Editing Battle of Iwo Jima (section)

===Pre-landing bombardment===
[[File:USS New York (BB-34) bombarding Japanese defenses on Iwo Jima, 16 February 1945 (80-G-308952).jpg|thumb|The battleship {{USS|New York|BB-34|6}} firing her {{cvt|14|in|mm}} main guns on the island, 16 February 1945 (D minus 3)]]
Major General [[Harry Schmidt (USMC)|Harry Schmidt]], commander of the Marine landing force, requested a 10-day heavy bombardment of the island immediately preceding his planned [[amphibious assault]]. However, Rear Admiral [[William H. P. Blandy]], commander of the Amphibious Support Force (Task Force 52), believed that such a bombardment would not allow him time to replenish his ships' ammunition before the landings; he thus refused Schmidt's request. Schmidt then asked for nine days of shelling; Blandy again refused and insisted upon a three-day bombardment. This decision was resented among the Marines in the landing force. After the war, Lieutenant General [[Holland Smith|Holland M. "Howlin' Mad" Smith]], commander Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56, which consisted of Schmidt's Fifth Amphibious Corps), bitterly complained that a frequent lack of supporting naval gunfire had cost Marine lives throughout the Allied island-hopping campaign.{{sfn|Wright|2004|p=22}}

Each heavy warship was assigned an area on Iwo Jima to saturate with shells, ultimately covering the entire island. Each warship fired for approximately six hours before stopping for a certain amount of time. Poor weather on D-3 (three days before the landings) led to uncertain results for that day's bombardment. On D-2, the time and care that the Japanese had taken in preparing their artillery positions became clear. When [[heavy cruiser]] {{USS|Pensacola|CA-24|6}} got within range of Japanese shore batteries, the ship was quickly hit 6 times and suffered 17 dead. Later, 12 small craft attempting to land a UDT were all struck by Japanese fire and quickly retired. While aiding these vessels, the [[destroyer]] {{USS|Leutze|DD-481|6}} was also hit and suffered 7 dead. On D-1, Blandy's gunners were once again hampered by rain and clouds. Schmidt summed up his feelings by stating, "We only got about 13 hours worth of fire support during the 34 hours of available daylight."{{sfn|Wright|2004|pp=22–23}}

The limited bombardment had a questionable impact on the enemy since the Japanese were heavily dug-in and well fortified. The craters left behind by the barrage also provided additional cover for the defenders, while hampering the attackers' advance.{{Original research inline|date=April 2021}} Despite this, many bunkers and caves were destroyed during the bombardment, giving it some limited success. The Japanese had been preparing for this battle since March 1944, which gave them a significant advantage.{{sfn|Navy Department, ''Amphibious Operations, Iwo Jima''|1945|loc=Chapter II: Naval Gunfire}} By the time of the landing, about 450 American ships were located off Iwo Jima, and the battle ultimately involved about 60,000 U.S. Marines and several thousand U.S. Navy [[Seabee]]s.<ref>{{cite web |title=United States Marine Corps War Memorial |url=http://www.gwu.edu/~memory/issues/museums/IwoJima.html |publisher=The George Washington University |access-date=28 February 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110629000010/http://www.gwu.edu/~memory/issues/museums/IwoJima.html |archive-date=29 June 2011 |url-status=live}}</ref>