Editing Battle of Kursk (section)

=== Contest for aerial supremacy ===
By 1943 the Luftwaffe's strength on the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|Eastern Front]] had started to weaken after Stalingrad, and the siphoning of resources to [[North African Campaign|North Africa]].{{sfn|Muller|1992|p=106}} The Luftwaffe forces in the east were further depleted with [[Jagdgeschwader|fighter units]] being shifted back to Germany [[Defense of the Reich|to defend]] against the escalating [[Combined Bomber Offensive|Allied bombing campaign]].{{sfn|Beevor|2012|pp=471–472}} By the end of June, only 38.7 percent of the Luftwaffe's total aircraft remained in the east.{{sfn|Murray|1983|p=158}} In 1943 the Luftwaffe could still achieve local aerial superiority by concentrating its forces. The majority of German aircraft left available on the Eastern Front were slated for Citadel.{{sfn|Beevor|2012|p=472}} The goal of the Luftwaffe remained unchanged. The priority was to gain [[Air supremacy|aerial supremacy]], then to [[Air interdiction|isolate the battlefield]] from enemy reinforcements, and finally, once the critical point had been reached in the land battle, to render [[close air support]].<ref>{{harvnb|Corum|1995|pp=53–76}}</ref>
[[File:RIAN archive 225 IL-2 attacking.jpg|thumb|[[Voenno-Vozdushnye Sily|VVS]] [[Ilyushin Il-2]] ground attack aircraft during the battle of Kursk]]

The changing strengths between the two opponents prompted the Luftwaffe to make operational changes for the battle. Previous offensive campaigns had been initiated with Luftwaffe raids against opposing airfields to achieve aerial superiority. By this point in the war Red Army equipment reserves were extensive and the Luftwaffe commanders realised that aircraft could be easily replaced, making such raids futile. Therefore, this mission was abandoned. In addition, previous campaigns had made use of medium bombers flying well behind the frontline to block the arrival of reinforcements. This mission, however, was rarely attempted during Citadel.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=186}}

The Luftwaffe command understood that their support would be crucial for the success of Citadel, but problems with supply shortfalls hampered their preparations. Partisan activity, particularly behind Army Group Center, slowed the rate of re-supply and cut short the Luftwaffe's ability to build up essential stockpiles of petrol, oil, lubricants, engines, munitions, and, unlike Red Army units there were no reserves of aircraft that could be used to replace damaged aircraft over the course of the operation.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=160}} Fuel was the most significant limiting factor.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=159}} To help build up supplies for the support of Citadel, the Luftwaffe greatly curtailed its operations during the last week of June.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=104}} Despite this conservation of resources, the Luftwaffe did not have the resources to sustain an intensive air effort for more than a few days after the operation began.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=103}}

For Citadel, the Luftwaffe confined its operations to the direct support of the forces on the ground.{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=105}} In this mission the Luftwaffe continued to make use of the [[Junkers Ju 87]] "Stuka" dive-bombers. A new development to this aircraft was the [[BK 37|"Bordkanone" 3,7&nbsp;cm]] cannon, one of which could be slung under each wing of the Stuka in a [[gun pod]]. Half of the Stuka groups assigned to support Citadel were equipped with these ''Kanonenvogel'' (literally "cannon-bird") tankbuster aircraft.{{sfn|Bergström|2007|pp=79–81, 102, 106, 114, 118}} The air groups were also strengthened by the recent arrival of the [[Henschel Hs 129]], with its 30&nbsp;mm [[MK 103 cannon]], and [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190#Ground attack versions (BMW 801)|the F-subtype]] ground attack ("jabo") version of the [[Focke-Wulf Fw 190]].{{sfn|Healy|2010|p=104}}

In the months preceding the battle, [[Luftflotte 6]] supporting Army Group Center noted a marked increase in the strength of the opposing VVS formations. The VVS formations encountered displayed better training, and were flying improved equipment with greater aggressiveness and skill than the Luftwaffe had seen earlier.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=155}} The introduction of the [[Yakovlev Yak-9]] and [[Lavochkin La-5]] fighters gave the Soviet pilots near parity with the Luftwaffe in terms of equipment. Furthermore, large numbers of ground-attack aircraft, such as the [[Ilyushin Il-2|Ilyushin Il-2 "Shturmovik"]] and the [[Petlyakov Pe-2|Pe-2]], had become available as well. The VVS also fielded large numbers of aircraft supplied via lend-lease. Huge stockpiles of supplies and ample reserves of replacement aircraft meant the Red Army and VVS formations would be able to conduct an extended campaign without slackening in the intensity of their effort.{{sfn|Newton|2002|p=186}}