Editing Battle of Cannae (section)

== Prelude ==
In the spring of 216&nbsp;BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae, in the Apulian plain, placing himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=75}} As Polybius noted, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district".<ref name="Fordham University website" /> The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of him.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=77}} After two days' march, they found him on the left bank of the river [[Aufidus]], and encamped {{cvt|8|km|sigfig=1}} away.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=77}}

Varro, in command on the first day, is presented by contemporary sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris, who was determined to defeat Hannibal. As the Romans approached Cannae, some of Hannibal's light infantry and cavalry ambushed them.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=80}} Varro repelled the attack and continued slowly on his way to Cannae.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=80}} This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps leading to overconfidence on Varro's part.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=81}}

Paullus was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry, in both quality and quantity. Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the river Aufidus, sending the remainder to fortify a position on the opposite side, {{cvt|2|km|mi}} away from the main camp.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=81}} The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy.<ref>Cottrell, Leonard. Enemy of Rome. Evans Bros, 1965, {{ISBN|0-237-44320-1}}. p. 94</ref><!-- Cottrell as a reliable secondary source is questionable, as he added fictitious and/or inflated events, accounts, and circumstances throughout this entire book, and his timeline maintains consistent inaccuracies. -->

The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second day (August 1) Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle, but Paullus refused.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=82}} When his request was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of water from the Aufidus to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications.{{sfn|Goldsworthy|2001|p=82}} According to Polybius,<ref name="Fordham University website" /> Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp.<ref>Caven, B. ''Punic Wars''. London: George Werdenfeld and Nicholson, 1980.</ref>

On the morning of the battle, as the forces drew up, a Carthaginian officer named [[Gisgo]] reportedly remarked to Hannibal that the size of the Roman army was astonishing. "There is one thing, Gisgo, yet more astonishing", Hannibal coolly replied, "which you take no notice of." He then explained, "In all those great numbers before us, there is not one man called Gisgo", provoking laughter that spread through the Carthaginian ranks.<ref>[[Plutarch]], ''[[Parallel Lives]]'', [[s:Lives (Dryden translation)/Fabius|"Fabius Maximus"]].</ref>

[[Appian]] and [[Livy]] say Hannibal sent a small contingent of 500–600 mercenaries to pretend to desert to the Roman side. Those men, [[Celtiberians]] according to Appian and [[Numidians]] according to Livy, handed their weapons to the Romans as a sign of good will while retaining hidden short swords in their clothes. Once the battle started, following Hannibal's plans, the mercenaries attacked, stealing weapons and shields from their victims and causing chaos and confusion in the Roman camp. However, the veracity of this part is disputed.{{sfn|Daly|2002|pp=43}}