divisions, was in 5th Army reserve, ready to advance and mop up as soon as the French defence collapsed.{{sfn|Mason|2000|pp=21, 32}} Special arrangements were made to maintain a high rate of artillery-fire during the offensive; {{frac|33|1|2}} munitions trains per day were to deliver ammunition sufficient for {{nowrap|2,000,000 rounds}} to be fired in the first six days and another {{nowrap|2,000,000 shells}} in the next twelve. Five repair shops were built close to the front to reduce delays for maintenance and factories in Germany were made ready, rapidly to refurbish artillery needing more extensive repairs. A redeployment plan for the artillery was devised, to move field guns and mobile heavy artillery forward, under the covering fire of mortars and the super-heavy artillery. A total of {{nowrap|1,201 guns}} were massed on the Verdun front, two thirds of which were heavy- and super-heavy artillery, which was obtained by stripping modern German artillery from the rest of the Western Front and substituting for it older types and captured Russian and Belgian guns. The German artillery could fire into the Verdun salient from three directions yet remain dispersed around the edges.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=214–216}}

===German plan===
The 5th Army divided the attack front into areas, ''A'' occupied by the [[VII Reserve Corps (German Empire)|VII Reserve Corps]], ''B'' by the [[XVIII Corps (German Empire)|XVIII Corps]], ''C'' by the [[III Corps (German Empire)|III Corps]] and ''D'' on the [[Woëvre]] plain by the [[XV Corps (German Empire)|XV Corps]]. The preliminary artillery bombardment was to begin in the morning of 12 February. At {{nowrap|5:00 p.m.}}, the infantry in areas ''A'' to ''C'' would advance in open order, supported by grenade and flame-thrower detachments.{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=211}} Wherever possible, the French advanced trenches were to be occupied and the second position reconnoitred for the artillery to bombard on the second day. Great emphasis was placed on limiting German infantry casualties by sending them to follow up destructive bombardments by the artillery, which was to carry the burden of the offensive in a series of large "attacks with limited objectives", to maintain a relentless pressure on the French. The initial objectives were the Meuse Heights, on a line from Froide Terre to Fort Souville and Fort Tavannes, which would provide a secure defensive position from which to repel French counter-attacks. "Relentless pressure" was a term added by the 5th Army staff and created ambiguity about the purpose of the offensive. Falkenhayn wanted land to be captured from which artillery could dominate the battlefield and the 5th Army wanted a quick capture of Verdun. The confusion caused by the ambiguity was left to the corps headquarters to sort out.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=211–212}}

Control of the artillery was centralised by an ''Order for the Activities of the Artillery and Mortars'', which stipulated that the corps Generals of Foot Artillery were responsible for local target selection, while co-ordination of flanking fire by neighbouring corps and the fire of certain batteries, was reserved to the 5th Army headquarters. French fortifications were to be engaged by the heaviest [[howitzers]] and [[Enfilade and defilade|enfilade]] fire. The heavy artillery was to maintain long-range bombardment of French supply routes and assembly areas; counter-battery fire was reserved for specialist batteries firing gas shells. Co-operation between the artillery and infantry was stressed, with accuracy of the artillery being given priority over rate of fire. The opening bombardment was to build up slowly and {{lang|de|[[Barrage (artillery)|Trommelfeuer]]}} (a rate of fire so rapid that the sound of shell-explosions merged into a rumble) would not begin until the last hour. As the infantry advanced, the artillery would increase the range of the bombardment to destroy the French second position. Artillery observers were to advance with the infantry and communicate with the guns by field telephones, flares and coloured balloons. When the offensive began, the French were to be bombarded continuously, with harassing fire being maintained at night.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=213–214}}

===French preparations===
[[File:East bank of the Meuse, Verdun, February to March 1916.png|thumb|{{centre|East bank of the Meuse, February–March 1916}}]]
In 1915, {{nowrap|237 guns}} and {{cvt|647|LT}} of ammunition in the forts of the RFV had been removed, leaving only the heavy guns in retractable turrets. The conversion of the RFV to a conventional linear defence, with trenches and barbed wire began but proceeded slowly, after resources were sent west from Verdun for the Second Battle of Champagne {{nowrap|(25 September to 6 November 1915).}} In October 1915, building began on trench lines known as the first, second and third positions and in January 1916, an inspection by General [[Noël Édouard, vicomte de Curières de Castelnau|Noël de Castelnau]], Chief of Staff at [[Grand Quartier Général (1914–1919)|French General Headquarters]] (GQG), reported that the new defences were satisfactory, except for small deficiencies in three areas.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=265–266}} The fortress garrisons had been reduced to small maintenance crews and some of the forts had been readied for demolition. The maintenance garrisons were responsible to the central military bureaucracy in Paris and when the XXX Corps commander, Major-General [[Paul Chrétien]], attempted to inspect Fort Douaumont in January 1916, he was refused entry.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=36}}

Douaumont was the largest fort in the RFV and by February 1916, the only artillery left in the fort were the {{nowrap|75 mm}} and {{nowrap|155 mm turret}} guns and light guns covering the ditch. The fort was used as a barracks by {{nowrap|68 technicians}} under the command of Warrant Officer Chenot, the {{lang|fr|Gardien de Batterie}}. One of the rotating {{cvt|155|mm|order=flip}} turrets was partially manned and the other was left empty.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=36}} The Hotchkiss machine-guns were stored in boxes and four {{nowrap|75 mm guns}} in the [[casemate]]s had already been removed. The drawbridge had been jammed in the down position by a German shell and had not been repaired. The {{lang|fr|coffres}} (wall bunkers) with Hotchkiss revolver-cannons protecting the moats, were unmanned and over {{cvt|5000|kg|lb+LT|order=flip}} of explosives had been placed in the fort to demolish it.{{sfn|Holstein|2010|p=35}} Colonel [[Émile Driant]] was stationed at Verdun and criticised Joffre for removing the [[artillery]] guns and infantry from fortresses around [[Verdun]]. Joffre did not listen but Colonel Driant received the support of the Minister for War [[Joseph Gallieni]]. The formidable Verdun defences were a shell and were now threatened by a German offensive; Driant was to be proved correct by events.

[[File:West bank of the Meuse, Verdun, 1916.png|thumb|{{centre|West bank of the Meuse, 1916}}]]
In late January 1916, French intelligence obtained an accurate assessment of German military capacity and intentions at Verdun but Joffre considered that an attack would be a diversion, because of the lack of an obvious strategic objective.{{sfn|Foley|2007|p=217}} By the time of the German offensive, Joffre expected a bigger attack elsewhere but finally yielded to political pressure and ordered the VII Corps to Verdun on 23 January, to hold the north face of the west bank. XXX Corps held the salient east of the Meuse to the north and north-east and II Corps held the eastern face of the Meuse Heights; Herr had {{frac|8|1|2}} divisions in the front line, with {{frac|2|1|2}} divisions in close reserve. {{lang|de|[[Army Group Centre (France)|Groupe d'armées du centre]]}} (GAC, General [[Fernand de Langle de Cary|De Langle de Cary]]) had the I and XX corps with two divisions each in reserve, plus most of the 19th Division; Joffre had {{nowrap|25 divisions}} in the French strategic reserve.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=267}} French artillery reinforcements had brought the total at Verdun to {{nowrap|388 field}} guns and {{nowrap|244 heavy}} guns, against {{nowrap|1,201 German}} guns, two thirds of which were heavy and super heavy, including {{cvt|14|in}} and {{nowrap|202 mortars,}} some being {{cvt|16|in}}. Eight specialist flame-thrower companies were also sent to the 5th Army.{{sfn|Foley|2007|pp=215, 217}}

[[File:Woëvre.png|thumb|{{centre|The Woëvre region of Lorraine (in green)}}]]
Castelnau met De Langle de Cary on 25 February, who doubted the east bank could be held. Castelnau disagreed and ordered General [[Frédéric-Georges Herr]] the corps commander, to hold the right (east) bank of the Meuse at all costs. Herr sent a division from the west bank and ordered XXX Corps to hold a line from Bras to Douaumont, Vaux and [[Eix]]. Pétain took over command of the defence of the RFV at {{nowrap|11:00 p.m.,}} with Colonel Maurice de Barescut as chief of staff and Colonel [[Bernard Serrigny]] as head of operations, only to hear that Fort Douaumont had fallen. Pétain ordered the remaining Verdun forts to be re-garrisoned.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|pp=272–273}}

Four groups were established, under the command of Generals [[Adolphe Guillaumat]], Balfourier and [[Denis Auguste Duchêne|Denis Duchêne]] on the right bank and [[Georges de Bazelaire]] on the left bank. A "line of resistance" was established on the east bank from Souville to Thiaumont, around Fort Douaumont to Fort Vaux, Moulainville and along the ridge of the Woëvre. On the west bank, the line ran from [[Cumières-le-Mort-Homme|Cumières]] to [[Mort Homme]], Côte 304 and Avocourt. A "line of panic" was planned in secret as a final line of defence north of Verdun, through forts Belleville, St Michel and [[Moulainville]].{{sfn|Mason|2000|pp=107–109}} I Corps and XX Corps arrived from 24 to 26 February, increasing the number of divisions in the RFV to {{frac|14|1|2}}. By 6 March, the arrival of the XIII, XXI, XIV and XXXIII corps had increased the total to {{frac|20|1|2}} divisions.{{sfn|Doughty|2005|p=274}}