Editing Battle of Mogadishu (1993) (section)

=== UNOSOM offensive and Mogadishu insurgency ===
[[File:Pictures from an armed convoy trip in Mogadishu.jpg|thumb|Mogadishu skyline from a UNOSOM convoy]]
On [[June 1993 attack on Pakistani military in Somalia|5 June 1993]], SNA fighters and Somali citizens at Radio Mogadishu attacked the Pakistani force that was inspecting an arms cache located at the station, out of fear that the United Nations forces had been sent to shut down the SNA's broadcast infrastructure. Radio was the most popular medium for news in Somalia, and consequently control of the airwaves was considered vital to both the SNA and UNOSOM. Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular station with the residents of Mogadishu,<ref name=":24">{{Cite book |last=Hirsch |first=John L. |url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/32200261 |title=Somalia and Operation Restore Hope : reflections on peacemaking and peacekeeping |date=1995 |others=Robert B. Oakley |isbn=1-878379-41-0|publisher=United States Institute of Peace Press |location=Washington, D.C. |pages=115–121 |oclc=32200261}}</ref> and rumors that the United Nations was planning to seize or destroy it had been abound for days before 5 June. On May 31, 1993, Aidid's political rivals met with the top UNOSOM official and attempted to convince him to take over Radio Mogadishu, a meeting Aidid was made well aware of.{{sfn|Drysdale|1994|pages=180–195}} According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry in the events leading up to the Battle of Mogadishu:<blockquote>"Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu."<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Secretary-General |first1=Un |date=1994-06-01 |title=UN Commission of Inquiry Established under Security Council Resolution 885 to Investigate Armed Attacks on UNOSOM II (1994) |url=https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/189847 |journal=United Nations |language=en |pages=22}}</ref></blockquote> The attack marked a seminal moment in the UNOSOM II operation. The Pakistani forces suffered 24 dead and 57 wounded, as well as one wounded Italian and three wounded U.S. soldiers.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Lorch |first=Donatella |date=8 June 1993 |title=U.N. Moves Troops to Somali City And Vows Punishment for Attack |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/08/world/un-moves-troops-to-somali-city-and-vows-punishment-for-attack.html |access-date=16 March 2022 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> On 6 June 1993, the [[United Nations Security Council|Security Council]] passed [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 837|Resolution 837]], a call for the arrest and prosecution of the persons responsible.<ref>Security Council, Resolution 837, United Nations Doc. Nr. S/RES/837 (1993)</ref> Though Resolution 837 did not name Aidid, it held the Somali National Alliance responsible. The hunt for Aidid became a major focus of the U.N. intervention through the Battle of Mogadishu.<ref name=":24" />{{sfn|Drysdale|1994|pages=180–195}} [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[Jonathan Howe]] issued a $25,000 [[Warrant (law)|warrant]] for information leading to Aidid's arrest, while UNOSOM forces began attacking targets all over Mogadishu in hopes of finding him.<ref name="Lester H p.28">Brune, Lester H. (1999) ''The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia, 1992–1998'', Regina Books, {{ISBN|0941690903}}, p. 28</ref> Professor [[Ioan Lewis|Ioan M. Lewis]] asserts that the UN made an unwise choice to resort to military force, which led to substantial Somali casualties, rather than attempting to politically isolate Aidid and launch an independent legal inquiry.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Economides |first=Spyros |title=United Nations Interventionism, 1991-2004 |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2007 |isbn=9780511491221 |pages=128–138}}</ref>

In mid-June 1993, American [[Lockheed AC-130|AC-130]] gunships began striking SNA targets across the capital and an [[insurgency]] began growing against UNOSOM forces. When Somali insurgents and UNOSOM forces skirmished, it proved to be costly to each—especially for the Somali, who were usually outgunned by heavy weaponry.{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|pp=192–193}} Through the rest of June the insurgency escalated, resulting in growing losses on both sides,{{Sfn|Drysdale|1994|p=195}} in one instance a crowd of [[June 1993 UN killings of Somali protestors|protestors were machine gunned by UNOSOM troops]] resulting in the death of at least 20 civilians.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Meir |first=Karl |date=1993-06-13 |title=UN killings inflame Somali crisis: 20 demonstrators shot dead in Pakistani 'revenge' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/un-killings-inflame-somali-crisis-20-demonstrators-shot-dead-in-pakistani-revenge-1491496.html |access-date=2022-09-22 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":110">{{Cite web |last=Simon |first=Roger |date=15 October 1993 |title=A little-known massacre explains Somali hatred |url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-1993-10-15-1993288151-story.html |url-access=subscription |access-date=2022-09-21 |website=Baltimore Sun}}</ref> A week after the start of the offensive, U.S. intelligence claimed Aidid's command was badly weakened, SNA [[morale]] had collapsed, and most of its arsenal was destroyed. Officials estimated only 300 fighter's loyal to Aidid opposed UNOSOM, driven by cash or the drug khat.<ref name=":41">{{Cite news |last=Richburg |first=Keith |date=18 October 1993 |title=A SOMALI VIEW: 'I AM THE WINNER' |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1993/10/18/a-somali-view-i-am-the-winner/d27d3887-5298-41a2-8ce3-af199a7e8298/ |url-access=subscription |newspaper=[[Washington Post]]}}</ref> Instead each major armed confrontation with UN forces was noted to have the effect of inadvertently increasing Aidid's stature with the Somali public.<ref name=":82">{{Cite journal |last=Maren |first=Michael |date=1996 |title=Somalia: Whose Failure? |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/45317578 |journal=Current History |volume=95 |issue=601 |pages=201–205 |doi=10.1525/curh.1996.95.601.201 |issn=0011-3530 |jstor=45317578}}</ref> The UNOSOM offensive backfired politically, alienating many Somalis, boosting support for Aidid, and drawing international criticism. In response, many UNOSOM II contingents pushed for diplomacy with the SNA,<ref name=":252">{{Cite book |last=Wheeler |first=Nicholas J. |url=https://academic.oup.com/book/276 |title=Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2002 |isbn=9780191600302 |chapter=From Famine Relief to 'Humanitarian War': The US and UN Intervention in Somalia}}</ref> while relief agencies began distancing themselves from the UN.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Press |first=Robert M. |date=15 June 1993 |title=Relief Agencies in Somalia Back Away from Close UN Ties |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0615/15072.html |access-date=2023-10-08 |work=Christian Science Monitor |issn=0882-7729}}</ref> Former Under-Secretary-General of the UN, Ramesh Thakur, observed that, "The scale, intensity, and frequency of the [[use of force]] by UNOSOM after June 1993 bore little resemblance to the [[rhetoric]] and expectations of when it was established, nor any recognizable relationship by then to a [[Peacekeeping|peacekeeping operation]] as defined in the UN [[lexicon]]."<ref name=":112">{{Cite journal |last=Thakur |first=Ramesh |date=1994 |title=From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement: The UN Operation in Somalia |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/161981 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=387–410 |doi=10.1017/S0022278X00015159 |issn=0022-278X |jstor=161981 |s2cid=154768424}}</ref>