Editing Battle of Denain (section)

===Beginning of the campaign===
{{Main|Bombardment of Arras}}
The Duke of Marlborough, having conquered Bouchain in the previous year, had left most of his troops to occupy the outermost border towns, so that the French would be prevented from building up lines to cover their remaining lands during the winter. This prompted a plan in [[The Hague]] to burn down a large hay storehouse, set up by the French within Arras. This would prevent Villars from getting his armies into the field early in the year and allow Eugene to lay siege to Arras or [[Cambrai]] without the threat of a French army. On 2 and 3 March 1712 an Allied army under [[Arnold van Keppel, 1st Earl of Albemarle|Arnold van Keppel, Earl of Albemarle]] closed in on Arras and [[Bombardment of Arras|bombarded the town]]. The action was a major success, but the advantage had to go entirely unused because the Emperor's troops arrived too late to the Allied army. Villars had by then already assembled his army in the plain between Cambrai and Arras.{{Sfn|Van Nimwegen|2020|pp=338–339}}{{Sfn|De Vryer|1737|pp=383–285}}

In June, Prince Eugene [[Siege of Le Quesnoy|besieged and captured Le Quesnoy]]. The Duke of Ormonde withdrew his forces during the siege, leading to a rift between the British and the rest of the Allies. In line with their prior agreement with the French, Ormonde removed his men towards [[Dunkirk]].<ref>Henderson pp.&nbsp;206–207</ref> However, the 25,000–30,000 German and [[Danish Auxiliary Corps in Anglo-Dutch service 1701–1714|Danish troops]] in British pay refused to leave and declared to the [[Field deputy (Dutch Republic)|Dutch field deputies]] that they would not leave the Allied army until they had received further orders from their respective sovereigns. The field deputies promised them that the Dutch Republic would pay them instead. Despite the absence of British troops, this meant that the Allies could still continue their offensive and Eugene and [[Claude Frédéric t'Serclaes, Count of Tilly|Count Tilly]] concluded the siege of Le Quesnoy successfully.{{Sfn|Van Nimwegen|2020|p=340}}

Once the Allies were assured of the support of the auxiliary troops that had previously served under the English, they decided the fortress of [[Landrecies]] would be the next target. Ordinarily, they would have first captured [[Valenciennes]] to secure their supply lines, ensuring a more secure siege of the city. However, the political situation left the Dutch-Imperial army with limited time to break through the French line of fortresses, compelling them to take greater risks. The Allied army's supply lines were exceedingly long and ran dangerously close to the French positions. Defending these extended lines required the army to be fragmented.{{Sfn|Wijn|1964|p=180}}

[[File:Slag bij Denain, 1712 Plan der Battailje by Denain (titel op object), BI-B-FM-090-156 (cropped).jpg|thumb|Dutch map showing the order of battle of the troops at the Battle of Denain on 24 July 1712. In the bottom right corner, a crowing French rooster stands atop the legend, beside a reclining Dutch lion and a bucking English unicorn.]]

The Dutch-Imperial army comprised 122 battalions and 273 squadrons. Although Villars initially commanded a larger force with 139 battalions and 249 squadrons, the situation shifted in favour of the Allies. As the defending party, Villars had to allocate 40 battalions to garrison various fortress towns. Additionally, to safeguard the interior from raids, like [[Grovestins's cavalry raid|the one of Grovestins]], he was compelled to detach 36 squadrons. [[Leopold I, Prince of Anhalt-Dessau|Prince of Anhalt-Dessau]] encircled Landrecies with 34 battalions and 30 squadrons, while the main Allied force was positioned between Fontaine au Bois and Thiant. Some troops were reserved for guarding the supply line that went from Landrecies to [[Marchiennes]].{{Sfn|Wijn|1964|p=180–181}}

A corps of 10 battalions and 23 squadrons under Albemarle was stationed at Denain, a fortified encampment, and not a fortress as was typically the case. It was only equipped with field fortifications that were no match for the overwhelming numerical superiority Albemarle would face. Due to the hard ground, it lacked high [[Rampart (fortification)|ramparts]] or a deep moat, had no outer ditch, and—perhaps most critically, despite what the painting by [[Jean Alaux]] suggest—was without a [[palisade]]. The retrenchment had been constructed to guard against [[sortie]]s from Valenciennes and against smaller enemy raids. It does not appear that Albemarle and Eugene had anticipated facing a large enemy force or an entire army. Only a single pontoon bridge connected Albemarle’s encampment to the right bank of the Scheldt. Since the English had taken their bridging equipment with them, Albemarle had to provide the materials for a second pontoon bridge to the main army. The wooden bridge he planned as a replacement was still unfinished when the French arrived.{{Sfn|Wijn|1964|p=192–193}}